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As an emerging approach towards organizational task solving, the crowdsourcing strategy is 
increasingly gaining management’s attention. Crowdsourcing refers to the act of leveraging 
the wisdom of crowds (solvers) for organizational tasks. As a relatively new phenomenon, 
many aspects of crowdsourcing remain to be understood. Under-explored areas include the 
antecedents of solvers’ and firms’ (seekers’) participation in crowdsourcing and how 
effectively the crowds learn as they participate. Since solvers and seekers serve as the 
foundation for the realization of the crowdsourcing strategy, their participation influences the 
value of crowdsourcing platforms. Crowdsourcing platforms need to understand how to 
encourage solvers’ and seekers’ participation and realize the benefits of the crowdsourcing 
strategy. Further, solvers’ performance determines what results seekers can obtain from the 
crowdsourcing and whether they are satisfied with them. Many crowdsourcing tasks such as 
logo design and software design tasks may need specialized skills to be tackled. Learning is a 
key way for solvers to pick up necessary skills and perform in the crowdsourcing. However, 
unclarity and disagreement exist on how effectively solvers learn to improve their 
performance in crowdsourcing activities and on the conditions under which the learning 
activities have an impact on solvers’ crowdsourcing performance. Overall, knowledge gaps 
exist in three aspects: (1) what factors determine seekers’ participation in crowdsourcing, (2) 
what factors determine solvers’ participation in crowdsourcing, and (3) the relationship 
between learning and performance and under what conditions solvers can effectively learn in 
order to perform.  
To address these knowledge gaps, this thesis conducted three studies, with the first 
focusing on seekers’ intention to crowdsource, the second on solvers’ participation in 
crowdsourcing, and the third on the performance effects of solvers’ learning respectively. 
Study 1 developed a model based on transaction cost theory, the resource based view, and the 
knowledge based view to examine drivers and inhibitors of firms’ intention to crowdsource. 
Study 2 developed a model based on prospect theory and previous related literatures to 
VI 
 
examine the influence of benefit and cost motivations on solvers’ participation in 
crowdsourcing as well as the moderating effects of trust. Study 3 developed a model based on 
performance outcome learning theory and previous related literatures to examine the 
influence of both vicarious and experiential learning on solvers’ performance in 
crowdsourcing. It also explored the moderating effects of environmental dynamism, 
competition intensity, and prior experience on solvers’ performance. 
The three models were tested through survey (and archival) data collected from 
TaskCN, a popular crowdsourcing website in China. Partial Least Squares was used to 
analyze the data and test the hypotheses. Study 1 found that cost reduction, access to 
specialized skills, and brand visibility positively affect firms’ intention to crowdsource, while 
proposal evaluation cost and codification cost reduce firms’ intention to crowdsource. Study 
2 found that monetary reward, skill enhancement, work autonomy, and enjoyment positively 
affect solvers’ participation in crowdsourcing, while cognitive effort deters solvers from 
participating in crowdsourcing. Further, trust was found to negatively moderate the 
relationship between cognitive effort and solvers’ participation in crowdsourcing and the 
relationship between loss of knowledge power and solvers’ participation in crowdsourcing. 
Study 3 found that vicarious learning and experiential learning positively affect solvers’ 
performance in crowdsourcing. Further, prior experience was found to positively moderate 
the influence of vicarious learning and experiential learning on solvers’ performance in 
crowdsourcing. Environmental dynamism was found to positively moderate the influence of 
vicarious learning on their performance but negatively moderate the influence of experiential 
learning on their performance. In addition, competition intensity was found to negatively 
moderate the relationship between vicarious learning and solvers’ performance in 
crowdsourcing. The theoretical contributions, practical implications, and future research 
directions are discussed separately for each study. The thesis concludes by summarizing the 
findings and implications of the three studies.  
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  INTRODUCTION 
 
The interconnectivity and interactivity afforded through Internet-based technologies have 
transformed how organizational tasks are being completed (Prahalad and Ramaswamy 2004; 
Zwass 2010). These technologies enable people from around the world to work on tasks from 
different organizations (Chesbrough 2003; Zwass 2010). At the same time, in the world of 
widely distributed knowledge, organizations realize that they cannot rely only on internal 
resources to compete (Chesbrough 2003; Keupp and Gassamann 2009). In order to sustain 
competitive advantage, they are increasingly adopting the paradigm of open innovation, i.e., 
tapping on external knowledge sources for product or service innovation tasks (Keupp and 
Gassmann 2009; Laursen and Salter 2006).  
As the paradigm of open innovation acquires momentum, the importance of leveraging 
the wisdom of crowds to solve a variety of problems is increasingly gaining management’s 
attention (Howe 2008; Zwass 2010). Organizations are starting to tap into the wisdom of crowds 
to obtain aggregate information about products/services, undertake tedious work, collect novel 
ideas, and promote brand awareness (Surowiecki 2004; Schulze et al. 2011). Such a phenomenon 
is called crowdsourcing, which is defined as the act of recruiting a large group of undefined 
individuals (solvers) for solutions to organizational problems through Internet-based platforms 
(Howe 2008). Stakeholders in crowdsourcing include firms (usually called seekers) who post 
problems online, the crowds or individual knowledge workers (usually called solvers) that offer 




The definition of crowdsourcing suggests that crowdsourcing shares similarity with 
outsourcing, as both employ external talents to work on organizational tasks (Schenk and 
Guittard 2009). Besides, for both strategies, uncertainties exist in the process and the final 
outcomes. However, several characteristics differentiate crowdsourcing from outsourcing. First, 
crowdsourcing aims to recruit undefined individuals to work on tasks rather than to recruit 
identified employees or companies (Howe 2008). Unlike in outsourcing, all the solvers in the 
crowdsourcing platform are invited to solve the problems through an open call. Second, the 
quality of solutions obtained from crowdsourcing usually cannot be guaranteed (Roman 2009). 
Not all solvers in the crowdsourcing platforms are specialized in a particular area and their 
solutions even if they are novel and valuable may be infeasible to implement (Poetz and Schreier 
2012). Third, in general, multiple solution providers simultaneously work on the same task in 
crowdsourcing while this is not the case in outsourcing. Firms have more choices in 
crowdsourcing than in outsourcing. Usually, firms need to deploy internal employees to select 
the best solutions from crowdsourcing (Sieg et al. 2010). Overall, the differences indicate that as 
a new phenomenon, crowdsourcing requires investigation in its own right.  
1.1 Benefits of Crowdsourcing 
Crowdsourcing can offer various benefits to organizations. We elaborate on the following 
benefits of crowdsourcing mentioned in the past literature, i.e., accessing heterogeneous valuable 
knowledge, reducing the cost of task execution, externalizing the risk of failure, and remaining 
specialized in their core areas (Doan et al. 2011; Heeks 2010; Howe 2008; Kittur 2010; 
Leimeister et al. 2009).  
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First, crowdsourcing allows companies to leverage capabilities and skills that are 
unavailable within the firm (Kittur 2010). Through crowdsourcing, companies can invite and 
connect to a large volume of the crowds to work on organizational tasks (Howe 2008). The 
crowds are likely to have specialized knowledge about their own problems regarding existing 
products or services (Brabham 2008, 2010). Through crowdsourcing, they are given an 
opportunity to express their reactions to and experience with existing product or services and 
even propose their requirements for further improvement (von Hippel 2001; Zwass 2010). With 
their skills and unique needs information, the crowds may be able to provide novel and useful 
solutions for the crowdsourced tasks (Poetz and Schreier 2012). Further, the crowds may even be 
able to design ahead-of-trend products or services of great commercial potential in the market 
(Franke et al. 2006; Huston and Sakkab 2006). Besides, crowdsourcing can help organizations 
collect discrete information from individuals, such as information about customer preferences, 
and combine it in a useful way (Morgan and Wong 2010). 
Second, companies can obtain solutions to their problems at a relatively lower cost 
through crowdsourcing than solving them internally (Horton and Chilton 2010; Kaufman et al. 
2011). For example, on average, it only costs $1.38/hour to engage the crowd in laborious work 
in Amazon Mechanical Turk (Horton and Chilton 2010). Some crowds may even work for free if 
the tasks provide fun and enjoyment (Brabham 2010). For example, in Galaxyzoo.org, the 
crowds find it engaging enough to label the galaxy images for free. Thus, crowdsourcing internal 
tasks could be a viable way for organizations to reduce costs of obtaining solutions and increase 
profits (Zwass 2010). Further, by inviting a large number of solvers to participate, companies can 
complete the tasks more quickly (Morgan and Wong 2010). For instance, in the case of image 
labeling or audio transcription tasks, crowdsourcing enables companies to solve the tasks in a 
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shorter time than performing them internally (Schenk and Guittard 2011). Similarly, in Galaxy 
Zoo, it would take researchers years to process the photographs while it is estimated that with 
20,000 to 30,000 people giving their time to classify the galaxies, the process could be completed 
in one month (McGourty 2007). In the case of new product or service development tasks, 
crowdsourcing may help companies quickly brainstorm new possibilities that may fall outside 
the companies’ operation and routines. This could enable companies to shorten innovation life 
cycles and enhance organizational competitive advantage through increasing the speed to market 
of new products or services (Chesbrough 2003).  
Third, through crowdsourcing, companies can externalize the risk of problem solving and 
remain specialized in their core areas (Howe 2006; Roman 2009). Take logo design for example. 
Traditionally, firms will require employees in the sales or marketing department to generate 
ideas and prototypes of the logos to be used for new products or services. Even if managers are 
not satisfied with the designs, they still need to pay these employees and cover other costs. In 
contrast, through crowdsourcing, firms can invite the crowd to participate in logo design and 
choose from several various logos proposed by solvers. They can refuse to pay if they are not 
satisfied with the solutions (Howe 2008). This will allow them to externalize the risk of problem 
solving as compared to deploying employees for the task. At the same time, the crowdsourcing 
strategy will allow the company to remain specialized in its core areas instead of hiring 
specialists for peripheral or infrequent tasks.  
1.2 Challenges of Crowdsourcing 
Despite the potential benefits of crowdsourcing, there are challenges for seekers and solvers to 
adopt this approach. First, firms/seekers encounter the issues of selecting the right 
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problems/tasks for crowdsourcing and of appropriately formulating them so as to obtain novel 
and satisfactory solutions (Doan et al. 2011; Sieg et al. 2010). Ambiguously defined tasks will 
mislead solvers and thus will not receive the expected solutions (Doan et al. 2011). Also, highly 
complex tasks may not be possible to solve within the timeframe of online contests (Yang et al. 
2009). Further, crowdsourcing requires firms’ employees to work with crowdsourcing websites 
for clarifying ambiguities in task requirements, providing feedback for solvers’ proposal, and 
selecting the final solutions (Sieg et al. 2010), which can involve considerable time and effort. 
For certain tasks, it is costly to transfer knowledge from “solvers” to “seekers”, i.e., for the latter 
to interpret, acquire, and assimilate the knowledge (Burger-Helmchen and Penin 2010). These 
activities may raise a large cost for seekers contrary to the purpose of crowdsourcing, i.e., 
lowering the cost of solving organizational problems. As a result of such issues, firms are 
hesitating about whether to crowdsource their tasks. 
Second, how to encourage solvers’ participation is a problem of interest to both 
researchers and practitioners (Terwiesch and Ulrich 2009; Howe 2008). Attracting a large pool 
of solvers to participate in a contest is necessary to improve the outcomes for the proposed tasks 
(Leimeister et al. 2009; Boudreau et al. 2011), because more solvers can increase the quantity 
and diversity of proposals. Diverse proposals can add significantly to the generation of 
exceptional innovative ideas (Terwiesch and Ulrich 2009), rendering firms a higher chance to 
obtain viable solutions to their problems (Boudreau et al. 2011). However, significant challenges 
rise in the process of publicizing a crowdsourcing platform and establishing a network of solvers 
(Greengard 2011). In particular, participants are motivated by varied incentives (Kaufman et al. 
2011; Yang et al. 2009). Further, the influences of costs raised during crowdsourcing remain 
unclear. Inability to provide what the crowd wants for solving tasks limits the performance of 
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crowdsourcing (Howe 2008). Thus, seekers and crowdsourcing websites need to understand 
what motivates or inhibits solvers from participating in crowdsourcing.  
Third, a large number of talented solvers’ participation in problem solving is in essence 
the asset for crowdsourcing platforms to create value (Leimeister et al. 2009; Boudreau et al. 
2011). Solvers’ performance in crowdsourcing determines the value that firms obtain and 
whether they are satisfied with the results. However, firms are questioning whether solvers in 
crowdsourcing websites have the capability to solve their problems (Doan et al. 2011). Some 
firms consider the crowd as mobs rather than experts in solving their problems (Roman 2009). In 
general, seeker firms face significant uncertainty regarding the quality of proposed solutions 
obtained from crowdsourcing. In light of uncertainty, they are concerned about the sunk costs of 
crowdsourcing, such as the time and effort put into defining and clarifying task requirements and 
selecting solutions from proposals. Thus, organizations may hesitate to participate in 
crowdsourcing. 
To perform well and create value for seekers in crowdsourcing, solvers may be required 
to have specialized skills or knowledge to solve organizational tasks (Doan et al. 2011; 
Greengard 2011). Sometimes, solvers may not have the required skills and knowledge to start 
with. Learning is a viable approach for solvers to pick up necessary knowledge or skills to start 
with. However, learning can be arduous and its effectiveness depends on individual and 
environmental factors (Kankanhalli et al. 2012). Thus, seekers, solvers, and crowdsourcing 
platforms need to understand how solvers’ learning affects performance. 
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1.3 Literature Gaps and Research Questions 
1.3.1 Seeker’s Intention to Crowdsource 
With regard to seekers’ participation, prior research has begun to investigate what motivates 
firms to crowdsource tasks (e.g., Schenk and Guittard 2009; Burger-Helmchen and Penin 2010). 
In a conceptual paper, Schenk and Guittard (2009) proposed that crowdsourcing enables firms to 
mobilize external competencies for internal tasks with a lower cost. Theoretically, Burger-
Helmchen and Penin (2010) proposed that solution measurability could be a driver for firms to 
crowdsource inventive activities. Through a case study of several crowdsourcing websites, Kittur 
(2010) found that crowdsourcing is a less expensive way for firms to solve problems and obtain 
creative solutions.  
However, prior studies on seekers’ participation in crowdsourcing are mainly conceptual 
investigations (e.g., Schenk and Guittard 2009; Burger-Helmchen and Penin 2010) or case 
studies (e.g., Kittur 2010; Yang et al. 2008). Few studies have empirically investigated the 
antecedents of seekers’ participation in crowdsourcing. Thus, theoretically-driven empirical 
studies are needed to examine the antecedents of seeker firms’ participation in crowdsourcing.  
1.3.2 Solver’s Participation in Crowdsourcing 
For solvers’ participation in crowdsourcing, prior research has attempted to investigate the 
phenomenon either conceptually (e.g., Terwiesch and Xu 2008), or empirically (e.g., Zheng et al. 
2011). These studies focused on the influences of benefit factors (extrinsic or intrinsic 
motivations) on solvers’ intention to participate in crowdsourcing. For example, Zheng et al. 
(2011) found that firm recognition and intrinsic motivation affect solvers’ intention to participate 
in crowdsourcing. However, limited theoretically-driven empirical research has systematically 
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investigated the influence of these benefit factors on solvers’ actual participation in 
crowdsourcing.  
Additionally, participation in crowdsourcing will incur the cost of spending time and 
effort in understanding the problems and proposing solutions. Solvers may encounter the risks of 
not getting payment for their effort and revealing their ideas to others (Allio 2004; Greenberg 
2011). These costs and risk concerns may deter them from participating in crowdsourcing. 
However, there is a lack of research examining the influence of cost factors on solvers’ 
participation.  
Further, previous literature suggests that in the face of uncertainty and risk, trust can 
mitigate cost concerns (e.g., Chiles and McMackin 1996) and may moderate the relationship 
between cost concerns and behavior (e.g., Noorderhaven 1996). However, the moderating role of 
trust on solvers’ participation in crowdsourcing has yet to be examined. Thus, combined together, 
there is a need to understand the influences of benefits and cost factors as well as trust on solvers’ 
participation in crowdsourcing.  
1.3.3 Solver’s Learning in Crowdsourcing 
Many crowdsourced tasks may need creativity and skills to be tackled (Bullinger et al. 2010). 
Solvers need to learn the skills and to contribute their own distinctive perspectives. Some 
researchers suggest that through participating in crowdsourcing, solvers will learn new skills and 
become experts (e.g., Brabham 2008, 2010; Kaufman et al. 2011; Leimeister et al. 2009) while 
others question this argument (e.g., Hallerstede and Bullinger 2010; Roman 2009). For example, 
Yang et al. (2008) found that solvers do learn to submit later and to choose less popular tasks and 
tasks with higher winning odds through analyzing the field data from TaskCN. However, they 
also found a paradoxical result that solvers fail to improve their performance by learning. In 
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Archak and Ghose (2010)’s study of online crowdsourcing contests in ToperCoder.com, solvers 
were found to learn by doing and take into account the impact of skills they can learn now on 
their future performance.   
As discussed above, the results in previous literature are mixed. So far, it is unclear if 
solvers’ learning will improve their performance during the process of crowdsourcing. Further, 
little understanding exists on the contingencies under which learning effectively affects solvers’ 
performance in the context of crowdsourcing. Thus, research is needed to examine how 
effectively solvers learn to improve their performance in crowdsourcing and the contingencies of 
their learning effectiveness. 
1.3.4 Research Questions 
In order to address these knowledge gaps, this thesis aims to address the following research 
questions:  
(1) What drives firms to crowdsource internal tasks?  
(2) What drives solvers to participate in crowdsourcing?  
(3) How effectively solvers learn to perform in crowdsourcing and under what conditions 
solvers’ learning can effectively improve their performance in crowdsourcing?  
This thesis comprises three essays to answer the three research questions respectively. 
First, based on transaction cost theory, the resource based view, and the knowledge based view, 
it developed a model to explain why firms crowdsource internal tasks. Second, based on prospect 
theory, it developed the second model to explain solvers’ participation in crowdsourcing. Third, 
based on the theory of performance outcome learning, it constructed the third model to explain 
the impact of solvers’ learning in crowdsourcing on their performance. 
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1.4 Expected Contributions 
The thesis is expected to contribute to the literature in the following ways. First, building on past 
literature, this thesis will identify the antecedents of seekers’ intention to crowdsource. This will 
contribute to the literature on what are the important factors that drive seekers’ intention to 
participate in crowdsourcing based on established theories. This attempts to address the 
knowledge gap of why firms leverage crowdsourcing approaches to address organizational tasks.  
Second, this thesis should contribute to previous literature on crowdsourcing by adopting 
a new theoretical lens (prospect theory) to analyze solvers’ actual participation in crowdsourcing. 
This theoretical lens can provide new insights on the phenomenon of crowdsourcing and 
improve our understanding of how solvers make decisions on their participation in 
crowdsourcing. Further, it will also extend previous literature by exploring and empirically 
testing the antecedents of solvers’ actual participation in crowdsourcing rather than those of the 
intention to crowdsource as studied in previous literature. This aims to address the knowledge 
gap of how crowdsourcing platforms can motivate and establish a network of solvers. 
Third, this thesis aims to explore how effectively solvers will learn to perform tasks in 
crowdsourcing and the contingencies of the learning effects on performance. Specifically, it will 
explore the influences of experiential learning and vicarious learning on solvers’ performance. 
This will inform the mechanisms through which solvers can improve their performance in 
crowdsourcing websites. Also, it will explore the contingencies that influence the effects of 
solvers’ learning on performance. In this manner, this thesis will contribute to previous literature 
by validating how effectively solvers learn and under what conditions they can perform better.  
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Fourth, this thesis may serve to enrich the currently limited literature and understanding 
on crowdsourcing in the IS field; thereby paving the way for future research in this area. It will 
extend the transaction cost theory, the resource based view, the knowledge based view, prospect 
theory, and performance based learning theory by applying and refining them in the context of 
crowdsourcing. Specifically, it will contribute to prospect theory by extending and testing its 
applicability to the context of crowdsourcing. Further, it will add to transaction cost theory and 
the knowledge based view by integrating them and applying them in the context of seekers’ 
decision to crowdsource. Additionally, it will contribute to the performance outcome learning 
theory by exploring the effectiveness of experiential and vicarious learning through studying 
their relationships with solvers’ performance in crowdsourcing. It will also extend the 
performance outcome learning theory by exploring the contingencies of the relationship between 
learning and performance. 
Apart from its theoretical contributions, the thesis is also expected to contribute to the 
practice by providing practitioners with insights on how to motivate the participation of solvers 
and seekers in crowdsourcing activities and hence realize the value of crowdsourcing. The 
motivating factors and incentives investigated in this thesis can help crowdsourcing platforms 
better manage the transactions between solvers and seekers. Besides the incentives, this thesis 
also provides suggestions on the support that crowdsourcing platforms can provide to reduce the 
costs for both solvers’ and seekers’ participation in crowdsourcing and hence sustain their 
competitive advantage in the market.  
Further, this thesis can provide insights on how crowdsourcing platforms should 
encourage solvers to learn and perform better. Through encouraging solvers to perform better, 
crowdsourcing platforms can improve the quality of solutions provided and hence the 
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satisfaction of seekers. This will help enhance the benefits obtained from a crowdsourcing 
platform. Overall, this thesis aims to provide suggestions to practitioners regarding the desired 
factors for crowdsourcing success and what aspects should be improved to capture the value of a 
crowdsourcing strategy.  
1.5 Thesis Organization 
This opening chapter has provided an overview of the thesis and the general motivations based 
on the current research gaps. It highlights the importance of seekers’ and solvers’ participation, 
and solvers’ learning for crowdsourcing, and raises the research questions that will be addressed 
in the studies as well as the potential contributions. The subsequent chapters of the thesis are 
organized as follows.  
Chapter 2 describes Study 1 in detail. It first reviews theories that could explain firms’ 
intention to crowdsource, identifies relevant constructs from previous literature, and adapts these 
constructs to the context of this study. As argued that crowdsourcing shares similarity with 
outsourcing, it borrows from IT outsourcing literature and modifies concepts to explain firms’ 
crowdsourcing behaviors. It then develops the research model and hypothesis based on 
transaction cost theory, the resource based view, and the knowledge based view. The research 
model is tested through survey data collected from TaskCN. The implications and limitations of 
Study 1 are then reported. 
Chapter 3 describes Study 2 in detail. It reviews the previous crowdsourcing literature on 
solvers’ participation, identifies the literature gaps, and introduces prospect theory. It then 
presents the hypotheses on solvers’ participation in crowdsourcing. Survey and archival data are 
used to test the hypotheses. Discussions of the implications and limitations of Study 2 follow. 
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Chapter 4 describes Study 3 in detail. It reviews literature on solvers’ learning in 
crowdsourcing to position our study and identifies the gaps our study seeks to address. It then 
describes the performance outcome learning theory and applies it to explain the impacts of 
vicarious learning and experiential learning on solvers’ performance in crowdsourcing. The 
contingencies of learning effectiveness are also identified and hypothesized in the research 
model. Survey and archival data are used to test the hypotheses. Implications and limitations of 
the study are then reported. 





CHAPTER 2    
STUDY 1: INVESTIGATING FIRMS’ INTENTION TO 
CROWDSOURCE ORGANIZATIONAL TASKS 
 
2.1 Introduction 
With the enablement of Internet based technologies, crowdsourcing is increasingly gaining 
momentum for management (Bullinger et al. 2010; Heeks 2010). Evidence of this trend can be 
seen from the emergence of crowdsourcing platforms, such as Amazon Mechanical Turk, 
InnoCentive, and TaskCN (Kaufman et al. 2011; Yang et al. 2009). For example, Amazon 
Mechanical Turk hosts more than 100,000 tasks every day
1
. Two other platforms, CrowdFlower 
and CloudCrowd, have received to the order of $5 Million venture funding respectively 
(Techcrunch 2010a, 2010b). Even established market leaders such as Google and Procter & 
Gamble have recognized the potential of crowdsourcing. In 2008, Google funded a $10 Million 
crowdsourcing project (Project 10^100) that called for ideas from the crowd to change the world 
(Yang et al. 2010). P&G launched a “Connect and Develop” program for its innovation tasks in 
2000. Since then, it has been relying on external knowledge sources for more than 50% of its 
innovation projects (Huston and Sakkab 2006). 
However, firms (seekers) encounter challenges in carrying out crowdsourcing activities. 
They face the issues of selecting the right problems/tasks for crowdsourcing and of appropriately 






 All measures were translated into Chinese by the author, then back translated into English by an independent 
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formulating them so as to obtain satisfactory solutions (Doan et al. 2011; Sieg et al. 2010). One 
reason for the issues lies in ambiguously defined tasks which will mislead solvers, resulting in 
seeker firms receiving unsatisfactory solutions (Doan et al. 2011). Additionally, crowdsourcing 
necessitates firms’ employees to work with crowdsourcing platforms for clarifying the 
ambiguities in task requirements, providing feedback for further improvement of solvers’ 
proposal, and selecting the final solutions (Sieg et al. 2010). For certain tasks, it is costly to 
transfer knowledge from “solvers” to “seeker firms”, and to allow the latter to interpret, acquire, 
and assimilate the knowledge (Burger-Helmchen and Penin 2010). These activities may raise a 
large cost for seekers contrary to the purpose of crowdsourcing, i.e., lowering the cost of solving 
organizational tasks. As a result of such issues, firms are hesitating on whether to crowdsource 
their tasks. 
Prior research has begun to investigate what motivates firms to crowdsource tasks (e.g., 
Schenk and Guittard 2011; Burger-Helmchen and Penin 2010). In a conceptual paper, Schenk 
and Guittard (2011) proposed that crowdsourcing enables firms to mobilize external 
competencies for internal tasks with a lower cost. Theoretically, Burger-Helmchen and Penin 
(2010) proposed that solution measurability could be a driver for firms to crowdsource inventive 
activities. Through a case study of several crowdsourcing platforms, Kittur (2010) found that 
crowdsourcing is an inexpensive way to solve problems and a viable approach to obtain creative 
solutions. However, prior studies on seekers’ crowdsourcing behavior are mainly based on 
conceptual investigations (e.g., Schenk and Guittard 2011; Burger-Helmchen and Penin 2010), 
or case studies (e.g., Kittur 2010; Yang et al. 2008) on examining the influences of 
crowdsourcing benefits on seekers’ participation. There is an absence of theoretically-driven 
empirical research investigating the antecedents of seeker firms’ participation in crowdsourcing.  
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Previous literature has noted the similarity between crowdsourcing and outsourcing, as 
both employ external talents to work on organizational tasks (Schenk and Guittard 2011). 
Besides, for both strategies, uncertainties exist in the process and the final outcomes. However, 
several characteristics differentiate crowdsourcing from outsourcing. First, crowdsourcing aims 
to recruit undefined individuals to work on tasks rather than to recruit identified employees or 
companies (Howe 2008). Unlike in outsourcing, all solvers in the crowdsourcing platform are 
invited to solve problems through an open call. Second, the quality of solutions obtained from 
crowdsourcing cannot be guaranteed (Roman 2009). Solvers in the crowdsourcing platforms may 
not be specialized in a particular area and some solutions even if novel and valuable may be 
difficult to implement (Poetz and Schreier 2012). Third, in general, multiple solution providers 
simultaneously work on the same task in crowdsourcing while not in outsourcing. Firms have 
more choices of solutions in crowdsourcing. In light of choices, firms need to deploy internal 
employees to select the best solution from crowdsourcing (Sieg et al. 2010). Overall, the 
differences indicate that as a new phenomenon, crowdsourcing requires investigation in its own 
right. However, as discussed above, there is a lack of theoretically-grounded empirical research 
on what motivates firms to crowdsource. 
This paper aims to address the knowledge gap by developing a model to answer the 
following research question: what drives firms to crowdsource internal tasks? Drawing on the 
resource based view, the knowledge based view and transaction cost theory, this study developed 
a model to explain seeker firms’ intention to crowdsource. Based on these theories and previous 
related literature, it expects that cost reduction, brand visibility, access to specialized skills, and 
solution diversity will enhance firms’ intention to crowdsource while specification cost, 
codification cost, and proposal evaluation cost will reduce firms’ intention to crowdsource. The 
17 
 
model is tested through a survey of seeker firms in TaskCN, a large crowdsourcing platform in 
China. This study is expected to contribute to research by modeling and testing the antecedents 
of seekers’ intention to crowdsource. Also, it is expected to provide insights to practitioners on 
the determinants of firms’ decision to crowdsource internal tasks. 
2.2 Conceptual Background 
This section reviews theories that could explain firms’ intention to crowdsource, identifies 
relevant constructs from theories and previous related literature, and adapts these constructs to 
the context of this study.  
Since crowdsourcing shares similarity with outsourcing, this study borrows from theories 
applied in outsourcing literature and adapts concepts to explain firms’ crowdsourcing behavior. 
In the outsourcing literature, three broad perspectives are commonly used by researchers to 
predict the determinants of outsourcing, i.e., strategic, economic, and relational perspectives 
(Heng et al. 2009). The strategic perspective is concerned about what strategy organizations 
formulate for outsourcing and how they use the strategy to obtain a desirable performance. It 
includes the resource based view, the knowledge based view, resource-dependency theory, firm 
strategy theory, and game theory. The economic perspective is concerned about how 
organizations achieve a desirable performance in outsourcing in an efficient way. It includes 
transaction cost theory, agency theory, and incomplete contract theory. The relational perspective 
is concerned about how organizations rely on the relation with external knowledge sources to 
perform under the assumption of establishing a long-term relationship. It includes 




In the context of crowdsourcing, the relationship between solvers and seekers is 
transaction-based and short term (Yang et al. 2008; Sun et al. 2012). Therefore, the relational 
perspective may not be applicable in this context. Further, previous literature suggests that 
crowdsourcing is a strategic as well as an economic choice for organizations (e.g., Zwass 2010). 
Firms need to weigh the strategic and economic benefits against the costs before they decide to 
adopt crowdsourcing activities. Thus, the strategic perspective and economic perspective are 
relevant for this study. In particular, crowdsourcing refers to the notion of leveraging the crowd 
to solve organizational problems rather than solving them internally (Howe 2008). Firms need to 
decide whether to crowdsource or not (buy vs. make). Thus, among above theories in the 
economic perspective, transaction cost theory better fits the context of this study since it is 
concerned about the decisions of whether to buy particular products/services from external 
sources or make them internally (Williamson 1981).  
Also, crowdsourcing is a channel for firms to collect novel and effective solutions from 
the crowd (Schenk and Guittard 2011; Burger-Helmchen and Penin 2010). Leimeister et al. 
(2009) suggested that firms can access internally unavailable expertise through crowdsourcing. 
Similarly, Schenk and Guittard (2011) argued that firms adopt the crowdsourcing strategy 
because they can obtain knowledge or skills that are internally unavailable. Given the 
characteristics of crowdsourcing, both the resource based view and the knowledge based view 
are appropriate theoretical lenses to understand crowdsourcing since both posit that a firm will 
look to external sources for resources that are lacking inside (Barney 1991; Grant 1996). As 
complementary lenses (Dibbern et al. 2008), the knowledge based view (KBV) and the resource 
based view (RBV) together with transaction cost theory are used here to explain seekers’ 
participation in crowdsourcing. We elaborate the theories next. 
19 
 
2.2.1 Transaction Cost Theory 
Transaction cost theory (TCT), initially developed by Coase (1937) and extended by Williamson 
(1981, 1985), is mainly used to identify the conditions under which firms will decide whether to 
buy or make particular products or services. It argues that these decisions are made by balancing 
two types of costs to achieve efficiency, which is important for organizations to sustain 
competitive advantage in the market (Williamson 1985). The two costs considered are 
production costs and transaction costs. Production cost is the cost required to make the product 
or to provide the service, such as the cost of capital, labor, and materials. Transaction cost 
includes the time, effort, and money spent in planning, information communication, process 
monitoring, and performance evaluation. TCT proposes that firms should outsource when 
internal production presents comparative cost disadvantages (high internal production cost), but 
should exit when transaction costs exceed production savings (Liang and Huang 1998).  
Transaction costs are proposed to depend on various contingencies, such as asset 
specificity and uncertainty (Liang and Huang 1998; Williamson 1981). Asset specificity refers to 
the value of an asset attached to a particular transaction that it supports (Williamson 1985). The 
party who has invested in the asset will incur a loss if the party who has not invested withdraws 
from the transaction. Transactions that are supported by high asset specificity should be 
governed by hierarchical structures (make internally), whereas transactions that require only 
general-purpose investments will be efficiently conducted over markets (buy in). Uncertainty 
refers to the cost associated with unexpected outcomes and information asymmetry (Liang and 
Huang 1998). Greater uncertainty of a transaction generally implies a higher transaction cost, 
indicating that the transaction should be conducted internally. This has been supported by 
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empirical findings that projects with less uncertainty or more external performance information 
will be outsourced (e.g., Goo et al. 2007; Mann et al. 2011). 
TCT has been widely applied to study outsourcing in information systems (IS) literature 
(Dibbern et al. 2004). For example, based on TCT, Dibbern et al. (2008) suggest that transaction 
costs in outsourcing can arise for a number of activities and affect firms’ outsourcing behaviors. 
In the onshore transition phase, the cost associated with the process of explaining and defining 
what firms need (specification cost) and the cost associated with the description or codification 
of the specific structure, data, and algorithm for the systems outsourced (design cost) will arise 
and determine firms’ outsourcing decision. In the delivery phase, costs for ensuring that the 
vendor acts and performs toward the desired objectives of the client (control cost) arise as one of 
the important factors determining firms’ decision of IT outsourcing. In Jayatilaka et al. (2003)’s 
case study of ASP choice, economic cost is found to determine firms’ ASP choice. In Dhar and 
Balakrishnan (2006)’s case study of an IT outsourcing project, lower cost is listed as an 
important driver of the IT outsourcing decision. Based on TCT, Qi and Chau (2012)’s case study 
suggests that control costs such as contractual complexity and contract management will 
influence IT outsourcing success. Overall, we summarize the antecedents of an IT outsourcing 
decision based on TCT in Table 2.1. 
Table 2.1. Antecedents of Crowdsourcing Intention Derived from TCT 
Constructs (IT 
Outsourcing) 





Jayatilaka et al. (2003); Heng et 
al. (2009) 




Sommerville (2004); Dibbern et 
al. (2008) 
Specification Cost Yang et al. (2009) 
Design Cost Dibbern et al. (2008) Codification Cost Yang et al. (2009); 
Doan et al. (2011) 
Control Cost  Dhar and Balakrishnan (2006); Qi 
and Chau (2012) 
Proposal Evaluation Cost Yang et al. (2008); 
Doan et al. (2011) 
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In the context of crowdsourcing, seeker firms are also concerned about the costs of 
participation (Leimeister et al. 2009). When making decisions about crowdsourcing, firms will 
consider the efficiency of crowdsourcing, i.e., the production cost and transaction cost incurred 
through crowdsourcing. We mapped the costs identified in the outsourcing context to the context 
of our study in Table 2.1. Specifically, in the context of crowdsourcing, the price paid for 
crowdsourcing is considered as a production cost by firms. Overall, firms want to see if 
crowdsourcing results in cost reduction (Terwiesch and Xu 2008). Therefore, we include cost 
reduction in our model. Also, other factors incur transaction costs during crowdsourcing, i.e., 
asset specificity and uncertainty. In the context of crowdsourcing, the asset specificity is 
demonstrated in the form of specification cost and codification cost. For example, firms need to 
spend time in explaining and defining contextual knowledge related to the tasks (specification 
cost) and effort in codifying the task requirements (codification cost) (Yang et al. 2009). Since 
uncertainty exists on the quality of solutions obtained from crowdsourcing (Roman 2009), firms 
may need to spend time and effort in evaluating the proposals from solvers and selecting the 
winners (proposal evaluation cost) (Yang et al. 2008). Therefore, as per transaction cost theory 
and the related literature, we include cost reduction, specification cost, codification cost, and 
proposal evaluation cost as the antecedents of firms’ intention to crowdsource in our model. 
While TCT is theoretically and empirically useful, it also received criticisms from 
strategic management researchers (Foss and Klein 2010). One of the salient criticisms of TCT is 
that it neglects differential capabilities of firms (i.e., firm heterogeneity) (Kogut and Zander 
1992). Under the same assumption with TCT (i.e., bounded rationality), both the KBV and RBV 
argue that differential capabilities (resources) give rise to different production costs, and that 
such cost differences influence firms’ make or buy decision. Thus, firms may internalise 
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activities because they can carry out these activities in a more production (not transaction) cost-
efficient way than other firms are capable of (Foss and Klein 2010). In this way, the RBV and 
KBV complement TCT in explaining firms’ make or buy decision (Dibbern et al. 2008). 
Therefore, we employ TCT together with the resource/knowledge based view to explain seeker 
firms’ intention to crowdsource in our model. The resource based view and knowledge based 
view are introduced next. 
2.2.2 Resource Based View and Knowledge Based View 
The resource based view (RBV) argues that resources determine firm performance and 
competitive advantage in the market (Barney 1991; Penrose 1959). According to Barney (1991), 
resources include assets, capabilities, processes, firm attributes, information, and knowledge that 
can contribute to the enhancement of the efficiency and effectiveness of value creating strategies. 
Rare and valuable resources can create competitive advantage for firms. Sustained competitive 
advantage can only be achieved when firms are able to protect against resource imitation, 
transfer, or substitution.  
The value creation capability of different resources affects the boundary decisions of a 
firm (Barney 1999). Firms will try to retain in-house activities that take advantage of their 
strategic resources. Outsourcing these resources would deprive organizations of their competitive 
advantage and subsequent abnormal returns (Duncan 1998). Where resources are not strategic, 
however, they will look to outsource them. The RBV has been applied to study outsourcing 
decision in previous literature (e.g., Alvarez-Suescun 2007; Roy and Aubert 2002).  
In the context of our study, we expect that firms will crowdsource if they can obtain 
strategic resources from crowdsourcing platforms. Past literature suggests one unique factor that 
may determine firms’ decision about crowdsourcing, i.e., brand visibility (Yang et al. 2008). 
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Yang et al. (2008) suggested that firms may be able to use the crowdsourcing website as a 
platform to promote the awareness of their brand (brand visibility). Further, Agerfalk and 
Fitzgerald (2008) suggested that open sourcing (crowdsourcing) can increase customers’ 
familiarity with the firm’s brand and lead them to accept the brand. Besides, there are other 
knowledge-based resources that can be accessed through crowdsourcing, which can be explained 
by the knowledge based view. 
The knowledge based view (KBV) is a theoretical perspective originating from the 
resource based view (Grant 1996). It argues that the competitive advantage of a firm lies in the 
capability of creating, storing, integrating, and applying knowledge (Barney 1991; Penrose 1959). 
Thus, firms that are better at utilizing their knowledge for value creation will achieve 
competitive advantage (Grant 1996).  
KBV also posits that firms will search for required knowledge from external sources if it 
is lacking inside (Grant 1996). This is because, based on the assumption of bounded rationality, 
cognitive limitations prohibit firms from possessing identical stocks of knowledge (Conner and 
Prahalad 1996). Since each organization has its unique set of human resources, it follows that 
each firm possesses a unique repository of knowledge, thus leading to knowledge asymmetry 
among firms (Grover et al. 1994). Accordingly, there are times when firms lack necessary 
knowledge to solve particular problems (Chesbrough 2003; Conner and Prahalad 1996). 
Therefore, acquiring the knowledge externally is strategically wise for firms to maintain 
competitive advantage (Barney 1991). This external acquisition is known for filling gaps 
between knowledge required for a task and knowledge available in the firm in the strategic 
management literature (e.g., Stevensen 1976). Filling gaps of knowledge (e.g., through a 
crowdsourcing strategy in our case) not only maintains the firm’s stock of knowledge in order to 
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buttress and extend positions of competitive advantage (Bandyopadhyay and Pathak 2007; Goo 
et al. 2007), but also broadens the firm’s strategic opportunity set (Grant 1991). 
The KBV has been applied in various areas of IS research. For example, Tanriverdl (2005) 
explored the value of IT to the firm through the KBV. Other areas where KBV has been applied 
include knowledge management systems (e.g., Alavi and Leidner 2001) and IT outsourcing (e.g., 
Dibbern et al. 2008). For example, Jayatilaka et al. (2003) utilized the KBV to identify the 
determinants of IT outsourcing. They found that incongruence between the knowledge required 
and their knowledge store affects firms’ decision about IT outsourcing. Through a game theoretic 
analysis, Bandyopadhyay and Pathak (2007) found that knowledge complementarity between 
host firms and outsourcing firms contributes to the outsourcing success. 
According to the KBV, we expect that firms will consider crowdsourcing if it can fill the 
gap between the knowledge required for solving tasks and the knowledge available in the firm 
(Burger-Helmchen and Penin 2010) (see Table 2.2). Past literature has suggested that 
crowdsourcing will render firms access to specialists in various fields (access to specialized 
skills) (Schenk and Guittard 2011; Burger-Helmchen and Penin 2010). Different from 
outsourcing, crowdsourcing is suggested to provide firms with heterogeneous ideas (solution 
diversity) (e.g., Kittur 2010; Poetz and Shreier 2012). Combined together, we include access to 
specialized skills, solution diversity, and brand visibility in the model to explore seekers’ 
intention to crowdsource. 
Table 2.2. Antecedents of Crowdsourcing Intention Derived from RBV and KBV 
Constructs Sources 
Access to Specialized Skills Schenk and Guittard (2011); Burger-Helmchen and Penin (2010) 
Solution Diversity Kittur (2010) 
Brand Visibility Yang et al. (2008) 
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2.3 Research Model and Hypotheses 
As per the above discussion, we combine the variables derived from TCT (i.e., cost reduction, 
specification cost, codification cost, and proposal evaluation cost) and the RBV and KBV (i.e., 
brand visibility, access to specialized skills, and solution diversity) to develop a model for 
seekers’ decision on adopting the crowdsourcing strategy (see Figure 2.1). The dependent 
variable is the firm’s intention to crowdsource, which should be a sufficient predictor of future 


































Intention to Crowdsource 
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2.3.1 Cost Reduction 
Cost reduction refers to the cost savings of solving the tasks externally through crowdsourcing 
than solving them internally. Reducing cost is considered one of the key strategies for firms to 
improve their profitability and maintain competitiveness in the market (Coase 1937). Cost 
reduction has been found to positively impact firms’ decision to outsource (Dibbern et al. 2004).  
Previous crowdsourcing research suggests that solving tasks through crowdsourcing is 
cheaper (e.g., Howe 2008; Burger-Helmchen and Penin 2010). Although some compensation is 
required for rewarding solvers, Brabham (2008)’s case study found that most of the time the cost 
of crowdsourcing is lower than that of solving the task inside firms. In an experimental study, 
Horton and Chilton (2010) found that firms only need to pay a median wage of USD 1.38/hour to 
workers in Amazon Mechanical Turk. Particularly, previous studies suggested that cost reduction 
could affect firms’ crowdsourcing behavior (e.g., Burger-Helmchen and Penin 2010). For 
example, Terwiesch and Xu (2008)’s analytical paper suggested that low cost could be one of the 
factors that drive firms to crowdsource. Therefore, the cost for crowdsourcing is lower than the 
cost of solving them internally. In the context of this study, we expect that as a means to enhance 
profits, cost reduction through crowdsourcing could drive firms’ intention to adopt this approach. 
Therefore, we hypothesize 
H1: Cost reduction positively affects seekers’ intention to crowdsource 
2.3.2 Brand Visibility 
Brand visibility refers to the perception of the extent to which brands or products are seen by 
consumers (Sprott et al. 2009). Marketing literature suggests that for an unknown brand, building 
the brand’s knowledge in consumers’ minds is the crucial task for a firm (e.g., Campbell and 
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Keller 2003; Sprott et al. 2009). Since consumers have limited cognitive capacity and memory 
for product brands (Gibson and Birkinshaw 2004), they tend to purchase products from familiar 
brands (Sprott et al. 2009). The exposure of product information to potential consumers should 
improve the brand familiarity and thus enhance their purchase (Campbell and Keller 2003). Such 
results are also seen in the user innovation literature where users who are involved in designing a 
particular product, are more familiar with and likely to buy it (e.g., Franke et al. 2010; von 
Hippel 2001). 
In line with the reasoning above, it is reasonable for seeker firms to expect that solvers 
who perform tasks for the company in crowdsourcing platforms are more likely to become aware 
of and possibly purchase their products/services. The more solvers get involved in solving tasks 
by companies, the more likely they will be able to form an impression about them (Pisano and 
Verganti 2008; Boudreau and Lakhani 2009), and have a better awareness of their brand. Thus, 
according to RBV, firms may adopt crowdsourcing as a mechanism to increase the visibility of 
their brand since crowdsourcing allows them to reach a large pool of solvers for problem solving. 
Following the discussion above, benefit of brand visibility could determine seekers’ intention to 
crowdsource. Thus, we expect: 
H2: Brand visibility positively affects seekers’ intention to crowdsource 
2.3.3 Access to Specialized Skills 
Access to specialized skills refers to the extent to which firms think they can acquire specialized 
knowledge or skills through crowdsourcing. Previous literature suggests that firms can have 
access to a broader range of knowledge, skills, abilities, and opinions through crowdsourcing 
(Schulze et al. 2011; Soukhoroukova et al. 2012). Through leveraging specialized knowledge 
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and skills from the crowd, firms can tackle internal problems effectively. For example, Wilogo 
taps around 13,000 logo design talents to work on tasks proposed by seekers. Through this 
platform, seekers can approach skilled workers around the world and invite them to design 
specialized and potentially valuable logos that cannot be obtained from internal staff members. 
Furthermore, previous literature suggests that access to specialized skills drives firms to 
participate in crowdsourcing (e.g., Schenk and Guittard 2011). In a study of crowdsourcing in the 
SAP community, for instance, Leimeister et al. (2009) suggested that access to experts is one of 
reasons for firms to crowdsource IT tasks.  
In general, crowdsourcing allows seeker firms to approach the crowd’s specialized 
abilities which may be unavailable internally and effectively solve their tasks. According to the 
KBV, the incongruence between the knowledge required for task solving and the knowledge 
available leads firms to acquire external knowledge (Grant 1996), e.g., through crowdsourcing. 
Therefore, we expect 
H3: Access to specialized skills positively affects seekers’ intention to crowdsource 
2.3.4 Solution Diversity 
Solution diversity refers to seekers’ perception of the range of different solutions proposed by 
solvers. The basic premise of crowdsourcing is to tap the “wisdom of crowds” (Howe 2008). 
Solvers’ heterogeneous skills and knowledge contribute to the diversity and innovativeness of 
solutions obtained from crowdsourcing. They can provide more diverse, novel, and useful ideas 
for problem solving than relatively homogeneous professional employees in seeker firms 
(Boudreau and Lakahani 2009). This argument has received empirical support from previous 
literature (e.g., Poetz and Schreier 2012). In an experiment of designing new products for babies, 
for instance, Poetz and Schreier (2012) found that through crowdsourcing, solvers generated 
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ideas of significantly higher novelty and customer benefits than employees in firms. Thus, firms 
can obtain diverse solutions from crowdsourcing. 
Solution diversity allows firms to have more choices on how to solve their problems 
(Howe 2008). These choices will render seeker firms a sense of control and satisfaction with 
crowdsourcing. Also, diverse perspectives from the crowd allow firms to better understand their 
needs, reduce the cost of thinking of multiple possibilities, and find the best fit solution. Thus, 
combined together, the potential benefits of solution diversity should motivate firms to 
crowdsource tasks. Thus, we propose that 
H4: Solution diversity positively affects seekers’ intention to crowdsource 
2.3.5 Specification Cost 
For crowdsourcing, costs for seekers arise from activities in the process. Besides economic costs, 
costs that firms need to expend in the process of crowdsourcing can be separated into two parts: 
“transferring specific knowledge to solvers so that they can understand the background 
information of tasks” (specification cost) and “codifying the task requirement so that solvers can 
understand what firms need” (codification cost).  
Adapted from the IT outsourcing literature (e.g., Dibbern et al. 2008), specification cost 
refers to costs associated with the process of explaining the contextual knowledge to solvers. 
Specification cost includes time and effort spent in briefing solvers about the company’s 
customers, organizational culture, brand product, and the industry in which it is located. Past 
outsourcing literature found that specification cost affects firms’ decision to outsource (e.g., 
Dibbern et al. 2008; Sommerville 2004). The specification cost can be high due to the specificity 
of contextual knowledge and difficulty of transferring such knowledge (Sommerville 2004). At 
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the same time, this contextual knowledge may keep changing during the process of task solving, 
which may cause higher specification cost.  
In the context of crowdsourcing, specification cost exists since firms need to brief solvers 
about the background knowledge of tasks. The cost of transferring contextual knowledge of tasks 
is high if the required knowledge is highly specific (Dibbern et al. 2008). Since specification cost 
is the asset specific to the process of crowdsourcing, if solvers fail to perform, as per TCT, firms 
will not choose to crowdsource. Thus, we expect that 
H5: Specification cost negatively affects seekers’ intention to crowdsource 
2.3.6 Codification Cost 
Codification cost refers to the cost associated with codifying and defining tasks (Sommerville 
2004). Previous research has suggested that clearly defined tasks may be able to receive better 
solutions from the crowd (e.g., Yang et al. 2009). Clearly defined requirements of tasks can 
reduce the chance of irrelevant submissions (Soukhoroukova et al. 2012). Also, clarified 
problems will reduce the conflicts between solvers and seekers on why particular solutions were 
not selected. However, to clearly define and codify tasks, firms are compelled to spend much 
time and effort, i.e., a high codification cost. Some tasks even require more time and effort to be 
codified if transformation of tacit knowledge to explicit knowledge is required. Such time and 
effort (codification cost) could become a sunk cost if firms fail to obtain satisfactory results from 
crowdsourcing. Thus, a high codification cost indicates a high transaction cost for crowdsourcing, 
which, as per TCT, inhibits firms from adopting the crowdsourcing strategy.  
Further, past literature in knowledge contribution has found that individuals will refuse to 
share knowledge if the action requires a high level of codification cost (e.g., Kankanhalli et al. 
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2005). Similarly, in the context of our study, if the cost of codifying the task requirement is high, 
seeker firms may have little intention to crowdsource them and will choose to solve tasks 
internally. Hence, we expect that 
H6: Codification cost negatively affects seekers’ intention to crowdsource 
2.3.7 Proposal Evaluation Cost 
Proposal evaluation cost refers to the cost associated with the process of assessing and selecting 
the winners from all solutions obtained from crowdsourcing. Past literature has claimed that the 
advantage of crowdsourcing is its ability to attract a large number of problem solvers and ideas 
through an open call (e.g., Howe 2008). Nonetheless, this could cause the disadvantage of being 
costly to screen and evaluate these submissions (Pisano and Verganti 2008). When there are a 
number of proposals obtained from solvers, seekers will need to spend considerable time and 
effort in evaluating them (Pisano and Verganti 2008). If it is too costly to evaluate these 
proposals, as per TCT, firms may prefer to solve the tasks internally in order to reduce the 
transaction cost (Afuah and Tucci 2012). In particular, a high proposal evaluation cost will 
decrease the attractiveness of crowdsourcing for seeker firms. Thus, we expect 
H7: Proposal evaluation cost negatively affects seekers’ intention to crowdsource 
2.4 Research Methodology 
Survey methodology was employed to test the research model. The survey was conducted in 
TaskCN.com. TaskCN is considered as one of the most popular and established crowdsourcing 
websites in China. By the end of November 2012, TaskCN has over 3.3 million registered 
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solvers and over 52 thousand tasks
2
. This platform has been recognized as successful in 
facilitating solutions of a variety of tasks and has received extensive media coverage in China as 
well as researchers’ attention (e.g., Yang et al. 2009, 2010; Yang et al. 2008). The selection of 
this platform allows us a sufficiently large pool of solvers to test our models. The existence of 
previous studies on this platform allows for comparisons and cumulation of research in this area.  
2.4.1 Instrument Development and Conceptual Validation 
Since several constructs in our model were adapted to the study context and items for other 
constructs needed to be developed from scratch, this study conducted a systematic procedure of 
instrument development (DeVellis 2003). There are three stages in instrument development, i.e., 
item creation and scale development, conceptual validation, and instrument testing. In the item 
creation and scale development stage, pools of items for each construct are created by first 
examining the relevant existing instruments or creating new items according to their definitions. 
In the conceptual validation stage, the unlabelled and labeled sorting exercises are conducted to 
assess the validity of the scales developed and to identify any potential ambiguity in the items. 
According to the judges’ feedback and construct validity, the items are refined. In the instrument 
testing stage, the instrument is further refined through a pilot test.  
In this study, through a review of relevant literature, items for each model construct were 
generated based on previous literature, interviews with seekers, or its definition. The construct 
definitions are shown in Table 2.3. All items for each construct were validated through 
unlabelled and labeled sorting exercises in which two sets of four judges were used. Inter-judge 
agreement (i.e., Cohen’s Kappa and agreement level) and item placement hit ratio were used to 
assess the level of conceptual reliability and validity. The results for unlabelled and labeled 





sorting are shown in Tables A.1, A.2, and A.5 in Appendix A. We found that in the two rounds 
of item sorting, the instrument has high Kappa score, agreement level, and hit ratio, i.e., greater 
than 0.8, suggesting sufficient item reliability and validity (Jarvenpaa 1998). 
Table 2.3. Definitions of Constructs in the Proposed Model for Study 1 
Constructs  Definition  Source  
Cost Reduction The cost saving by solving the tasks externally through 
crowdsourcing versus solving them internally 
Dibbern et al. 
(2004) 
Brand Visibility The extent to which seekers believe that their brands or products 
will be exposed to a broader audience and obtain potential 
customers’ awareness through crowdsourcing 




The extent to which firms believe they can acquire specialized 
knowledge or skills through crowdsourcing 
Agerfalk and 
Fitzgerald (2008) 
Solution Diversity Seekers’ perception of the range of different solutions proposed 
by solvers 
Chen et al. (2010) 
Intention to 
Crowdsource 
The degree to which seekers believe that they will engage in 
crowdsourcing activities in future 
Zheng et al. 
(2011) 
Specification Cost The cost (time and effort) perceived by seekers spent in briefing 
solvers about their products, customers, and cultures in order to 
better solve the tasks 
Subramani (2004) 




The cost associated with evaluating the proposals from solvers 
and selecting the winner 
Orpen (1998) 
2.4.2 Pilot Study 
A pilot study was conducted to assess the reliability and validity of the instrument and to identify 
any potential problems in the items, as indicated by the respondents. We pilot tested the 
instrument in zhubajie.com, a similar crowdsourcing website to our main study sample in 
TaskCN. To pilot test the instrument, we surveyed 102 seekers in zhubajie.com, a smaller 
crowdsourcing but similar platform
3
.  
                                                          
3
 All measures were translated into Chinese by the author, then back translated into English by an independent 
translator, and verified by an independent native speaker. 
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The results for the pilot study are shown in Tables B.1, B.3, B.6 and B.7 in Appendix B. 
According to the pilot test, one item for Access to specialized skills was removed due to low 
loading (see Table B.6 in the Appendix B). After removing the item, the results for exploratory 
factory analysis demonstrate sufficient instrument validity (see Table B.7 in Appendix B). We 
also edited item wordings in the instrument according to the feedback from the pilot test and 
follow up interviews. The final instrument is shown in Table 2.4. 
Table 2.4. Items of Constructs in the Proposed Model for Study 1 
Constructs  Definition  Source  
Cost Reduction COS1:It is cost effective to solve tasks through crowdsourcing 
COS2:Crowdsourcing helps save money in obtaining solutions to our 
problems 
COS3:We can obtain solutions to our tasks at a lower price through 
crowdsourcing 
COS4:It is relatively cheaper to outsource the tasks to the crowds than 







BRD1:Crowdsourcing will improve our brand image among the 
community 
BRD2:Crowdsourcing lets more people know (be familiar with) about my 
company’s brand  
BRD3:Crowdsourcing is a way to get our brand products known by 
solvers in the community 
BRD4:Crowdsourcing is a good way to promote our brand and products 
among the community 
Developed 
from Sprott 




ACC1:The platform brings solvers from specific expertise areas to work 
on tasks 
ACC2:There are a number of solvers with specific expertise that we need 
in the platform 
ACC3:The platform can invite a number of solvers with specialized 









DIV1:Different solutions can be obtained through crowdsourcing  
DIV2:Solutions obtained through crowdsourcing are different from each 
other 
DIV3:Solutions obtained through crowdsourcing are of great variance 
DIV4:Solutions obtained through crowdsourcing represent different ways 
of thinking for particular tasks 
Developed 





SPE1:We need to transfer specific knowledge about our company in 
order to address our tasks 
SPE2: We need to transfer specific knowledge about our products in 
order to address our tasks 
SPE3: We need to transfer specific knowledge about our customer base 
in order to address our tasks 
SPE4: We need to transfer specific knowledge about our company 









COD1: It is difficult to codify our tasks 
COD2: It needs much time to codify our tasks 
COD3: It takes much time and effort to write task requirements 
COD4: It is difficult to write down what we need into task requirement 
Kankanhalli 




EVA1:It is difficult to evaluate how well the tasks are solved 
EVA2:It needs time and effort to assess the performance of task solving 
EVA3:Assessing how well the tasks have been done is difficult 






INT1:We will use this platform for crowdsourcing 
INT2:We will crowdsource tasks in this platform  
INT3:We will use this platform to crowdsource tasks  
Adapted 
from Zheng 
et al. (2011) 
2.4.3 The Main Study 
To survey the seekers in TaskCN, we accessed seekers through the task list
4
 and randomly 
selected 500 seekers. We sent invitations through TaskCN’s internal messaging tool to these 
seekers. As a token of appreciation for their participation, a $10 voucher was given to them. A 
total of 161 valid responses were received with a 32.2% response rate. The titles of responded 
seekers include project managers, IT managers, individual entrepreneurs, system analysts, 
system developers, and sales supervisors. 
Since a web-based survey design may suffer from non-response bias (Roztocki 2001), we 
tested for such bias by comparing the early and late respondents as recommended by Armstrong 
and Overton (1977). T-tests of the differences between the earliest 10% respondents and the last 
10% respondents in terms of demographics revealed no systematic difference (see Table C.1 in 
Appendix C). Thus, non-response bias is not expected in this study. 
2.4.4 Control Variables 
To rule out confounding effects of differences in firms’ characteristics, this study also includes 
the demographic variables of seeker firms as controls in the model, which may affect their 
intention to crowdsource. These demographic variables include seekers’ firm age, firm size, 





previous experience, and industry. Smaller and younger firms may be more likely to 
crowdsource since they lack resources to solve task internally and are more concerned with the 
cost (Doan et al. 2011; Greengard 2011). Firm’s age is measured by the years elapsed since its 
foundation while firm size refers to the number of employees. Industry indicates the type of 
products or services the firm is providing. This study includes the type of industry as dummy 
variables in the model. Previous experience refers to whether the firm has crowdsourced task(s) 
to the platform. Previous experience is coded as a dummy variable, i.e., if the firm has not 
crowdsourced task, then 0, if it has crowdsourced 1 or more tasks, then 1.  
2.5 Data Analysis and Results 
For this study, structural equation modeling (SEM) analysis was chosen over linear regression, 
because SEM can simultaneously analyze all paths among latent variables in one analysis (Gefen 
et al. 2011). Within SEM, Partial Least Squares (PLS) was chosen over co-variance based SEM 
because our research is exploratory (Chin 1998). This study aims to explore the antecedents of 
seekers’ intention to crowdsource that previous studies have not examined before. Further, single 
item constructs (e.g., controls variables) are included in the model analysis. This could result in a 
low model fit in co-variance based SEM and a poor hypotheses testing result. Thus, co-variance 
based SEM could be problematic in analyzing the model. Therefore, this study chose PLS to 
analyze the data. The SmartPLS 2.0 software was used to conduct the statistical analyses. All 
constructs in model were measured using reflective indicators. The demographic information 
about the respondents is listed in Table 2.5.  
2.5.1 Instrument Validity 
To validate our instrument, convergent validity and discriminant validity were tested (Hair et al. 
2006). As suggested by Straub et al. (2004) and Hair et al. (2006), this study assessed convergent 
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validity by examining the Cronbach’s α (CA) (>0.7), composite reliability (>0.7), average 
extracted variance (AVE) (>0.5), and factor analysis results. The factor analysis results are 
shown in Table 2.6. 
Table 2.5. Demographic Information for Study 1 
Demographic variables (Seeker Firm)  Frequency (N=161)  Percentage  
Firm Age (Years) 
<1 1 0.62 
1-5 100 62.11 
6-10 33 20.50 
>10 27 16.77 
Firm Size (The number 
of employees) 
<50 87 54.04 
50-100 38 23.60 
101-500 22 13.66 
>500 14 8.70 
Industry  
Advertising and Public Relationship 12 7.45 
Education 17 10.56 
Financial Service and Insurance 16 9.94 
IT service 42 26.09 
Manufacturing 33 20.50 
Retailing 16 9.94 
Traditional Services (Haircut, Restaurant, 
etc.) 
25 15.52 
Previous Experience  
0 49 30.43 
1 112 69.57 
Table 2.6 shows that the factor loading of each item was larger than 0.7. Results in Table 
2.7 show that each reflective construct in the model has the value of CA and CR greater than 0.7 
and the value of AVE greater than 0.5. Thus, all constructs have satisfied the criteria, 
demonstrating sufficient convergent validity (Hair et al. 2006). 
Discriminant validity was assessed by examining the indicator-factor loadings and 
comparing the square root of AVEs with inter-construct correlations as suggested by Gefen and 
Straub (2005). The results in Table 2.6 show that all indicators load more strongly on their 
corresponding constructs than on other constructs in the model. The results in Table 2.7 show 
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that the square root of AVE is larger than the inter-construct correlations. Thus, the constructs 
demonstrate sufficient discriminant validity.  
Table 2.6. Exploratory Factor Analysis for Study 1 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
BRD1 0.03 0.09 0.13 0.85 0.26 0.07 0.12 0.12 
BRD2 0.01 0.09 0.11 0.88 0.01 0.20 0.22 0.06 
BRD3 0.12 0.00 0.10 0.89 0.07 0.11 0.20 0.11 
BRD4 0.04 -0.01 0.17 0.81 0.14 0.07 0.28 0.33 
COS1 -0.07 0.12 0.86 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.18 0.02 
COS2 -0.04 0.17 0.83 0.25 0.02 0.22 0.02 0.02 
COS3 -0.06 0.02 0.87 0.08 0.01 0.20 0.08 0.12 
COS4 -0.03 0.09 0.87 0.02 0.14 0.20 0.13 0.18 
ACC1 -0.01 0.09 0.07 0.09 0.00 0.43 0.14 0.77 
ACC2 -0.08 0.11 0.12 0.17 0.07 0.23 0.22 0.81 
ACC3 0.01 0.18 0.13 0.23 0.15 0.01 0.12 0.87 
DIV1 -0.01 0.12 0.12 0.15 0.01 0.85 0.24 0.22 
DIV2 0.01 0.11 0.26 0.12 0.05 0.85 0.13 0.13 
DIV3 0.12 -0.01 0.26 0.04 0.21 0.88 -0.05 0.23 
DIV4 -0.12 0.21 0.18 0.16 0.21 0.75 0.06 -0.03 
SPE1 0.20 0.02 0.10 0.07 0.78 0.00 0.00 0.02 
SPE2 -0.05 0.14 0.15 0.00 0.86 0.31 0.05 0.08 
SPE3 0.05 0.24 0.11 0.16 0.89 0.28 0.08 0.03 
SPE4 0.04 0.11 -0.04 0.17 0.75 -0.04 0.04 0.11 
EVA1 0.84 -0.09 0.07 0.08 -0.14 0.00 -0.29 -0.08 
EVA2 0.80 -0.16 0.06 0.10 -0.07 0.11 -0.29 -0.05 
EVA3 0.75 0.06 -0.12 0.02 0.07 -0.02 0.08 0.07 
EVA4 0.86 0.14 -0.05 -0.02 0.02 -0.07 -0.13 -0.07 
COD1 -0.04 0.81 0.14 0.07 0.04 0.12 -0.05 0.10 
COD2 -0.03 0.82 0.12 -0.02 0.03 0.14 -0.03 0.10 
COD3 0.01 0.83 0.13 0.07 0.14 0.14 -0.07 0.14 
COD4 0.18 0.90 -0.02 0.03 0.29 -0.01 -0.08 -0.01 
INT1 -0.09 -0.15 0.24 0.24 0.01 0.12 0.91 0.11 
INT2 -0.05 -0.07 0.13 0.32 0.05 0.18 0.94 0.20 
INT3 -0.06 -0.07 0.10 0.28 0.08 0.11 0.93 0.19 
Initial Eigenvalue 8.05 4.27 3.34 2.22 1.90 1.60 1.22 1.03 
% of variance 25.16 13.35 10.44 6.92 5.92 5.01 3.81 3.21 





Table 2.7. Descriptive Statistics and Correlations for Study 1 
 Mean STD CA CR AVE Age Size EXP DIV SPE ACC BRD COD COS EVA INT 
Age 7.04 8.28 - - - - 
 
 
        
Size 302.39 1060.85 - - - 0.40 -  
        
EXP 0.95 0.87 - - - -0.24 -0.15 - 
        
DIV 5.42 1.19 0.85 0.89 0.69 0.10 0.13 0.08 0.83 
       
SPE 5.32 1.21 0.84 0.89 0.67 0.08 0.34 0.05 0.09 0.82 
      
ACC 5.99 0.99 0.75 0.86 0.67 0.12 0.54 0.07 0.09 0.33 0.82 
     
BRD 5.25 1.26 0.88 0.93 0.81 0.12 0.37 0.07 0.10 0.30 0.43 0.90 
    
COD 5.16 1.17 0.88 0.90 0.70 0.09 0.22 -0.01 0.10 0.36 0.18 0.13 0.84 
   
COST 5.85 1.06 0.88 0.91 0.78 0.10 0.51 -0.02 0.09 0.25 0.43 0.31 0.19 0.88 
  
EVA 4.61 1.44 0.81 0.89 0.73 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.03 -0.02 -0.18 0.02 0.06 -0.06 0.85 
 
INT 5.81 1.39 0.92 0.95 0.86 0.15 0.31 0.04 0.09 0.19 0.51 0.51 -0.10 0.32 -0.25 0.93 
Notes 
COS= Cost Reduction, BRD= Brand Visibility, ACC= Access to Specialized Skills, DIV= Solution Diversity, SPE= Specification Cost, COD=Codification Cost, EVA= Proposal 
Evaluation Cost, INT= Intention to Crowdsource, Age= Firm Age, Size= Firm Size, EXP= Previous Experience 
CA=Cronbach’s α, CR= Composite Reliability, AVE= Average Variance Extracted 
- Excluded as it was  a single measure  
*      Diagonal elements are the square root of AVE 
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Since the data were collected from a single source, this study tested for common method 
bias (CMB). It conducted the Harman’s single factor test by running an exploratory factor 
analysis with all variables included (Podsakoff et al. 2003). The factor analysis produced neither 
a single factor nor one general factor that accounted for the majority of the variance (21.86% 
<50%). The results suggest that common method bias was not high in this study. We further 
included a common method factor in the structural regression model (Podsakoff et al. 2003) 
using a PLS approach documented in the literature (Liang et al. 2007; Wells et al. 2011). 
Additional details and the results are reported in Table D.1 in Appendix D. The analysis results 
show that only 5 of the 30 paths from the common method factor were significant, providing 
further evidence that the study results were not due to CMB. 
2.5.2 Results of Hypotheses Testing 
Hypotheses testing results in Table 2.8 show that the model explains 47% of the variance in 
seekers’ intention to crowdsource. According to Ringle et al. (2012), a study that uses PLS for 
data analysis should report the structural model evaluation criteria, i.e., Cohen’s effect size ƒ2, 
which allows researchers to evaluate the independent variable’s incremental explanation of a 
dependent variable. Following Chin et al. (2003), we calculated the Cohen’s effect size of the 
model. The main model has a large effect size ƒ2 of 0.77, according to Cohen (1988)5. This 
suggests a decent predictive capability of our model in explaining seekers’ intention to 
crowdsource. Among the control variables, firm age (marginally) and education industry 
significantly predict seeker firms’ intention to crowdsource. This suggests that older firms tend 
                                                          




to have a higher intention to crowdsource than younger ones while firms in the education 
industry are more likely to crowdsource their tasks. 
As expected, cost reduction, brand visibility, and access to specialized skills are 
positively related to seeker firms’ intention to crowdsource (H1, H2, and H3 are supported) 
while codification cost is negatively related to the intention to crowdsource (H6 is supported). 
Proposal evaluation cost has a marginally significant impact on seeker firms’ intention to 
crowdsource, suggesting that H7 is marginally supported. However, solution diversity, and 
specification cost are not related to seeker firms’ intention to crowdsource (H4 and H5 are not 
supported).  
Table 2.8. Results of Hypotheses Testing for Study 1 (DV= Intention to crowdsource) 
 Control  Main Effect  Result 
Age  0.11*  0.08†   Sig.  
Size 0.04 0.01 N.S.  
Advertising and Public Relations 0.004 0.09 N.S. 
Education 0.21* 0.14* Sig. 
Financial Service and Insurance -0.07 -0.07 N.S. 
IT Service 0.15 0.08 N.S. 
Manufacturing 0.19 0.13 N.S. 
Retailing 0.13 0.11 N.S. 
Previous Experience 0.05 0.04 N.S. 
Cost Reduction   0.11* H1 Supported  
Brand Visibility   0.39**  H2 Supported  
Access to Specialized Skills   0.32** * H3 Supported  
Solution Diversity   -0.01  H4 not Supported  
Specification Cost   0.01 H5 not Supported  
Codification Cost   -0.22**  H6 Supported  
Proposal Evaluation Cost   -0.07† H7 Marginally Supported  
R
2
  0.06 0.47   
ƒ2  0.77  
Observations  161 
†p<0.1;*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001  
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2.5.3 Post-hoc Analysis 
Since the surveyed seeker firms include those who have crowdsourced a task to TaskCN in the 
past and those who have not, this study post hoc tested whether there is a difference in the 
antecedents of intention to crowdsource for the two groups of seeker firms. 49 seeker firms in 
our sample have registered but did not submit a task in TaskCN (inexperienced seeker firms) 
while 112 seeker firms have prior experience in crowdsourcing through TaskCN (experienced 
seeker firms). This study split the sample into these two groups and tested the hypotheses 
separately on each group. The results are shown in Table 2.9. Keil et al. (2000)’s approach was 
adopted to statistically compare the corresponding path coefficients for the two groups and 
compute the T-values shown in Table 2.10. 
Table 2.9. Post-Hoc Analysis  for Study 1 
 Inexperienced Experienced 
Cost Reduction  0.25*** 0.08 
Brand Visibility  0.28** 0.42*** 
Access to Specialized Skills  0.24** 0.30*** 
Solution Diversity  -0.09 0.02 
Specification Cost  0.16** -0.08 
Codification Cost  -0.26** -0.23*** 
Proposal Evaluation Cost  -0.20** -0.18** 
R
2
  0.46 0.53 
Observations  49 112 
p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001  
Table 2.10 shows that significant differences exist in the antecedents of intention to 
crowdsource between inexperienced and experienced seeker firms. Inexperienced seekers pay 
more attention to cost reduction, codification cost, specification cost, and proposal evaluation 
cost while experienced seeker firms pay more importance on brand visibility and access to 
specialized skills.  
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Inexperienced 0.25(0.060) 0.28(0.065) 0.24(0.066) -0.09(0.056) 0.16(0.052) -0.26(0.078) -0.20(0.040) 
Experienced 0.08(0.052) 0.42(0.056) 0.30(0.063) 
0.02(0.045) -0.08(0.046) -0.23(0.053) -0.18(0.034) 
S pooled 0.057 0.061 0.064 0.052 0.048 0.062 0.326 
T-test across groups  18.02*** -13.72**** -5.60*** -12.78*** 29.26*** -2.84** -3.25** 
** p<0.01,  *** p<0.001 
The difference could result from experience in crowdsourcing. According to the belief-
adjustment model (Hogarth and Einhorn 1992), individuals will update their beliefs over time. 
When individuals gained experience, they will update their beliefs with the current information. 
In particular, individuals first developed a general perception of an action. Their beliefs will be 
adjusted according to new information received. If the received information is positive, there 
would be a slight increase in the strength of current beliefs. If the received information is 
negative, there could be a considerable decrease in the strength of current beliefs. 
In the context of our study, seeker firms developed a general perception of crowdsourcing 
before their participation. Their beliefs will be revised after they obtained new information 
during crowdsourcing. It is possible that the feedback from the crowdsourcing experience 
significantly changed their beliefs in the importance of motivations on intention to crowdsource, 
i.e., cost reduction, solution diversity, and specification cost. 
Similar arguments can be found in cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger 1957). It 
suggests that as individuals gain first-hand experience, they evaluate the extent to which their 
initial cognition (or beliefs) is consonant or dissonant with actual experience, and revise their 
cognition or behaviour to achieve greater consonance. Empirical research has also validated the 
theory in the context of electronic commerce (e.g., Bhattacherjee 2002; Gupta and Kim 2007). In 
our study, similarly, after seekers gained first-hand experience, they will evaluate whether their 
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initial cognition is consonant with actual experience and revise their cognition and behaviours 
accordingly. Specifically, after they obtained the knowledge regarding benefits and costs from 
crowdsourcing, they will re-evaluate and change their cognition of the importance of certain 
motivations and may revise their intention to crowdsource accordingly. We also interviewed 
seekers to validate the results. As one seeker interviewed pointed out, she will learn and adapt 
their perception during the process of crowdsourcing. She also highlighted that price paid to 
solvers can be increased as long as solutions of good quality can be obtained. 
2.6 Discussion and Implications 
The emergence of new Internet based technologies enables firms to leverage the wisdom of the 
crowd to solve internal tasks. To attract more firms to participate, crowdsourcing platforms 
should understand what motivates them to crowdsource. This is essential as not every 
crowdsourcing platform has been successful in attracting and retaining firms to crowdsource 
their tasks. Further, little research has theoretically modeled and empirically tested the 
antecedents of firms’ intention to crowdsource. Therefore, researchers and practitioners alike are 
interested to understand how to encourage firms to crowdsource tasks (Terwiesch and Ulrich 
2009; Howe 2008). From seeker firms’ viewpoint as well, participation in crowdsourcing may 
allow them to obtain the benefits achievable through this approach. Deriving from the KBV, 
RBV, and TCT, this study developed a model to explain firms’ intention to crowdsource. It 
found that cost reduction, brand visibility, and access to specialized skills positively affect seeker 
firms’ intention to crowdsource while codification cost and proposal evaluation cost negatively 
affect their intention to crowdsource.  
Contrary to our prediction, solution diversity had no impact on firms’ intention to 
crowdsource. This could result from the nature of tasks crowdsourced in our sample. The tasks 
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crowdsourced could not require high creativity to solve. Thus, firms did not consider solution 
diversity as an important motivation for crowdsourcing. Another reason could be because firms 
are only interested to have their problems solved regardless of different approaches used to 
derive the solution.  
Further, specification cost did not affect the intention to crowdsourcing. The reason why 
this effect was not significant could be that firms may consider the specification cost as a 
necessary effort required to obtain results. As the post-hoc analysis results show in Table 2.10, 
specification cost positively affects inexperienced seekers’ intention to crowdsource. However, it 
has no impact on experienced seekers’ intention to crowdsource. This could be because seeker 
firms have experienced the process of transferring contextual knowledge to solvers and adjusted 
their perception regarding the influence of specification cost on their intention to crowdsource. 
For example, during crowdsourcing, seekers may need to spend much time and effort in 
transferring contextual knowledge to solvers and providing feedback to their proposals. They 
would reconsider the importance of specification cost when making crowdsourcing decision. 
2.6.1 Limitations and Future Research 
The findings of this study should be interpreted in light of its limitations. First, although similar 
results have been found in both pilot test and main study, our study is restricted in its ability to 
make a broad generalization by studying one type of crowdsourcing platform. Such platforms 
could include Wilogo.com, TopCoder.com, and Netflix.com. Future research could focus on 
seeker firms in other crowdsourcing platforms such as Innocentive (e.g., Jeppesen and Lakhani 
2010) to test if similar results hold. For example, in Innocentive, seeker firms tend to 
crowdsource tasks that require more creativity and expertise to solve, e.g., R&D problems. This 
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may require seeker firms to consider these factors in a different manner. Specially, seeker firms 
may be more likely to focus on the benefits of access to specialized skills and solution diversity. 
Second, while this paper studied the influence of benefit and cost factors on firms’ 
intention to crowdsource, future work can explore the influence of the characteristics of 
crowdsourcing platforms on seeker firms’ crowdsourcing behavior. Such characteristics could 
include the capabilities of crowdsourcing platforms in organizing solvers to solve problems and 
supporting firms to obtain satisfactory solutions. Researchers could investigate how 
crowdsourcing platforms perform in facilitating the process of crowdsourcing. For example, they 
can frame crowdsourcing platforms as knowledge brokers and utilize knowledge brokering 
theory to explore the performance of crowdsourcing platforms (e.g., Hargadon 2003; Hargadon 
and Sutton 1997). 
2.6.2 Theoretical Contributions 
This paper contributes to previous crowdsourcing literature by developing a comprehensive 
model to explain firms’ intention to crowdsource and empirically testing it with survey data. 
Specifically, this study contributes to previous research in several ways. First, as the knowledge 
of seeker firms’ crowdsourcing behavior in previous literature was based on conceptual or case 
studies (e.g., Burger-Helmchen and Penin 2010; Schenk and Guittard 2009; Terwiesch and Xu 
2008; Yang et al. 2008), this paper empirically explored the antecedents of firms’ intention to 
crowdsource. It found that cost reduction, brand visibility, and access to specialized skills 
positively affect firms’ intention to crowdsource. This study extends previous crowdsourcing 
literature by validating that these are important considerations for firms’ crowdsourcing decision.  
Second, previous literature mainly focused on investigating the influence of benefit 
factors on firms’ crowdsourcing behavior (e.g., Doan et al. 2011; Kittur 2010). Little has 
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investigated the influences of cost concerns raised during crowdsourcing on firms’ intention to 
crowdsource. This paper identified the cost constructs for this context and tested them on the 
TaskCN platform. It found that codification cost and proposal evaluation cost negatively affect 
firms’ intention to crowdsource. The findings contribute to previous crowdsourcing literature 
(e.g., Howe 2008) by enriching our understanding that the cost concerns will thwart firms’ 
intention to crowdsource.  
Third, this study extends the findings from outsourcing literature to the context of 
crowdsourcing. In agreement with previous outsourcing literature (e.g., Jayatilaka et al. 2003), 
this study found that cost reduction and access to specialized skills are important antecedents of 
firms’ intention to crowdsource. This study also found that certain antecedents are specific to 
firms’ intention to crowdsource, i.e., brand visibility, codification cost, and proposal evaluation 
cost. This contributes to previous research by identifying additional important factors that are 
salient in the crowdsourcing context. Further, this study developed and validated an instrument 
for studying firms’ crowdsourcing. It contributes to previous literature by providing a reusable 
instrument for future study. 
Fourth, this study contributes to the literature on TCT, KBV, and RBV. This study 
extends the applicability of TCT, RBV, and KBV to the context of crowdsourcing. The 
explanatory power and support for the model indicate that the complementary perspectives of 
TCT, the KBV, and RBV are appropriate theoretical lenses to explain firms’ intention to 




2.6.3 Practical Implications 
From a pragmatic perspective, this study offers insights to crowdsourcing platform 
administrators on how to attract firms to crowdsource their tasks in two ways.  
First, this study provides guidelines for crowdsourcing platforms to enhance firms’ 
intention to crowdsource. In particular, the results suggest that crowdsourcing platforms should 
heighten the perception of cost reduction, brand visibility, and access to specialized skills for the 
purpose of promoting firms’ participation in crowdsourcing. On one hand, crowdsourcing 
platforms should take the initiative to attract and retain talented solvers to participate in 
crowdsourcing so that firms can access their specialized skills in multiple areas. Further, 
crowdsourcing platforms could communicate the advantage to firms that solving tasks through 
crowdsourcing is inexpensive. Inviting experienced seeker firms to share their crowdsourcing 
experience could be a viable approach for crowdsourcing platforms to advertise benefits of 
crowdsourcing. A webpage could be established to elicit firms’ feedback and comments on their 
crowdsourcing experience. 
Second, crowdsourcing platforms should seek ways to reduce the costs for firms to 
participate. They should facilitate firms to codify their requirements description and provide 
suitable tools to support their task codification. In particular, they should help firms define their 
problems by providing useful advice and improve the process of requirement submission through 
providing tools to support them, such as tools providing samples and modules for requirement 
codification. Apart from reducing codification effort, crowdsourcing platforms should reduce 
firms’ proposal evaluation cost. To do so, they can provide appropriate tools for firms to filter 
out irrelevant proposals by setting relevant keywords. They can offer to select the relevant 




STUDY 2: UNDERSTANDING SOLVERS’ 




Inviting undefined individuals (solvers) to solve organizational tasks is a key step for 
crowdsourcing (Howe 2008). Solvers’ participation in solving tasks determines the success of 
crowdsourcing (Afuah and Tucci 2012; Boudreau et al. 2011). As a result, crowdsourcing 
platforms have to publicize themselves and establish a substantial network of individual 
knowledge workers as solvers (Doan et al. 2011; Greengard 2011). However, crowdsourcing 
platforms encounter challenges in attracting solvers and retaining them (Greengard 2011). 
Solvers are motivated by varied incentives (Kaufman et al. 2011; Yang et al. 2009). In fact, 
monetary reward alone may not be sufficient to motivate participation in crowdsourcing (Zheng 
et al., 2011). Further, the influences of costs incurred during crowdsourcing are largely unknown. 
Inability to assess the antecedents of a solver’s participation limits the performance of 
crowdsourcing (Howe 2008). Thus, firms and crowdsourcing platforms need to understand what 
motivates or inhibits solvers from participating in crowdsourcing.  
Prior research has attempted to investigate solvers’ participation in crowdsourcing either 
conceptually (e.g., Terwiesch and Xu 2008), or empirically, i.e., based on survey data (e.g., 
50 
 
Zheng et al. 2011). These studies mainly focused on the influences of expected benefits 
(extrinsic or intrinsic motivations) on solvers’ intention to participate in crowdsourcing. 
However, there is limited theoretically-driven empirical research systematically investigating the 
influence of these benefit factors on solvers’ actual participation in crowdsourcing. Additionally, 
participation in crowdsourcing will incur costs in terms of spending time and effort in 
understanding the problems and proposing solutions. The costs may hinder solvers’ participation 
in crowdsourcing. However, no research has examined the influence of cost factors on solvers’ 
participation. Further, solvers may also encounter the risks of firms’ opportunistic behaviors (e.g., 
denying their solutions to tasks) and revealing ideas to peers (Afuah and Tucci 2012; Allio 2004). 
The risk of firms’ opportunistic behaviors exists when solutions to crowdsourced tasks are so 
specific to firms that only firms can evaluate them and when solutions are information goods 
(Afuah and Tucci 2012). These risk concerns may affect the influence of cost concerns on 
solvers’ participation. Previous literature suggests that in the face of uncertainty and risk, trust 
can mitigate cost concerns (e.g., Chiles and McMackin 1996) and may moderate the relationship 
between cost concerns and behaviors (e.g., Noorderhaven 1996). However, there is a lack of 
research examining the moderating role of trust on solvers’ participation in crowdsourcing. Thus, 
combined together, there is a need to examine the influences of benefits and costs on solvers’ 
participation in crowdsourcing as well as the moderating effects of trust.  
In order to address these knowledge gaps, this study aims to address the research question: 
What factors affect solvers’ participation in crowdsourcing? Based on prospect theory and 
previous related literatures, this study developed a model to predict solvers’ participation in 
crowdsourcing. Specifically, this study proposes that monetary reward, skill enhancement, peer 
reputation, firm recognition, enjoyment of solving, and work autonomy will enhance solvers’ 
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participation while cognitive effort and loss of knowledge power will inhibit their participation. 
It also explores the moderating role of trust in determining solvers’ participation in 
crowdsourcing. 
This study is expected to contribute to the crowdsourcing literature by modeling and 
testing the antecedents of solvers’ actual participation in crowdsourcing and exploring the 
influences of cost concerns and trust on their participation in crowdsourcing. Also, it is expected 
to provide insights to practitioners on how crowdsourcing platforms can attract and sustain 
solvers’ participation. 
3.2 Conceptual Background 
This section first reviews the theories that have been applied in the context of solvers’ 
participation in crowdsourcing, and identifies the gaps this study seeks to address. It then 
describes and applies prospect theory to explain the impacts of benefits and cost concerns on 
solvers’ participation in crowdsourcing.  
During crowdsourcing, solvers may face the risk of seeker firms’ denying their solutions 
and revealing their ideas to firms and peers (Afuah and Tucci 2012). They need to maximize the 
value of their behavior and may experience a tension between the benefits and costs of 
participation (e.g., money obtained vs. time and effort spent) (Kaufman et al. 2011). In the face 
of such risks, they will make a decision by weighing benefits and costs before they decide 
whether to solve crowdsourced tasks. Given the specific context of crowdsourcing, prospect 
theory is particularly relevant to our study since it posits that individuals maximize the value of 
their behavior and decision making based on the evaluation of likely gains and losses (costs and 
benefits in our study) of a particular action before deciding to act (e.g., Kahneman and Tversky 
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1979). Prospect theory explains individuals’ actual behaviors (make decision under the tension 
between benefits and costs) rather than optimal behaviors. Therefore, this study employs 
prospect theory to explain solvers’ participation in crowdsourcing. 
3.2.1 Theories Used in Explaining Solvers’ Participation in Crowdsourcing 
Through a literature review, we identified theories that have been applied to explain solvers’ 
participation in crowdsourcing (shown in Table 3.1), i.e., value expectancy theory, job design 
theory, motivation theory, and value theory. Specifically, through a survey of solvers in TaskCN, 
based on value expectancy theory, Sun et al. (2012) found that extrinsic and intrinsic motivations 
enhance solvers’ continuance intention to participate in crowdsourcing. Also, task complexity 
negatively moderates the influences of extrinsic motivation while self efficacy positively 
moderates the influence of intrinsic motivation on continuance intention.  
Combining job design theory and motivation theory, Zheng et al. (2011) empirically 
tested the influences of job characteristics and motivations on intention to participate in 
crowdsource. They found that task characteristics such as autonomy, variety, tacitness, and 
analyzability enhance intrinsic motivation which, together with extrinsic motivation to gain 
money and recognition, enhances solvers’ participation intention in TaskCN. Similarly, Kaufman 
et al. (2011) has combined the two theories and conducted a field study to rank all the 
motivations of solvers in Amazon Mechanical Turk. They found that payment, task autonomy, 
and skill variety are ranked as the top three motivators. Based on value theory, Sun et al. (2011) 
conducted a survey study in TaskCN and found that hedonic value enhances solvers’ 
participation intention mediated by satisfaction with the process of crowdsourcing.  
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Table 3.1. Theories Used to Explain Solvers’ Intention to Participate in Crowdsourcing 





Individuals’ actions are related to their 
subjective value of behavioural outcomes 
and the expectancy or probability to 
conduct the behaviour successfully and 
achieve outcomes. As expectancy 
increases, effect of value on behavioural 
intentions increase 
Extrinsic motivation, 
intrinsic motivation, task 
complexity* extrinsic 
motivation, self efficacy* 
intrinsic motivation → 
continuance intention 




Workers are motivated by jobs in which 
they feel they can make a difference. Five 
characteristics of jobs are proposed to 
affect workers’ motivation and 
productivity in work, i.e., task variety, 













People are driven to achieve their goals 
by their motivations. Motivation can be 
intrinsic and extrinsic 
Extrinsic motivation to gain 
money, extrinsic motivation 




Zheng et al. 
(2011) 
Value Theory People are motivated to do things by 
judging their value. There are two types 





→continuance intention  
Sun et al. 
(2011) 
The results in Table 3.1 reveal that existing literature focused on the potential benefits 
that motivate solvers’ intention to participate in crowdsourcing. No study has investigated the 
influences of cost concerns and trust on solvers’ participation in crowdsourcing and the 
antecedents of solvers’ actual participation (i.e., how many tasks they have performed). However, 
theories in Table 3.1 are unable to explain the influences of cost concerns e.g., time and effort 
spent on solvers’ actual participation in crowdsourcing. A different perspective is needed to 
explain the influences of costs expected during crowdsourcing and trust. Therefore, to address 
the gap, we draw on prospect theory to explain solvers’ participation in crowdsourcing, which 
claims that under risks, individuals will act based on their evaluation of benefits and costs of 
their action (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). 
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3.2.2 Prospect Theory 
Prospect theory was developed by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and Tversky and Kahneman 
(1981) to predict actual behavior but not to characterize optimal behavior. It asserts that 
individuals maximize the value of their choice and decision making under conditions of 
uncertainty and risk. Individuals make decisions based on the potential value of losses and gains 
rather than the final outcome (Kahneman and Tversky 1979).  
The theory argues that individuals make decisions based on the evaluation of changes or 
differences rather than the evaluation of absolute magnitudes (Gupta and Kim 2010). This 
change becomes the reference point from where any new decisions are made. However, the 
emphasis on “change” as a carrier of value does not imply that the value of a particular change is 
independent of the initial position. Rather, value should be treated as a function of two 
arguments: the asset position that serves as a reference point and the magnitude of change 
(positive or negative) from that reference point.  
Prospect theory has been applied in information systems (IS) research. For example, in 
the context of evaluating online auction strategy, based on prospect theory, Wu et al. (2009) 
found that online bidders’ satisfaction is affected by online service quality and online auction 
price mediated by the hedonic value of the bidding process. Keil et al. (2000) used prospect 
theory to explain IS project escalation. They found that sunk cost effect enhances project 
escalation. Similarly, in an experimental study, Keil et al. (1994) found that a high level of sunk 
cost may influence decision makers to escalate their commitment to an IT project.  
In the context of crowdsourcing, solvers will encounter uncertainty while making 
decision on their participation. The uncertainty lies in whether their solutions will win the reward 
and whether firms will fairly acknowledge their proposals. Further, when individuals decide 
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whether to participate in solving crowdsourced tasks, they would calculate the gains and losses 
(benefits and costs) of participation (e.g., money obtained vs. time and effort spent) comparing 
with their current status and possible change in the magnitude of potential gains and losses of 
participation. Individuals would then choose to maximize their value by deciding whether to 
participate in crowdsourcing or not. Thus, prospect theory would be an appropriate theoretical 
lens to explain solvers’ participation in crowdsourcing.  
Currently, the IS studies that employed prospect theory mainly focused on individuals’ or 
organizational thinking when making risky decisions such as project escalation (e.g., Keil et al. 
2000, 1994). The decisions are usually long term and the decided projects or activities have been 
in existence for some time. In crowdsourcing platforms, on average, each task will be completed 
in around 2-3 months or an even shorter time (Yang et al. 2008), and solvers are attracted to 
participate by incentives (gains). Therefore, individuals in crowdsourcing platforms are more 
likely to be risk averse and they will weigh the benefits and costs of participation using the 
current preference as the reference point. 
Under the guidance of prospect theory, we review previous crowdsourcing and 
knowledge management literatures to identify the benefit and cost factors that may affect solvers’ 
participation in crowdsourcing. 
3.2.3 Benefits of Participation in Crowdsourcing 
Prior research has investigated solvers’ participation in a crowdsourced task either conceptually 
(e.g., Terwiesch and Xu 2008), or empirically (e.g., Sun et al. 2011). For example, Zheng et al. 
(2011)’s study in TaskCN found that extrinsic motivation enhances solvers’ intention to 
participate in crowdsourcing. Apart from extrinsic motivations such as winning monetary awards, 
prior literature (e.g., Brabham 2008; Kaufman et al. 2011) suggests that solvers may also be 
56 
 
motivated by other incentives to participate in crowdsourcing, such as enjoyment of solving the 
problem. For example, through surveying 205 solvers in TaskCN, Sun et al. (2011) found that 
hedonic value and satisfaction with crowdsourcing experience are the main drivers for solvers’ 
continuance intention to participate. Similarly, in Kaufman et al.’s (2011) field study, intrinsic 
motivations such as enjoyment and task autonomy are found to be highly ranked as predictors of 
solvers’ intention to participate. However, the study did not test the relationship between 
intrinsic motivations, extrinsic motivations, and solvers’ participation through statistical methods. 
It ranked them based on a collection of response from solvers.  
Through our review, benefit variables from previous literature have been listed in Table 
3.2.  We will include these six expected benefits as antecedents of solvers’ participation in our 
model. From Table 3.2, we see that the influences of costs factors and uncertainty and risks on 
solvers’ participation in crowdsourcing have been neglected in the previous literature. As per 
prospect theory, expected costs should be considered for decision making and will affect 
individuals’ behaviors (e.g., Tversky and Kahneman 1981). For example, Keil et al. (2000) 
found that sunk cost positively affects commitment escalation for IT projects. Further, previous 
literature suggests that trust plays an important role in mitigating uncertainty and risks as well as 
the cost perception (e.g., Chiles and McMackin 1996). Thus, we will investigate the influences 
of cost factors and trust in addition to the expected benefits on solvers’ participation in 
crowdsourcing. In order to identify the cost factors and the influence of trust, we reviewed the 






Table 3.2. Benefits of Solvers’ Participation in Crowdsourcing 




Case study: Istockphoto Brabham (2008) 
Case study: Threadless Brabham (2010) 
Analytic study Terwiesch and Xu (2008) 
Field study: Mechanical Turk (Survey data, no 
regression) 
Kaufman et al. (2011) 
Field study: TaskCN  Sun et al. (2011, 2012); 
Zheng et al. (2011) 
Field study: TaskCN  Yang et al. (2009) 
Skill 
Enhancement 
Case study: Istockphoto Brabham (2008) 
Case study: Threadless Brabham (2010) 
Case study: SAPien community Leimeister et al. (2009) 
Field study: Mechanical Turk (Survey data, no 
regression) (human capital advancement) 
Kaufman et al. (2011) 
Peer 
Reputation 
Case study: Istockphoto Brabham (2008) 
Case study: SAPien community 
(acknowledgement from peers) 
Leimeister et al. (2009) 
Enjoyment Case study: Istockphoto Brabham (2008) 
Field study: Mechanical Turk (Survey data, no 
regression) 
Kaufman et al. (2011) 
Field study: TaskCN  Sun et al. (2011, 2012); 
Zheng et al. (2011) 
Work 
Autonomy 
Case study: Threadless Brabham (2010) 
Field study: Mechanical Turk (Survey data, no 
regression) 
Kaufman et al. (2011) 
Field study: TaskCN  Zheng et al. (2011) 
Firm 
Recognition 
Case study: SAPien community Leimeister et al. (2009) 
Field study: TaskCN  Zheng et al. (2011); Yang et 
al. (2008) 
3.2.4 Costs of Participation and Trust 
Previous conceptual studies have suggested that there are costs for solvers to participate in 
crowdsourcing (e.g., Afuah and Tucci 2012; Doan et al. 2011; Yang et al. 2008). From Table 3.2 
and the prior discussion of previous literature, however, we can see that there is a lack of 
empirical studies investigating cost factors that may affect solvers’ participation in 
crowdsourcing. In order to address the gap, we draw from online knowledge sharing literature to 
identify the possible cost factors. This is because solvers’ contribution of solutions to tasks in 
crowdsourcing can be perceived as a type of online knowledge contribution behaviors 
(Leimeister et al. 2009).  
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The knowledge management literature suggests that knowledge sharing could incur the 
costs of loss of knowledge power and cognitive effort to knowledge contributors (Cillo 2005; 
Kankanhalli et al. 2005). These costs will discourage individual’s knowledge contribution 
behaviors (Cillo 2005; Kankanhalli et al. 2005). Similarly, in the context of crowdsourcing, 
solvers expend time and effort to solve tasks and contribute their knowledge to solutions. Thus, 
we expect that these costs (i.e., loss of knowledge power and cognitive effort) may also hinder 
solvers’ participation in crowdsourcing. These costs can be considered as sunk costs for their 
participation in crowdsourcing. 
In addition to the cost-benefit analysis mentioned above, participation in crowdsourcing 
could also be determined by solvers’ trust in the crowdsourcing platform (Yang et al. 2008). 
Trust is not a cost or benefit but can exert influence on individuals’ cognitive deliberation on the 
costs and benefits of an action (Hsu et al. 2007; Putnam 1993). Previous literature suggests that 
trust can lessen the influence of cost concerns and moderate the relationship between the 
perceived costs and an action (e.g., Noorderhaven 1996). In particular, with a high level of trust, 
individuals may be less concerned about the costs that an action raises (Hsu et al. 2007). 
Conversely, when trust is low, individuals are more likely to focus on the costs of the action. 
Thus, trust in the crowdsourcing platform could be a factor that moderates the influence of cost 
concerns on solvers’ participation in crowdsourcing. Trust in the website could reduce solvers’ 
concerns on the potential risks and possible costs and is included in our model. 
3.3 Research Model and Hypotheses 
Drawing on prospect theory and previous related literatures, a model was developed to predict 

















Figure 3.1. Research Model for Solvers’ Participation 
Specifically, the model proposes that monetary reward, skill enhancement, peer 
reputation, firm recognition, enjoyment of solving, and work autonomy will enhance solvers’ 
participation in crowdsourcing while cognitive effort and loss of knowledge power will inhibit 
their participation. It also explored the moderating effects of trust on solvers’ participation in 
crowdsourcing. It expects that trust in the crowdsourcing website/platform will negatively 
moderate the relationship between codification cost and solvers’ participation in crowdsourcing 
and the relationship between proposal evaluation cost and solvers’ participation in 
crowdsourcing. To measure solvers’ actual participation in crowdsourcing, the dependent 
Cognitive Effort 



























variable (participation in crowdsourcing) is operationalized as the increased number of tasks 
participated by the solver in three months. 
3.3.1 Monetary Reward 
In crowdsourcing, monetary rewards are typically provided as incentives for solvers (Howe 
2008). To encourage solvers to participate in crowdsourcing, winners will receive monetary 
reward from firms if their solutions are selected (Travis 2008). Previous literature suggests that 
extrinsic motivations such as monetary reward are important drivers for individuals to undertake 
an action (e.g., Brabham 2008, 2010; Zheng et al. 2011). For example, Terwiesch and Xu 
(2008)’s analytic study suggests that monetary rewards will stimulate solvers’ participation in 
crowdsourcing. In Kaufman et al. (2011)’s field study, monetary rewards are ranked as the 
number one reason for individuals to work in Amazon Mechanical Turk. In TaskCN, using task 
level secondary data, Yang et al. (2009) found that solvers are more likely to participate in 
solving a task that rewards a greater amount of money. Similarly, Zheng et al. (2011) found that 
extrinsic motivation to gain money positively affect solvers’ intention to participate in 
crowdsourcing.  
In the context of our study, solvers will receive money from seekers if their solutions 
have won the task competition (Yang et al. 2009). Similarly, following the logic discussed above, 
we propose that for individual solvers, monetary reward will enhance their participation in 
crowdsourcing. Thus, we hypothesize 
H1: Monetary reward positively affects solvers’ participation in crowdsourcing 
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3.3.2 Skill Enhancement 
Skill enhancement refers to the degree to which solvers enhance their expertise through receiving 
feedback from the crowdsourcing process or by learning from others’ solutions. Previous 
literature suggested that to avoid wasting effort (avoid loss), individuals will select problems that 
they think will provide benefit for them either immediately or in the future (Stewart and Gosain 
2006). Similarly, in the context of this study, solvers are likely to submit solutions for problems 
that improve their skills or expertise with respect to a particular problem (Kaufman et al. 2011). 
Moreover, when solvers propose solutions, the staff members in the crowdsourcing platform or 
firms may provide feedback so that solvers can identify where their solutions fall short and what 
should be improved (Sieg et al. 2010). Such feedback provides guidance for solvers to improve 
their proposed solutions and enhance their skills in particular areas (Allio 2004; Leimeister et al. 
2009; Travis 2008).  
This argument agrees with previous anecdotal evidence. For example, Brabham (2008)’s 
case study noted that solvers are motivated to participate in iStockphoto
6
 by the opportunities of 
learning new photography skills. In Brabham (2010)’s case study in Threadless7, the opportunity 
to develop T-shirt design skills is found to be one of the factors that motivate solvers to 
participate in crowdsourcing. Similar results have been observed in Kaufman et al. (2011) that 
human capital advancement is ranked as an important factor for individuals to work in Amazon 
Mechanical Turk. In the context of our study, similarly, solvers may be able to pick up or 
improve skills such as the skills of marketing their solutions to seeker firms, communication 
skills, logo design/ product outlook design skills, programming skills, and writing and translation 
skills. Thus, we expect that 







H2: Skill enhancement positively affects solvers’ participation in crowdsourcing  
3.3.3 Peer Reputation 
Prospect theory posits that individuals will be motivated to undertake an action if they can 
receive gains from it (Tversky and Kahneman 1981). In the context of crowdsourcing, such gains 
can be derived from peers in the form of peer reputation (Leimeister et al. 2009) where peers 
respect and acknowledge solvers’ skills and contributions to the platform. Peer reputation is an 
indicator of status in a community and fulfills fundamental human goal, which can directly 
parallel money (Constant et al. 1994). Thus, peer reputation should motivate solvers to 
participate. This agrees with past literature which suggests that reputation among peers is an 
important antecedent for individuals’ intention to participate in crowdsourcing (e.g., Brabham 
2008; Leimeister et al. 2009). For example, in their case study of crowdsourcing in the SAPien 
community, Leimeister et al. (2009) found that individuals’ need for peer appreciation and 
acknowledgement of their knowledge is a motivator for their participation in crowdsourcing. A 
similar reason has been reported in Brabham’s (2008) case studies.  
In the context of our study, successful solvers will be interviewed by TaskCn to share 
their winning experience and their suggestions for other solvers in the winning solver webpage
8
. 
Their interviews will be shown in the front page of TaskCN. Further, for each task, the winning 
solution will be publicized for one week. Peers will then know who won the task. Further, there 
are solver forums in TaskCN in which solvers interact with each other and with firms. Through 
these ways, successful solvers will be known by their peers. Following the discussion above, we 
expect that 
H3: Peer reputation positively affects solvers’ participation in crowdsourcing 





3.3.4 Firm Recognition 
As noted in Leimeister et al. (2009), potential benefits for solvers to engage in crowdsourcing 
could include firm recognition in addition to peer reputation. Participation in crowdsourcing 
could enhance solvers’ reputation or status in the eyes of firms and hence increase their 
opportunities for employment (Leimeister et al. 2009). With firm recognition, solvers may also 
be recommended to other firms who may need their skills to solve similar problems.  
Therefore, if participation could improve individuals’ opportunities to be recognized and 
employed by firms, they are likely to undertake this behavior. This argument agrees with 
previous findings. For example, in Zheng et al. (2011)’s work, extrinsic motivation to gain 
recognition was found to determine individuals’ intention to participate in crowdsourcing. 
Besides, Yang et al. (2008) suggested that firms would like to directly outsource similar tasks to 
the winning solvers that they recognize through the platform. Thus, firm’s recognition could 
improve solvers’ opportunities to seek employment for other tasks. In the context of our study, as 
we have mentioned in previous section, successful solvers will be interviewed and listed at the 
front page of TaskCN. Seekers may know those successful solvers from interview contents. 
Further, seekers will need to select their winners. They may be familiar with their winners and 
approach them to solving future tasks. Further, TaskCN has a forum for solvers and seekers to 
interact with each other. Based on the above reasoning, the expected recognition from firms may 
lead users to actively participate in crowdsourcing.  
H4: Firm recognition positively affects solvers’ participation in crowdsourcing 
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3.3.5 Enjoyment of Solving 
Prior research suggests that solvers may be motivated by the enjoyment of taking up new 
problems (Lakhani and Jeppesen 2007; Zheng et al. 2011) and solving puzzles (Travis 2008). 
The crowdsourced problems can arouse their interest and curiosity to explore new fields. 
Through linking the novel problems with their existing knowledge, solvers try to find solutions 
to them. The more they solve challenging tasks, the more enjoyment they may perceive and the 
more likely they are to participate in crowdsourcing in future. In general, individuals will 
undertake tasks if they enjoy solving them. Previous literature has reported similar findings (e.g., 
Brabham 2008; Sun et al. 2011, 2012; Zheng et al. 2011). In Sun et al.’s (2011) study, hedonic 
value (enjoyment) is found to positively affect solvers’ continuance intention to participate in 
crowdsourcing. Kaufman et al.’s (2011) field study found that enjoyment based factors are listed 
by solvers as one of the reasons for their participation. Similar results have also been noted in 
Zheng et al. (2011) and Sun et al. (2012) that intrinsic motivation enhances solvers’ intention to 
participate in crowdsourcing. Thus, we hypothesize 
H5: Enjoyment of solving positively affects solvers’ participation in crowdsourcing 
3.3.6 Work Autonomy 
Work autonomy refers to the degree to which the work provides substantial freedom, 
independence, and discretion in scheduling and in determining the procedures to be used in 
carrying it out (Hackman and Oldham 1975). Prior studies have found that work autonomy 
influences employees’ perceptions of their ability to initiate, perform, and complete tasks (Xie 
and Johns 1995) and their performance (Haas 2010).  
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In the context of this study, crowdsourcing can allow solvers autonomy in deciding which 
tasks to solve, when to solve them, and how to solve them (Kaufman et al. 2011). Solvers do not 
have to commute to participate and be restricted by work schedules. The benefit of work 
autonomy should motivate them to participate in crowdsourcing. This argument has been 
supported by anecdotal evidence in past literature. For example, Brabham (2010)’s case study 
found that the potential to take up freelance work is one of the reasons that motivate solvers to 
participate in crowdsourcing. Similar results have been observed in Zheng et al.’s (2011) work 
that autonomy is positively related to solvers’ continuance intention to participate in 
crowdsourcing mediated. Hence, we hypothesize  
H6: Work autonomy positively affects solvers’ participation in crowdsourcing 
3.3.7 Cognitive Effort 
Cognitive effort refers to the effort required for solvers to solve firms’ problems, bridging the 
gaps between the context of their past solutions and that of current problems (Cillo 2005). 
Psychologists have found that humans have limited cognitive resources (Russo and Dosher 1983; 
Garbarino and Edell 1997). Cognitive effort is costly and as per prospect theory, humans expend 
only the effort necessary to make a satisfactory decision rather than an optimal decision. It is 
advisable that people are willing to forgo some benefits to conserve cognitive effort (Garbarino 
and Edell 1997).  
In the context of crowdsourcing, solvers need to exert cognitive effort to understand the 
task requirements, generate ideas, and come up with solutions (Boudreau and Lakhani 2009). 
They may need considerable cognitive effort to connect their expertise with problems and 
develop solutions for the problems. Solvers are likely to not participate in crowdsourcing if the 
cognitive effort is high (Yang et al. 2008). Thus, we expect 
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H7a: Cognitive effort negatively affects solvers’ participation in crowdsourcing 
The relationship between cognitive effort and participation in crowdsourcing may be moderated 
by trust. Trust implies a belief in the good intent of others (Putnam 1993). When trust is high, 
solvers are likely to believe that the crowdsourcing platform will ensure that their solution is 
evaluated fairly and reward them if it is adopted. Such beliefs may lead them to be less 
concerned about cognitive effort needed for information processing and solution formulation 
(Garbarino and Edell 1997). Solvers may then consider the cognitive effort as the necessary 
resources required for solving a task. Conversely, when trust is low, solvers may believe that 
they may not win even if they put in much cognitive effort in solving a task. As per prospect 
theory, individuals will be risk averse when they choose between gains and losses, and tend to 
minimize the loss (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). Thus, solvers are more likely to be concerned 
about the cognitive effort required to propose solutions when trust is low. Therefore, we 
hypothesize 
H7b: The negative relationship between cognitive effort and solvers’ participation in 
crowdsourcing is weaker when trust is high 
3.3.8 Loss of Knowledge Power 
Loss of knowledge power refers to the loss of proprietary knowledge and the sole claim to the 
benefits stemming from such knowledge (Kankanhalli et al. 2005). In knowledge management 
literature, the loss of knowledge power is reported as a barrier to knowledge sharing (Davenport 
and Prusak 1998). By contributing a part of their unique knowledge, knowledge contributors 
give up the sole claim to the benefits stemming from such knowledge (Gray 2001; Kankanhalli 
et al. 2005). The cost (i.e., loss of knowledge power) will discourage individuals to undertake the 
action, i.e., sharing their knowledge. Similarly, in the context of crowdsourcing, knowledge may 
be perceived as a source of power by solvers. They may fear losing their power or value if firms 
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and peers come to know of their ideas prior to being rewarded (Afuah and Tucci 2012; Allio 
2004). This may result in potential solvers avoiding participation in crowdsourcing. Following 
the logic above, we expect 
H8a: Loss of knowledge power negatively affects solvers’ participation in crowdsourcing 
Previous literature suggests that trust will mitigate individuals’ cost concerns and make them 
believe that the other party will behave in their interest (e.g., Noorderhaven 1996). When solvers 
have a strong trust in the crowdsourcing platform that it will protect their knowledge, they 
believe that the platform and firms will reward them according to their solutions and would not 
misuse their solutions. They may not frame their contribution as a loss but rather as an approach 
for seeker firms to understand their ideas. In such conditions the deterrent effect of the loss of 
knowledge power may be reduced. Conversely, with a low level of trust, solvers may be 
concerned about the loss of knowledge power when they apply their expertise or specialized 
knowledge to solve problems. They could be worried about whether their ideas will be misused 
by the crowdsourcing platform or seeker firms and whether they would be paid if their solutions 
are adopted. Therefore, we hypothesize: 
H8b: The negative relationship between loss of knowledge power and solvers’ participation in 
crowdsourcing is weaker when trust is high 
3.4 Research Methodology 
Survey methodology was employed to test the research model. Survey methodology provides a 
basis for establishing generalizability, allows replicability, and has statistical power (Neuman 
2005). To reduce the possibility of common method variance caused by a single data source 
(Podsakoff et al. 2003), the survey data was supplemented by objective data for the dependent 
variable collected from the corresponding platform and using the archival data in the data 
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analysis. Additionally, to better assess the causality between surveyed constructs and the 
dependent variable (Neuman 2005), we collected archival data for the dependent variable in 
three months after the survey.  
3.4.1 Instrument Development and Conceptual Validation 
Since several constructs in our model were adapted to the study context and items for other 
constructs needed to be developed from scratch, we conducted a systematic procedure of 
instrument development (DeVellis 2003). There are three stages in instrument development, i.e., 
item creation and scale development, conceptual validation, and instrument testing. In the item 
creation and scale development stage, pools of items for each construct are created by first 
examining the relevant existing instruments or creating new items according to their definitions. 
In the conceptual validation stage, the unlabelled and labeled sorting exercises are conducted to 
assess the construct validity of the scales developed and to identify any potential ambiguity in 
items. According to the judges’ feedback, the items are refined.  
Table 3.3. Definitions of Constructs in the Proposed Model for Study 2 
Constructs  Definition  Source  
Monetary Reward The degree to which solvers believe that they will receive 
monetary incentives for their solutions proposed 




The possibility of enhancing skills or expertise through 
receiving feedback from the crowdsourcing platform on their 
proposals or learn from peers’ solutions 
Adapted from Lakhani 
and Wolf (2005) 
Peer Reputation The perception of increase in reputation among peers due to 
participation in the crowdsourcing tasks 
Adapted from Wasko 
and Faraj (2005) 
 Firm Recognition The perception of increase in recognition among firms due to 
winning the reward from them through crowdsourcing 
Enjoyment of 
Solving 
The perception of pleasure obtained from solving tasks in the 
crowdsourcing platform 
Adapted from Lakhani 
and Jeppesen (2007) 
Work Autonomy The degree to which the work provides substantial freedom, 
independence and discretion in determining the choice of task 
type and the procedures to be used in carrying it out  
Hackman and Oldham 




Cognitive Effort The efforts required for solvers to link their expertise with 
firms’ problem and formulate their solutions 
Adapted from 




The perception of power and unique value lost due to 
submitting solutions to the crowdsourcing platform that others 
may see or copy 
Adapted from Gray 
(2001) 
Trust in the 
Crowdsourcing 
Platform 
The belief in the good intent, competence, and reliability of 






The number of tasks solvers have participated in a given 
period 
Adapted from Zheng et 
al. (2011) 
In the instrument testing stage, the instrument is further refined through a pilot test. A 
pilot test is used to obtain an indication of the scales’ reliability and to identify any potential 
problems in the instrument, as indicated by the respondents. In the pilot test, the various scales 
were put together into an overall instrument. 
In this study, through a review of relevant literature, existing scales were adopted. New 
items were created through interviews with solvers or according to the construct definition. 
Construct definitions are shown in Table 3.3. Items for each construct were validated through the 
unlabelled and labeled sorting exercises in which two sets of four judges were used. Inter-judge 
agreement (i.e., Cohen’s Kappa and agreement level) and item placement hit ratio were used to 
assess conceptual reliability and validity. Results for the sorting are shown in Tables A.1, A.3, 
and A.6 in Appendix A. The results show that in both rounds of item sorting, Kappa score 
agreement level, and hit ratio for all items are greater than 0.8, suggesting sufficient item 
reliability and validity (Jarvenpaa 1998). The validated items were then put together into an 
overall questionnaire and tested in the pilot study, which will be introduced next. 
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3.4.2 Pilot Study 
A pilot study was conducted to assess the reliability and validity and to identify any potential 
problems of the instrument, as indicated by the respondents. We pilot tested the instrument in 
zhubajie.com, a similar crowdsourcing platform to our main study sample in TaskCN. To pilot 
test the instrument, we surveyed 106 solvers in zhubajie.com, a similar but smaller 
crowdsourcing website with our main study site.  
The results for pilot study were shown in Tables B.2, B.4, and B.8 in Appendix B. 
According to the pilot test, one item for Monetary Reward and one for Skill Enhancement were 
removed due to low loading. After removing the items, the results for exploratory factory 
analysis demonstrate sufficient instrument validity (see Table B.8 in Appendix B). We also 
edited item wordings in the instrument according to the feedback from the pilot test and follow 
up interviews (see Table B.10). The final instrument is shown in Table 3.4. 
Table 3.4. Items of Constructs in the Proposed Model for Study 2 
Constructs  Items  Source  
Monetary 
Reward 
MON1: I expect to receive monetary rewards in return for my submission 
MON2: I will receive monetary rewards for my submission   
MON3: I will be financially rewarded by firms for my submission 
Adapted from 




SKL1: Participating in solving problems in the platform helps me 
improve my own skills in a particular area 
SKL2: I can enhance my skills in a particular area through participation 





REP1: I will earn respect from peers by winning the task in  the platform 
REP2: I feel that winning the tasks improves my reputation among peers 
in  the platform 
REP3: Winning rewards in the platform will improve my reputation 
among peers in the community 







REC1: Winning tasks can allow my expertise to be recognized by firms 
REC2: I can gain recognition from companies through winning the tasks  
REC3: Companies know me from my submissions 





ENJ1: I enjoy solving novel tasks proposed in  the platform 
ENJ2: The challenge of solving novel tasks proposed in  the platform is 
enjoyable for me 
ENJ3: I feel good when solving the tasks from  the platform 









AUT1: I can select the type of tasks I work on in the platform 
AUT2: I have freedom to decide how I perform the chosen task in  the 
platform 
AUT3: I can freely choose any approach to perform tasks in  the platform 
AUT4: I have the authority to choose any task in  the platform 




COG1: I try very hard to understand task requirements in the platform 
COG2: I need to put in effort into understanding firms’ task requirements 
COG3: I need to input much time and effort to solve tasks in the platform 
COG4: I need to put in time into solving firms’ problems 







LOS1: Providing my solutions through  the platform makes me lose my 
unique value  
LOS2: Providing my solutions through  the platform makes me lose my 
power base  
LOS3: Providing my solutions through  the platform makes me lose my 
knowledge that makes me stand out with respect to others  
LOS4: Providing my solutions through  the platform makes me lose my 




Trust in the 
Crowdsourci
ng Platform 
TRU1: I believe that the platform gives credit for solvers’ solutions 
TRU2: I believe that the platform will not misuse my solutions 
TRU3: I believe that the platform guarantees the rewards if solutions 
were adopted  




3.4.3 The Main Study 
We collected data from solvers in TaskCN.com to test the model. It is a third party platform to 
host the solving of seekers’ tasks by solvers. TaskCN is considered as one of the most popular 
and established crowdsourcing websites in China being founded in 2005. By the end of 
November 2012, TaskCN hosted over 3.3 million registered solvers and over 52 thousand
9
. 
Among all tasks, 51.9% are logo design tasks, 21.7% writing and translation tasks, 8.5% website 
design tasks, 4% programming tasks, and others. This platform has received media coverage in 
China as well as researchers’ attention (e.g., Sun et al. 2012; Yang et al. 2009). The selection of 
this platform allows us a sufficient large pool of solvers to test our models. The existence of 
previous studies on this platform allows for comparisons and cumulation of research in this area.  
Following Sun et al. (2012)’s procedure, we invited solvers in TaskCN to participate in 
our survey by sending emails to them through the internal message tool. As a token of 





appreciation for their participation, a $10 voucher was given to respondents. A total of 165 
responses were received of which 156 valid responses remained after removing incomplete, 
duplicate, and outliner data. 
Table 3.5. Demographic Information for Study 2 
Demographic Variables Frequency (N=156) Percentage (%) 
Gender 
Male  106  67.95  
Female  50  32.05  
Age 
16-20  19  12.18 
21-25  87  55.77 
26-30  29  18.59 
31-35 12  7.69 
35-40  5  3.21 
> 40  4  2.56 
Education 
Level 
High school  18  11.54 
Bachelor  124  79.49 
Master  9  5.77 
Doctorate 5  3.21 
Tenure 
(Months) 
3-6 19 12.18 
6-9 34 21.79 
9-12 22 14.10 
>12 81 51.92 
Status  
 
Amateur  122  78.21 
Professional  34  21.79  
Task Type Website design and programming  15 9.62 
Logo, benchmark, and product outlook 
design 49 31.41 
Writing and translation 47 30.13 
Laborious tasks (e.g., Post Ads in 
communities) 27 17.31 
Others 18 11.54 
Previous 
Performance 
0 97 62.18 
1-3 26 16.67 
4-6 19 12.18 
>6 14 8.97 
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For the dependent variable (solvers’ participation in crowdsourcing), we used the number 
of submissions of solvers in three months, i.e., the increased number of submissions. For the 
independent variable, we used the instrument to measure them. 
3.4.4 Control Variables 
We also included the demographic variables of solvers as controls in the model, which may 
affect solvers’ participation in crowdsourcing. These demographic variables include solvers’ age, 
gender, education, tenure, and previous performance in the crowdsourcing platform. Previous 
performance refers to the number of times they have won. Also, the status of solvers and type of 
tasks may affect their participation in crowdsourcing. Status of solvers refers to whether solvers 
are professional or amateur. Professional solvers who consider solving tasks in TaskCN as a 
career are more likely to actively participate in crowdsourcing than amateur solvers. We 
collected the data about solvers’ status through directly asking whether they are professional 
solvers or not in the questionnaire. The type of tasks was measured as dummy variables. The 
demographic information about the respondents is listed in Table 3.5. 
3.5 Data Analysis and Results 
For this study, structural equation modeling (SEM) analysis was chosen over linear regression, 
because SEM can simultaneously analyze all paths with latent variables in one analysis (Gefen et 
al. 2011). Within SEM, Partial Least Squares (PLS) was chosen over co-variance based SEM for 
two reasons. First, the dependent variable (solvers’ participation in crowdsourcing) is measured 
with archival data, which may not conform to the proportionality constraints and uncorrelated 
measurement errors of co-variance based SEM (Gefen et al. 2011). Second, PLS is a suitable 
choice for the model with moderating effects (Gefen et al. 2011; Wetzels et al. 2009) as in our 
model (i.e., H7b and H8b). Interaction terms were computed by cross-multiplying the 
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standardized items of the relevant constructs (Wetzels et al. 2009). We used SmartPLS 2.0 to 
analyze the data.  
Since a web-based survey design may suffer from non-response bias (Roztocki 2001), we 
tested for such bias by comparing the early and late respondents (Armstrong and Overton 1977). 
T-tests of the differences between the earliest 10% respondents and the last 10% respondents in 
terms of demographics revealed no systematic differences (see Table C.2 in Appendix C). Thus, 
non-response bias is not expected in this study. 
3.5.1 Instrument Validity 
To validate our instrument, convergent validity and discriminant validity were tested (Hair et al. 
2006). Convergent validity was assessed by examining the Cronbach’s α (CA) (>0.7), composite 
reliability (>0.7), average extracted variance (AVE) (>0.5), and factor analysis results (Straub et 
al. 2004). Table 3.6 shows that the values of CA, CR and AVE for each reflective construct in 
the model satisfy the thresholds. In addition, the factor loadings of each item were larger than 0.7 
(see Table 3.7). All the criteria are satisfied, which suggested sufficient convergent validity of 
the model constructs (Straub et al. 2004).  
Table 3.6. Descriptive Statistics for Study 2 
Construct  Min Max Mean  STD  AVE  CR  CA  
Work Autonomy (AUT) 1 7 5.71 1.30 0.79 0.94 0.91 
Monetary Reward (MON) 3.67 7 6.07  1.29  0.78 0.91 0.86 
Skill Enhancement (SKL) 2 7 5.53  1.56  0.78 0.92 0.86 
Enjoyment of Solving (ENJ ) 2.5 7 5.57  1.37  0.59 0.85 0.77 
Peer Reputation (REP) 1 7 4.91  1.72  0.70 0.90 0.86 
Firm Recognition (REC) 1 7 5.93  1.42  0.70 0.90 0.86 
Cognitive Effort (COG) 1 7 5.37  1.49  0.76 0.93 0.90 
Loss of Knowledge Power (LOS) 1 7 2.89  1.77  0.74 0.92 0.93 
Trust(TRU) 1.75 7 5.05 1.51  0.71 0.91 0.88 
Solvers’ Participation* 0 64 7.25  13.32  - - - 
* Single item construct measured by number of tasks participated 
75 
 
Discriminant validity was assessed by examining the indicator-factor loadings and 
comparing AVEs with inter-construct correlations (Gefen and Straub 2005). The results in Table 
3.7 show that all indicators load more strongly on their corresponding constructs than on other 
constructs in the model and the item loadings on unintended constructs were lower than 0.4. The 
results in Table 3.8 also show that the square root of AVE is larger than the inter-construct 
correlations. Thus, the constructs demonstrated sufficient discriminant validity.  
Since we collected data for our independent variables and dependent variable from two 
independent sources, common method variance (CMV) should not be an issue in our study 
(Podsakoff et al. 2003). Nevertheless, Harman’s single factor test was conducted by running an 
exploratory factor with all variables included (Podsakoff et al. 2003). The factor analyses 
produced neither a single factor nor one general factor that accounted for the majority of the 










Table 3.7. Exploratory Factor Analysis for Study 2 
   1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  
AUT1  0.09  -0.01  0.11  0.10  -0.01  0.11  0.90  0.08  -0.09  
AUT2  0.08  -0.09  -0.03  0.01  0.06  0.15  0.89  0.04  0.04  
AUT3  0.13  -0.11  0.07  -0.15  -0.03  0.10  0.93  0.15  0.09  
AUT4  0.06  0.00  0.16  0.21  0.02  0.10  0.87  0.17  -0.17  
MON1 -0.06  -0.05  0.12  0.25  0.17  -0.06  -0.16  0.14  0.91  
MON2  0.00  -0.05  0.07  0.12  0.07  0.11  0.06  -0.05  0.90  
MON3  0.04  0.11  0.22  0.18  0.20  0.16  -0.04  0.12  0.84  
SKL1  0.20  -0.16  0.09  0.26  -0.01  0.88 0.15  -0.04  0.07  
SKL2  0.30  -0.03  0.07  0.22  -0.02  0.90 0.10  0.04  -0.01  
SKL3  0.12  0.02  0.04  0.04  0.04  0.85  0.17  0.31  0.10  
ENJ1  0.06  -0.02  0.13  0.16  0.18  0.11  0.08  0.75  0.01  
ENJ2  0.15  -0.01  0.12  0.08  -0.08  0.16  0.08  0.75 0.04  
ENJ3  0.36  -0.15  0.09  0.05  0.13  0.17  0.23  0.74 0.13  
ENJ4  0.30  -0.05  -0.06  0.25  0.04  0.12  0.24  0.82  0.08  
REP1  0.15  0.09  0.87  0.17  0.02  0.02  0.08  0.16  0.11  
REP2  0.09  -0.02  0.76 0.20  0.19  0.25  0.03  0.03  0.04  
REP3  0.18  0.06  0.81  0.19  0.03  0.05  0.08  0.07  0.07  
REP4  0.06  0.09  0.89  0.20  0.04  0.02  0.11  0.04  0.19  
REC1  0.06  0.03  0.19  0.88 0.08  0.00  0.09  0.18  0.06  
REC2  0.13  0.03  0.21  0.80 0.03  0.25  0.07  0.08  0.22  
REC3  0.01  0.18  0.28  0.85 0.17  0.09  -0.05  0.10  0.23  
REC4  0.02  0.00  0.23  0.82 0.05  0.25  0.06  0.13  0.16  
COG1  0.06  0.08  -0.08  0.19  0.84  -0.02  0.09  -0.09  0.08  
COG2  0.01  0.09  0.12  0.12  0.93 -0.10  -0.02  -0.01  0.02  
COG3  0.00  0.04  0.11  -0.06  0.84 0.24  0.01  0.15  0.11  
COG4  0.00  0.07  0.10  0.00  0.88 0.00  -0.04  0.15  0.20  
LOS1  0.01  0.94  0.01  0.04  0.06  -0.16  -0.03  -0.02  -0.07  
LOS2  0.00  0.84 -0.02  0.00  0.05  -0.06  -0.05  0.02  -0.04  
LOS3  -0.19  0.91 0.17  0.04  0.05  0.06  -0.10  -0.09  0.02  
LOS4  -0.16  0.75 0.06  0.07  0.12  0.03  -0.03  -0.06  0.10  
TRU1  0.84  0.00  0.04  0.02  0.10  0.18  0.14  0.21  0.04  
TRU2  0.90 -0.10  0.19  -0.04  0.02  0.18  0.06  0.20  -0.01  
TRU3  0.87  -0.13  0.14  0.11  -0.02  0.06  0.08  0.02  -0.03  
TRU4  0.90 -0.10  0.10  0.08  -0.02  0.07  0.07  0.12  -0.03  
Eigenvalue 9.32 4.15 3.42 2.70 2.16 1.81 1.56 1.44 1.09 
% of variance 25.88 11.54 9.49 7.50 5.99 5.01 4.33 4.00 3.03 
Cumulative % 25.88 37.42 46.90 54.40 60.39 65.40 69.74 73.74 76.77 
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Table 3.8. Correlations for Study 2 
 AUT MON SKL ENJ REP REC COG LOS TRU Participation Tenure Gender Age Education Status 
Previous 
performance 
AUT 0.90                
MON 0.35 0.88               
SKL 0.42 0.52 0.88              
ENJ 0.34 0.22 0.28 0.76             
REP 0.30 0.18 0.18 0.36 0.84            
REC 0.25 0.34 0.21 0.41 0.51 0.84           
COG -0.07 0.01 -0.15 0.09 0.16 0.16 0.87          
LOS -0.06 -0.03 -0.05 -0.15 0.14 0.09 0.14 0.86         
TRU 0.00 -0.01 0.09 0.35 -0.09 0.27 0.19 0.06 0.88        
Participation 0.28 0.24 0.27 0.18 0.08 0.14 -0.22 -0.04 0.05 -*       
Tenure 0.04 -0.10 -0.08 0.02 0.02 0.05 -0.04 0.08 -0.22 0.22 -*      
Gender 0.04 -0.13 -0.01 -0.03 0.07 -0.14 0.11 0.03 -0.04 0.10 0.10 -*     
Age 0.04 -0.01 0.00 0.06 0.07 0.03 0.19 0.05 -0.11 0.23 0.26 0.09 -*    
Education 0.08 0.01 0.01 -0.06 -0.05 -0.04 -0.01 -0.02 -0.25 0.07 0.16 0.04 0.17 -*   
Status 0.10 0.21 0.07 0.13 0.09 0.26 0.13 0.01 0.04 0.13 0.09 -0.12 0.13 0.09 -*  
Previous 
Performance 
0.12 -0.01 -0.01 0.19 -0.01 -0.03 0.05 -0.12 0.06 -0.12 -0.01 0.07 -0.09 -0.04 -0.01 -* 
Notes 
* Excluded because construct has a single measure  
+     Diagonal elements are the square root of average variance extracted (AVE) 
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3.5.2 Results of Hypotheses Testing 
Table 3.9 shows the results of hypothesis testing. The model explains 42% of the variance in 
solvers’ participation in crowdsourcing. According to Ringle et al. (2012), a study that used 
PLS to analyze the data should report the structural model evaluation criteria, i.e., Cohen’s 
effect size ƒ2, which allows researchers to evaluate the independent variable’s incremental 
explanation of a dependent variable. Following Chin et al. (2003), we calculated the Cohen’s 
effect size of the model. Both the main model and the interaction model have a medium to 
large effect size ƒ2 of 0.28 and 0.21 respectively, according to Cohen (1988)10. This suggests 
a decent predictive capability of our model in explaining solvers’ participation in 
crowdsourcing. We also conducted incremental F test of the R
2
 change. The results in Table 
3.9 suggest that the independent variables and interactions have unique contributions to the 
explanation of the variance in solvers’ participation in crowdsourcing (F1=4. 23, p<0.001; 
F2=14.07, p<0.001).  
As the results in Table 3.9 show, among the control variables, age, gender and status 
are significantly related to solvers’ participation in crowdsourcing. This suggests that older 
solvers tend to be more active participants than young ones while males tend to more actively 
participate in crowdsourcing than females. In addition, professional solvers tend to be more 
active than amateur solvers. 
As hypothesized, monetary reward, skill enhancement, enjoyment, and work 
autonomy were found to positively affect solvers’ participation in crowdsourcing (H1, H2, 
H5, and H6 are supported) while cognitive effort was found to negatively affect solvers’ 
participation in crowdsourcing (H7a is supported). In addition, consistent with our 
hypotheses, trust was found to negatively moderate the relationship between cognitive effort 
                                                          




and solvers’ participation in crowdsourcing and the relationship between loss of knowledge 
power and solvers’ participation in crowdsourcing (H7b and H8b are supported).  
However, contrary to our hypotheses, peer reputation, firm recognition, and loss of 
knowledge power were found to have no impact on solvers’ participation in crowdsourcing 
(H3, H4, and H8a are not supported).  
Table 3.9. Results of Hypotheses Testing for Study 2 
DV = Solvers’ Participation in Crowdsourcing 
 Control  Main Effect  Main + 
Interaction  
Result 
Age 0.14* 0.16* 0.18* Sig. 
Gender 0.12* 0.14* 0.13* Sig. 
Education Level -0.01 -0.02 -0.05 N.S.  
Tenure  0.09 0.12 0.17 N.S.  
Status  0.16* 0.15* 0.19* Sig. 
Website Design and 
Programming  
0.05 0.02 0.03 N.S.  
Logo Design 0.08 0.05 0.04 N.S.  
Writing and Translation 0.03 0.01 0.02 N.S.  
Laborious Tasks  -0.11 -0.09 -0.04 N.S.  
Previous Performance 0.15* 0.10 0.08 N.S. 
Monetary Reward  0.14** 0.13** H1 supported  
Skill Enhancement   0.12* 0.11* H2 supported  
Peer Reputation  -0.06 -0.02 H3 not supported  
Firm Recognition   0.01 0.01 H4 not supported 
Enjoyment   0.11* 0.10* H5 supported 
Work Autonomy   0.15** 0.17** H6 supported  
Cognitive Effort   -0.14* -0.17* H7a supported  
Loss of Knowledge Power   0.03 0.03 H8a not supported  
Trust  0.01 0.03 N.A.  
TRU* COG   -0.10* H7b supported  
TRU* LOS   -0.12* H8b supported  
R
2 
 0.13 0.32 0.42  
Effect Size ƒ2  0.28 0.21  
∆R2 (F-Value)  0.19(4.23)*** 0.12(14.07)***  
Observations 156 
*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 
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3.5.3 Post Hoc Analysis 
Prospect theory asserts that individuals behave taking their status quo as the reference point 
for consideration (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). This means that individuals choose to be 
risk seeking or risk averse according to their current status, i.e., whether prior outcomes are 
gains or losses (Kahneman and Tversky 1983). If their current status is framed as gains, they 
tend to be risk averse, while if their status is framed as losses, they tend to be risk seeking 
(Kahneman and Tversky 1983). This argument has received empirical support from previous 
literature. For instance, Barberis et al. (2001) found that investors are loss averse over 
fluctuations in the value of financial wealth and the degree of loss aversion depends on their 
prior investment performance. Similarly, Keil et al. (2000) found that managers tend to invest 
more on projects with high sunk cost, i.e., risk seeking. 
Similarly, in the context of our study, solvers’ previous performance will affect their 
loss aversion/seeking in the future behaviors. In this sense, they will put different weights on 
motivations of their participation. Those solvers who have not won before may have been in 
the status of loss (e.g., the effort spent in past participation and possible loss of knowledge 
power). In the face of loss, when deciding their future participation, they may be risk seeking 
and would put less importance of costs on their future behaviors. Further, those solvers who 
have won before may be in the status of gains (e.g., winning rewards). They may be risk 
averse when deciding their future participation and put more weights on the importance of 
costs on their participation than low performed solvers. Previous literature suggests that 
losses hurt more than gains satisfy for risk averse individuals (e.g., Hastie and Dawes 2001). 
In our study, costs involved in crowdsourcing will hurt high performed solvers more than low 
performed solvers. Hence, high performed solvers will assign higher magnitude to the 
negative influences of costs on their participation than low performed solvers do, i.e., 
cognitive effort and loss of knowledge power. 
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Previous literature also suggests that individuals are risk averse for gains of high 
probability while risk seeking for gains of low probability (Tversky and Kahneman 1992). In 
the context of our study, solvers are more likely to be risk averse for gains of high probability, 
i.e., assign more importance on these benefits of high probability. For high performed solvers, 
they are more likely to obtain monetary reward, peer recognition, firm recognition, and 
enjoyment than losing solvers. Instead, low performed solvers will be more likely to enhance 
their skills or pick up new skills than winning solvers. Therefore, high performed solvers will 
assign more importance on monetary reward, peer recognition, firm recognition, and 
enjoyment while low performed solvers will assign more importance on skill enhancement. 
Since the surveyed solvers include those who won rewards in TaskCN and those who 
did not, this study post hoc tested whether there is a difference in the antecedents of 
crowdsourcing participation for the two groups of solvers. At the time of survey, 59 solvers 
in our sample have won at least once while 97 solvers have participated but not won. This 
study split the sample into these two groups (59 vs. 96) and tested the hypotheses separately 
on each group. Keil et al. (2000)’s approach was adopted to statistically compare the 
corresponding path coefficients for the two groups and compute the T-values shown in Table 
3.10. 




























Low 0.085 0.121 -0.203 0.197 -0.179 0.276 -0.108 -0.091 
High 0.23 -0.004 0.138 -0.232 0.279 0.279 -0.099 -0.278 
Standard 
error 
Low 0.0454 0.0477 0.1147 0.0676 0.0837 0.0348 0.0448 0.1157 
High 0.0497 0.0531 0.0824 0.1035 0.0608 0.0565 0.0703 0.1906 
S pooled 0.0471 0.0498 0.1037 0.0830 0.0759 0.0347 0.0558 0.1484 
T-value -18.64 15.192 -19.90 31.29 -36.54 -0.52 -0.976 7.62 
As the Table 3.10 shows, low performed solvers tend to pay more attention to skill 
enhancement, firm recognition, and loss of knowledge power, while high performed solvers 
tend to pay more attention to monetary reward, peer recognition, and enjoyment. It is 
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interesting to know that low performed solvers put more importance on firm recognition. This 
could also be understandable as Tversky and Kahneman (1992) found that individuals are 
risk averse for gains of high probability while risk seeking for gains of low probability. To 
solvers with a low prior performance, they have a lower probability to win firm recognition 
from crowdsourcing and tend to pursue this in a risk seeking mode. 
There is no difference of importance on work autonomy and cognitive effort. This 
could be because solvers will experience work autonomy and cognitive effort as long as they 
decided to participate and will not be different from previous status quo. According to 
prospect theory, individuals will only evaluate changes in the value and take into them 
consideration for decision. Thus, the two variables are perceived the same with previous 
status quo and the importance for their participation are considered the same for both groups 
of solvers. 
3.6 Discussion and Implications 
With the emergence of new Internet-based technologies, individuals are increasingly 
empowered to participate in organizational task solving through crowdsourcing platforms. To 
succeed in creating value for firms, crowdsourcing platforms should maintain a large pool of 
skilled solvers to work on organizational tasks. However, it is challenging for crowdsourcing 
platforms to publicize themselves and establish a network of talented solvers. Therefore, 
researchers and practitioners are interested to understand how to encourage solvers’ 
participation in crowdsourcing (e.g., Terwiesch and Ulrich 2009; Howe 2008). Based on 
prospect theory and related literatures, this study developed a model to explain solvers’ 
participation in crowdsourcing. It found that monetary reward, skill enhancement, enjoyment, 
work autonomy, and cognitive effort are significantly related to solvers’ participation in 
crowdsourcing. Also, we found that trust negatively moderates the influences of cognitive 
effort and loss of knowledge power on solvers’ participation in crowdsourcing.  
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Contrary to our prediction, firm recognition has no impact on solvers’ participation in 
crowdsourcing. This could result from the fact that solvers in crowdsourcing platforms are 
freelance knowledge workers, who may not like routine work in firms. In such cases, they 
may not care about the recognition from firms. In a study on the Amazon Mechanical Turk 
platform, similarly, Kaufman et al. (2011) found that signaling (peer recognition) is not 
ranked as the most important drivers for individuals to participate. Another possible reason 
could be that firm recognition may enhance solvers’ intention to participate as suggested in 
prior literature (e.g., Zheng et al. 2011) but cannot sustain their actual participation in 
crowdsourcing as assessed in our study. Further, peer reputation was not found to affect 
solvers’ participation in crowdsourcing. To understand why this effect was not significant, we 
interviewed a successful solver in TaskCN. He pointed out that peer reputation may not be 
desired as peers may then seek solvers’ advice on the improvement of proposed solutions. 
Due to peer competition, this will result in a dilemma for solvers on whether to reveal their 
genuine advice to peers. Besides, higher peer reputation may attract others to plagiarize his 
work. This suggests that peer reputation may not enhance solvers’ sustained participation in 
crowdsourcing. In a previous study, similarly, Archak and Ghose (2010) found that 
reputation negatively affects solvers’ activity in crowdsourcing. 
Additionally, loss of knowledge power was not found to impact solvers’ participation 
in crowdsourcing. This could be because before they decide to participate in crowdsourcing, 
solvers have already thought about the possibility of losing their knowledge power when 
proposing solutions to problems. They may take the loss of knowledge power as granted as 
they participate in crowdsourcing. When trust is low, they may start to be concerned about 
the loss of knowledge power as a sunk cost for participation. Therefore, loss of knowledge 
power did not directly affect solvers’ participation in crowdsourcing but interacts with trust to 
influence their participation.  
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3.6.1 Limitations and Future Research 
The findings of this study should be interpreted in light of its limitations. First, our study is 
restricted in its ability to make broad generalizations by studying one crowdsourcing platform 
i.e., TaskCN, in which users participate in tasks like logo design or software design. Future 
research could focus on other crowdsourcing platforms such as Innocentive (e.g., Jeppesen 
and Lakhani 2010) to test if the results of this study hold. For example, in Innocentive, more 
creativity may be needed to solve more complex tasks. This may change solvers’ perceptions 
of certain costs and benefits of their participation, such as enjoyment and cognitive effort. 
Second, while this paper studied the influences of perceived benefits and costs on 
solvers’ participation in crowdsourcing, future work can explore the process of solvers’ task 
solving and solvers’ performance in crowdsourcing. For instance, researchers can investigate 
the factors that influence the process of solvers’ task solving and cause different levels of 
performance in crowdsourcing. Researchers can investigate how crowdsourcing platforms 
can facilitate solvers’ participation in crowdsourcing and the influences of the support and 
policies offered by crowdsourcing platforms on their participation. It could be possible that 
crowdsourcing platforms’ initiatives would increase solvers’ participation in crowdsourcing.  
Third, this study explores the influences of costs and benefits on solvers’ participation, 
based on prospect theory. Future research can examine other determinants of solvers’ 
participation in crowdsourcing. For example, researchers can explore the effects of external 
environmental conditions (e.g., dynamism or competition intensity) on solvers’ participation 
in crowdsourcing. Alternatively, researchers can explore the influences of network structures 
between individual solvers on their participation in crowdsourcing.  
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3.6.2 Theoretical Contributions 
This study contributes to previous crowdsourcing literature by modeling the influences of 
both benefit and cost factors on solvers’ actual participation in crowdsourcing. Specifically, 
this study has several important contributions to the literature. First, based on prospect theory, 
this research identified and empirically tested the antecedents of solvers’ actual participation 
in crowdsourcing measured by the number of tasks that they have solved. In this way, the 
study contributes to previous crowdsourcing literature which has mainly studied the 
antecedents of intention to participate in crowdsourcing (e.g., Sun et al. 2012, 2011; Zheng et 
al. 2011). Our findings suggest that the antecedents of solvers’ participation in crowdsourcing 
may be different from those of the intention to participate, i.e., peer reputation and firm 
recognition are important drivers of intention to participate in crowdsourcing (e.g., Leimesiter 
et al. 2009; Zheng et al. 2011) but not the drivers of actual participation.  
Second, this study investigated the cost antecedents of solvers’ participation in 
crowdsourcing. It found that cognitive effort negatively affects solvers’ participation in 
crowdsourcing while loss of knowledge power negatively interacts with trust to affect 
participation. In this way, this study contributes to previous crowdsourcing literature by 
modeling and empirically testing the influences of cost factors i.e., cognitive effort and loss 
of knowledge power on solvers’ participation in crowdsourcing (e.g., Zheng et al. 2011; Sun 
et al. 2012). The findings enrich our understanding of solvers’ participation in crowdsourcing 
by showing that cost factors should be considered by crowdsourcing platforms to encourage 
solvers’ participation. 
Third, this study also examined the influences of benefit factors on solvers’ 
participation in crowdsourcing. It found that monetary reward, skill enhancement, peer 
recognition, enjoyment, and work autonomy positively affect solvers’ participation in 
crowdsourcing. The study adds to previous literature (e.g., Sun et al. 2012; Zheng et al. 2011) 
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by developing a comprehensive model to understand the antecedents of solvers’ actual 
participation in crowdsourcing and empirically validating it using survey and archival data. 
Fourth, this study examined the moderating role of trust in determining solvers’ 
participation in crowdsourcing. It found that trust negatively moderates the influences of 
cognitive effort and loss of knowledge power on solvers’ participation in crowdsourcing. 
This finding contributes to previous crowdsourcing literature (e.g., Zheng et al. 2011) by 
exploring the influence of contextual factors on solvers’ participation in crowdsourcing. It 
also adds to previous literature on trust (e.g., Chiles and McMackin 1996; Noorderhaven 
1996) by demonstrating that trust can moderate the influences of cost concerns on individual 
actions in the context of crowdsourcing. 
Fifth, this study contributes to the literature on prospect theory. Prospect theory has 
been applied in IS research (e.g., Klein et al. 2000) to explain risk motivations in IT projects 
e.g., commitment escalation. This study extends the application of prospect theory to explain 
short term decisions in the context of crowdsourcing. This research indicates that cognitive 
effort negatively affects solvers’ participation in crowdsourcing. This suggests that risk 
aversion exists in the context of crowdsourcing. Further, the explanatory power of the model 
indicates that prospect theory is an appropriate lens to explain solvers’ actual participation in 
crowdsourcing.  
3.6.3 Practical Implications 
From a pragmatic perspective, this study offers insights to firms and crowdsourcing platform 
administrators on how to encourage solvers to participate in crowdsourcing. In contrast to 
prior work that focused on the influence of expected benefits on solvers’ intention to 
participate (e.g., Kaufman et al. 2011; Zheng et al .2011), this study explored and empirically 
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tested the influence of benefit and cost factors on solvers’ actual participation in 
crowdsourcing. Specifically, this study contributes to practice in three ways.  
First, it provides suggestions for encouraging solvers to participate in crowdsourcing 
through extrinsic and intrinsic rewards. In particular, the results suggest that firms and 
crowdsourcing platforms should heighten the perception of monetary reward, enjoyment, 
skill enhancement, and work autonomy promoting solvers’ participation in crowdsourcing. 
Crowdsourcing platforms should create workable business models and monetization 
strategies for solvers’ participation in crowdsourcing and reconsider their profit sharing 
policies. Currently, in TaskCN, crowdsourcing platforms will obtain 20% of rewards for each 
task as the commission. TaskCN should reduce its commission ratio to attract more solvers to 
participate in crowdsourcing. Also, firms and the platforms can communicate the notion that 
participation in crowdsourcing is fun and enjoyable. They can emphasize the enjoyment and 
satisfaction of solving problems. Crowdsourcing platforms should establish an experience-
sharing webpage for solvers to broadcast their enjoyable and fun experience. Additionally, 
they can highlight work autonomy possible in the platform. They should advertise to solvers 
that they have the autonomy to realize the value of their skills through crowdsourcing by 
freely choosing the type of tasks they want to solve, the methods for solving, and the goals of 
task completion. Last, firms can also communicate the idea that solvers can improve their 
skills through participating in crowdsourcing platforms. They may inform solvers that 
participation in crowdsourcing is an effective way for them to learn and hone their skills in 
various areas. 
Second, crowdsourcing platforms could attempt to reduce the costs for solvers to 
participate in crowdsourcing. To reduce cognitive effort, they could facilitate solvers to better 
understand solvers’ problems and support them in proposing the solutions. In particular, they 
can work with seekers to better define problems in a way that can be clearly understood by 
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solvers. Tools should also be provided to facilitate the communication between solvers and 
seekers so that task requirements can be better understood, hence reducing solvers’ cognitive 
effort expended.  
Third, crowdsourcing platforms should take note that solvers’ trust in them mitigates 
the negative influences of cognitive effort and loss of knowledge power on participation in 
crowdsourcing. Thus, it is important for the platform to cultivate trust in solvers. Specifically, 
they should be careful in ensuring that solvers obtain appropriate rewards if their submissions 






STUDY 3: LEARNING THROUGH 
CROWDSOURCING AND SOLVERS’ 
CROWDSOURCING PERFORMANCE  
 
4.1 Introduction 
Solvers’ participation in solving tasks in essence creates value for crowdsourcing platforms 
and seeker firms (Leimeister et al. 2009; Boudreau et al. 2011). Their performance 
determines the innovativeness and quality of solutions and hence the amount of value that 
firms obtain from crowdsourcing. However, firms are questioning whether solvers in 
crowdsourcing websites are able to solve their problems satisfactorily (Doan et al. 2011). 
Some firms consider the crowd as mobs rather than experts in solving their problems (Roman 
2009). If firms are unsatisfactory with results from solvers, they can refuse to pay. 
Importantly, this puts the burden on individual solvers to perform. 
To perform well and create value for seekers in crowdsourcing, solvers are typically 
required to have specialized skills or knowledge to solve organizational tasks (Doan et al. 
2011; Greengard 2011). Sometimes, solvers may not have the required skills and knowledge 
to start with. This may challenge solvers’ performance in crowdsourcing. To mitigate 
challenges in crowdsourcing, learning is a viable approach for solvers to acquire the 
necessary knowledge or skills and perform well. Previous literature found that solvers indeed 
learn through crowdsourcing (e.g., Bayus 2010; Yang et al. 2008). However, learning can be 
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arduous and its effectiveness depends on individual and environmental factors (Kankanhalli 
et al. 2012).  
Limited previous research has investigated how effectively solvers learn through 
crowdsourcing, mainly through case studies or conceptual investigations (e.g., Brabham 2008, 
2010; Kaufman et al. 2011; Yang et al. 2008). The results are mixed. Some researchers 
suggest that solvers will learn to improve their performance in crowdsourcing (e.g., Archak 
and Ghose 2010; Brabham 2008, 2010) while others question this argument (e.g., Roman 
2009; Yang et al. 2008). So far, it is unclear if solvers’ learning will improve their 
performance during the process of crowdsourcing. Also, the contingencies under which 
learning affects crowdsourcing performance are unknown. Thus, research is needed to 
improve our understanding of how and under what conditions solvers can intensively, 
effectively, and quickly learn to improve their crowdsourcing performance. 
In order to address the knowledge gap, this paper aims to address the research 
question: How effectively do solvers learn to perform in crowdsourcing and under what 
conditions can their learning effectively improve their crowdsourcing performance? Past 
learning literature suggests that individuals can improve their skills through continuously 
learning from their own experience or imitating others’ behaviors (e.g., Kolb and Kolb 2005; 
Yi and Davis 2003). Some previous literature on crowdsourcing suggests that solvers do learn 
from their own experience (e.g., Archak and Ghose 2010; Yang et al. 2008) and others’ 
action (e.g., Bayus 2010; Huang et al. 2011). Both learning from experience (experiential 
learning) and learning from external sources (vicarious learning) can be explained by 
performance outcome learning theory (Schwab and Miner 2008).  
Thus, based on performance outcome learning theory, we develop a model to explain 
solvers’ learning performance in crowdsourcing. Specifically, we propose that vicarious 
learning and experiential learning will positively impact solvers’ performance in 
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crowdsourcing. Based on previous learning literature, we also identify contingent variables 
that may moderate the relationship between learning and solvers’ crowdsourcing performance. 
We expect that environmental dynamism, competition intensity, and prior experience will 
moderate the influences of solvers’ learning on their performance. This study is expected to 
contribute to the crowdsourcing literature by modeling and testing the impacts of vicarious 
and experiential learning on solvers’ performance in crowdsourcing as well as the moderating 
variables for these relationships. Also, it is expected to provide insights to practitioners on 
how solvers learn to improve their performance in crowdsourcing. 
4.2 Conceptual Background 
We first review previous crowdsourcing literature on solvers’ learning to position our study 
and identify the gaps it seeks to address. We then describe the performance outcome learning 
theory and apply it to explain the impacts of vicarious learning and experiential learning on 
solvers’ performance in crowdsourcing. Subsequently, we identify the contingencies that may 
moderate the relationship between solvers’ learning and performance. 
4.2.1 Solvers’ Learning in Crowdsourcing 
Past literature has noted that learning is key to individual creativity and performance 
(Kankanhalli et al. 2012). In the context of crowdsourcing, many tasks need solvers to update 
their knowledge and skills to perform (Howe 2008). Such tasks may include logo design, 
visual identity design, print advertisement design, software design, and new product 
development tasks. Individual solvers need to continuously learn new skills to tackle these 
tasks (Yang et al. 2008). For example, solvers need to pick up visual effect design skills for 
logos and advertisement tasks or system programming skills for software design tasks.  
A few previous studies have investigated whether solvers learn in the process of 
crowdsourcing. For example, through analyzing the field data from TaskCN, Yang et al. 
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(2008) found that solvers do learn to submit later and to choose less popular tasks or tasks 
with higher winning odds. However, they also found that solvers fail to improve their 
performance by such learning activities. On the other hand, Archak and Ghose (2010), in 
their study of online crowdsourcing contests in ToperCoder.com, found that solvers learn by 
doing and taking into account the impact of the skills they learnt on their future performance. 
Further, in the study of crowdsourcing in IdeaStorm, Huang et al. (2011) found that 
individuals learn from their crowdsourcing experience to propose high potential ideas. Bayus 
(2010) found that individuals who have the experience of generating more ideas are more 
likely to propose high quality ideas in Ideastorm and that individuals with a broad exposure 
to others’ ideas are more likely to propose divergent high quality ideas. This indicates that 
individuals may learn from their own and others’ experience. However, Bayus (2010) also 
found that individuals with a greater past success are less likely to propose high quality ideas 
in future. 
As suggested by the literature, solvers can learn from their own experiences (Archak 
and Ghose 2010; Yang et al. 2008) as well as from others’ behaviors (Bayus 2010; Huang et 
al. 2011). However, the relationship between solvers’ learning and performance is unclear 
and the contingencies affecting the relationships are unknown. This study seeks to address 
these gaps in the crowdsourcing literature. 
The theory of performance outcome learning is relevant to investigate solvers’ 
learning in crowdsourcing, since it posits that individuals will learn both experientially and 
vicariously in order to perform (Cyert and March 1992). Therefore, we use the theory of 
performance outcome learning to demonstrate the learning mechanisms underpinning solvers’ 
performance in crowdsourcing, which will be elaborated next. 
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4.2.2 Theory of Performance Outcome Learning  
The theory of performance outcome learning was initially proposed by Cyert and March 
(1963), and developed and extended by Greve (2003) and Schwab and Miner (2008). It rests 
on the assumption that actions (either their own or others’) with positive outcomes were 
observed, interpreted, and repeated in future actions while those with negative outcomes will 
be avoided (Greve 2003; Schwab and Miner 2008). The core of this theory lies in the 
selective replication of actions based on performance feedback (Schwab 2007). Positive 
outcomes serve as drivers for the increasing returns process (Pierson 2000), in which positive 
feedback from previous activities make the replication of particular actions more attractive 
for the next round. As such effects accumulate, they generate a powerful virtuous cycle of 
self-reinforcing performance. Thus, performance outcome learning is proposed to enhance 
the performance of future actions (Greve 2003). 
Further, this theory asserts that individual behavior is guided both by experience and 
by external feedback (Cyert and March 1992; Greve 2003). On one hand, individuals can 
learn from their own experience and improve their performance over repetitions of past 
successful actions (Levinthal and March 1993). On the other hand, they can also learn from 
others by observing, interpreting, and imitating others’ successful actions. Therefore, 
conceptually, the performance outcome learning process includes both the process of 
experiential learning from one’s own experience and vicarious learning from actions by 
others (Schwab and Miner 2008). As per performance outcome learning theory, both 
vicarious and experiential learning can contribute to performance. 
This theory has been previously applied in organizational studies in various industries. 
For example, Schwab and Miner (2008) found that better performance in US movie projects 
led to future collaborations with the same partners, which are highly likely to be successful. 
In studying US commercial bank acquisitions, using the lens of performance outcome 
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learning theory, Haleblian et al. (2006) found that the success of prior acquisitions increases 
the likelihood of future acquisitions and the probability of success. Guided by this lens, 
Schwab (2007) studied the adoption of innovative management practices in the football 
industry. He found that organizations will change the execution of the adopted innovative 
management practices through learning from their own experience and observing other 
organizations that had implemented the practices. This study will adopt performance outcome 
learning theory to understand solvers’ learning and examine the effects of learning on their 
performance in crowdsourcing. We will now discuss the two forms of learning as per this 
theory. 
Experiential Learning 
Experiential learning occurs when individuals rely on real-time experience to cumulatively 
learn skills and develop their knowledge stock (Eisenhardt and Tabrizi 1995; Miner et al. 
2001). Through improvisation or experimentation, individuals can learn, replicate, and extend 
successful skills and knowledge (Schwab and Miner 2008). Through repetition or frequent 
iteration of the same or similar tasks, successful skills or knowledge will be retained and 
extended (Eisenhardt and Tabrizi 1995). Experiential knowledge may be extracted from these 
experiences and may even be applied from one domain to another (Levinthal and March 
1993).  
The concept of experiential learning and its effectiveness has received substantial 
research attention in management studies (e.g., Schwab and Miner 2008; Eisenhardt and 
Tabrizi 1995; Miner et al. 2001). For example, Eisenhardt and Tabrizi (1995) suggested that 
based on experimentation, individuals repeat actions with a positive implication and try to 
extract knowledge from these actions such as knowledge of the causality and conditioning of 
the success. This is seen in Schwab and Miner (2008)’s study of movie production. They 
found that accidental combinations of actors, directors, and producers which turn out to have 
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a favorable result will be reproduced in future collaborations. However, some researchers 
found that learning from experience fails to have any impact on performance (e.g., Garud and 
Van de Ven 1992). Proposed reasons for the learning failure include ambiguity about the 
reliability of performance information and the lack of attention to previous outcomes (Miner 
et al. 2001). 
Experiential learning and its effectiveness has also been investigated in the IS 
literature with respect to IS development. For example, in a study of software development in 
a telecom firm, Boh et al. (2007) compared the effects of different experiential learning 
activities on productivity for modification requests and systems release. Overall, at the 
individual and group level, all experiential learning activities were found to negatively affect 
individuals’ productivity in terms of effort for each modification requests. However, contrary 
to the prediction, at the organizational-unit level, learning from shared-system-release 
experience was found to positively affect the effort for each system release. This indicates 
that learning from shared-system-release experience did not help improve but hurt the 
performance of systems release.  
Another example is Lyytinen and Robey (1999)’s case study of information systems 
development. They found that failing to learn from the experience in systems development 
led to a poor performance. Similarly, in a case study of IT outsourcing, Chua and Pan (2008) 
suggested that experiential learning is required to successfully transfer knowledge from IS 
department in a multinational bank to an insourced subsidiary bank. Overall, the above 
literature review suggests that mixed results remain on whether experiential learning will 
enhance performance.  
Further, existence of experiential learning has been found in crowdsourcing research 
(e.g., Archak and Ghose 2010; Yang et al. 2008). For example, through analyzing a dataset 
from an online crowdsourcing contest platform (i.e. Topcoder.com), Archak and Ghose (2010) 
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found that individual solvers choose projects of similar types based on learning by doing. In 
Yang et al. (2008)’s field study of TaskCN, they found that solvers did learn from their past 
experiences however their performance did not necessarily improve. However, how 
effectively solvers’ experiential learning enhances performance is still unclear. Based on the 
above discussion, we include experiential learning in our model as a key antecedent and 
explore its influence on solvers’ crowdsourcing performance. 
Vicarious Learning 
Besides experiential learning, individuals can also learn by observing and imitating actions of 
others that produced better performance, i.e., vicarious learning (Conell and Cohn 1995; 
Kraatz 1998). This occurs when people alter their behaviors in response to the behaviors of 
others (Srinivasan et al. 2007) or in accordance with external feedback (Greve 2003). When 
learning vicariously, learners take what they have observed as a mirror to inform their own 
course of action (Kim and Miner 2007). As an indirect learning mechanism, vicarious 
learning can allow individuals to gain the benefits of accumulated knowledge while avoiding 
the direct cost of exploration and experimentation (Denrell 2003).  
The concept of vicarious learning and its effectiveness have received empirical 
support in organizational studies (e.g. Kim and Miner 2007; Schwab 2007). For example, 
Kim and Miner (2007) found that banks who vicariously learn from others can improve their 
survival rate. Schwab (2007) analyzed the effects of vicarious learning on the change in the 
execution of innovative practices in the baseball industry. They found that through vicarious 
learning, an innovative practice adopted by the organization will be incrementally changed 
during its execution. In a study of new product development in the digital camera market, 
Srinivasan et al. (2007) found that firms vicariously learn from others about introducing the 
new products to the market and perform. Further, Bresman (2010) qualitatively examined 
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vicarious learning practices and empirically tested the influences of these activities on team 
performance in pharmaceutical firms. He found that vicarious learning activities are more 
strongly associated with team performance when teams engage in more internal learning 
while vicarious learning in the absence of sufficient amounts of internal learning can hurt 
performance. However, Denrell (2003) suggested that vicariously learning from a small 
sample may not improve but hurt organizational performance. Overall, the mixed results 
regarding the influence of vicarious learning on performance indicate that further research is 
needed to explore the conditions under which such learning affects performance. 
The effects of vicarious learning have been investigated in IS research. For example, 
Yi and Davis (2003) discussed the role of observational learning (a form of vicarious learning) 
in computer software skill training. They found that observational learning positively 
influenced training outcomes (software knowledge, self-efficacy, and task performance). 
Through a case study of IT outsourcing, Chua and Pan (2008) suggested that vicarious 
learning is required to successfully transfer knowledge from an IS department in a 
multinational bank to an insourced subsidiary bank. In a study of software development in a 
telecom firm, Boh et al. (2007) found that learning from colleagues enhances individuals’ 
productivity for modification requests in systems development. 
In the context of crowdsourcing, past literature suggests that solvers vicariously learn 
during the process of crowdsourcing (e.g., Huang et al. 2011; Sun et al. 2012). However, 
there is a lack of study of the effect of learning on crowdsourcing performance. In order to 
improve our understanding of how effectively individual solvers learn vicariously in 
crowdsourcing, we include vicarious learning in our model and examine its influences on 
solvers’ crowdsourcing performance. 
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4.2.3 Contingencies of Performance Outcome Learning 
Along with the limited and sometimes mixed findings in this area, previous researchers have 
questioned the effectiveness of learning from experience and observations (e.g., Levinthal 
and March 1993; Denrell and March 2001). They argue that cognitive and inferential 
limitations of individuals constrain their rationality and learning from their own experiences 
and observations of external events (Levinthal and March 1993). Even when individuals can 
clearly recall experience, they may not be able to extract accurate and relevant knowledge for 
future actions (Levinthal and March 1993). Ambiguity in causality and the influences of 
social context factors on past events may inhibit individuals’ learning. Additionally, the 
interpretations of past events and extraction of lessons from it are constrained by memory 
decay (March et al. 1991).  
In light of the above, previous learning literature has explored the influences of 
individual characteristics and social contexts on learning effectiveness (e.g., Kankanhalli et al. 
2012). One stream of research emphasized the importance of individual characteristics in 
determining the effectiveness of learning, such as the mental and meaning making activities 
employed (e.g., Salomon and Perkins 1998). This stream of research is based on the symbolic 
cognition view on learning (Lonka et al. 1996). Researchers in this stream tend to examine 
how individuals absorb information from their environment, arrange it mentally, and apply it 
in everyday activities. For example, absorptive capacity was found to be important in 
determining individuals’ learning effectiveness (Kankanhalli et al. 2012).  
Based on the symbolic cognition view of learning, previous literature has challenged 
the generality of the assumption that individuals are responsive to performance feedback (e.g., 
Denrell and March 2001; Greve 2003). They argue for the investigation of contingencies that 
may affect an individual’s ability and motivation to learn from feedback (Levinthal and 
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March 1993; Schwab 2007). Thus, the performance of learning is suggested to be contingent 
on the awareness and attribution of an outcome to some aspect of prior behavior and the 
ability to use this knowledge to select future behavior for the next round of action (e.g., Cyert 
and March 1992; Schwab and Miner 2008).  
In particular, researchers argue that for prior action to provide input information for a 
proposed learning activity, the prior action and its outcome must be noticed (Cyert and March 
1992; Kim and Miner 2007). Even when the outcome has been noticed, bounded rationality 
and ambiguity about the cause of the performance will limit the applicability of actions from 
a prior event to future events (Schwab and Miner 2008). Learning from self-derived 
conclusions of observed/self failure or success provides hypothetical but untried solutions 
and may lead to superstitious associations among the conditions surrounding observed events 
(Schwab 2007). What matters is the ability to extract knowledge about the cause of prior 
performance (Levinthal and March 1993). The capability of being aware of a prior action and 
the ability to extract knowledge from prior performance is based on individuals’ prior 
experience (Cohen and Levinthal 1990). Thus, prior experience could determine the 
effectiveness of individual learning. Therefore, based on the symbolic cognition view and 
previous related literatures, we include prior experience in our model and examine its 
moderating effect on the relationships between the two forms of solvers’ learning and their 
performance in crowdsourcing. 
Another stream of research has focused on exploring the effects of social context on 
learning based on the situated cognition view (e.g., Fuller et al. 2005; Kang et al. 2007; 
Salomon and Perkins 1998). Research adopting this view holds that individuals learn as they 
become socialized within a social system (Lave and Wenger 1991). Researchers in this 
stream have examined how social factors such as environmental conditions affect individuals’ 
learning (Salomon and Perkins 1998). For example, in a study of individual learners in IT-
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related research projects, Kankanhalli et al. (2012) found that external environmental 
conditions affect individuals’ learning effectiveness. 
As per the situated cognition view of learning, previous performance outcome 
learning research suggests that whether individuals are likely to learn vicariously or 
experientially depends on environmental conditions (e.g., Haunschild and Miner 1997). 
Specifically, learning is more likely to occur under conditions of uncertainty, when 
individuals look for guidance from others and their own experience (Haunschild and Miner 
1997). Uncertainty is typically caused by environmental turbulence, which includes 
environmental dynamism and competition intensity (Jansen et al. 2006).  
In the context of this study, uncertainty about the crowdsourcing environment can 
occur due to changes of seekers’ preferences or task requirements (environmental dynamism) 
and competition from other entities (competition intensity). Specifically, individuals tend to 
respond to environmental dynamism by imitating changes previously adopted by their peers 
(Jansen et al. 2006) or delving into their past experience (Levinthal and March 1993). Also, 
past literature suggests that high competition intensity will increase the pressure for 
increasing efficiency and lowering costs (Matusik and Hill 1998), resulting in reliance on 
existing knowledge and skills and a lower likelihood of learning from others (Levinthal and 
March 1993). However, there is a lack of study investigating the moderating effects of 
environmental conditions on the relationships between solvers’ learning and their 
performance in crowdsourcing. Based on the situated cognition view of learning and previous 
related literatures, we include environmental dynamism and competition intensity in our 
model and examine their moderating impacts on the relationship between solvers’ learning 
and their crowdsourcing performance. 
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4.3 Research Model and Hypotheses 
Deriving from performance outcome learning theory and previous related literatures, we 
developed the research model shown in Figure 4.1. This study proposes experiential learning 
and vicarious learning as independent variables and investigates their impacts on 
performance. The model also includes environmental dynamism, competition intensity, and 
prior experience as moderators on the influences of vicarious learning and experience 
learning on solvers’ performance in crowdsourcing. The dependent variable, i.e., solvers’ 
crowdsourcing performance, is measured through the number of winning submissions by a 
solver in the crowdsourcing platform as also employed in previous literature (e.g., Jeppesen 









Figure 4.1. Research Model for Solvers’ Learning Performance 
4.3.1 Experiential Learning 
Experiential learning refers to the learning where individuals rely on real-time experience to 
cumulatively develop skills (Eisenhardt and Tabrizi 1995). Through personal trial and error, 























Through the process of accumulating knowledge, individuals become more proficient and 
expert in a specific domain. Founded on previously accumulated knowledge and beliefs, 
individuals form a baseline against which incoming information is compared and absorbed 
(Lichtenthaler 2009), and increase the efficiency of adaptive perceptual schema formation 
(Jansen et al. 2005). The new perceptual schema help individuals acquire and assimilate new 
information while replicating past actions (Lichtenthaler 2009). This helps them adapt to the 
environment and hence obtain a better performance eventually (He and Wong 2004; Pollock 
et al. 2008). Further, through self-reflection and interpretation of past successful actions, 
individuals can extract useful knowledge for future actions (Levinthal and March 1993). 
Through such processes, useful knowledge and skills will be accumulated and hence facilitate 
individuals to perform.  
The discussion above suggests that learning from personal experience will improve 
individuals’ future performance. In the context of our research, previous studies suggest that 
solvers will learn from their own experience in crowdsourcing (e.g., Archak and Ghose 2010). 
Following the logic discussed above, we expect that solvers will learn experientially, use 
their new skills in different tasks, and improve their performance in crowdsourcing. 
Therefore, we hypothesize 
H1: Experiential learning is positively related to a solver’s crowdsourcing performance 
4.3.2 Vicarious Learning 
Vicarious learning refers to individuals’ indirect learning by observing and imitating others’ 
actions (Conell and Cohn 1995; Kraatz 1998). Through observing others’ actions of positive 
outcomes, individuals can learn knowledge or information for their own actions (Kim and 
Miner 2007). They take what they have observed as a reference model to inform their own 
course of actions. For example, through observing, individuals can pick up knowledge about 
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what should be done or avoided in order to perform well. Further, through extensive scanning 
and monitoring of target learning objects, individuals can acquire a detailed understanding of 
relevant problem-solving methods from others (Jansen et al. 2005). This allows individuals to 
understand the causes of good performance and the consequences of alternative options, and 
replicate them in their own actions. Thus, individuals can vicariously learn to enhance 
performance. 
Previous crowdsourcing literature also suggests that individual solvers can learn from 
peers (e.g., Sun et al. 2012; Huang et al. 2011). Individuals can learn from peers’ work the 
necessary knowledge or skills for problem solving. The externally learnt knowledge may 
offer solvers effective or more viable approaches to tackle crowdsourcing problems and 
hence enhance their performance. Thus, we expect  
H2: Vicarious learning is positively related to a solver’s crowdsourcing performance 
4.3.3 Environmental Dynamism 
Individuals’ activities are embedded in an environmental context, through which they obtain 
resources for their activities. Environments vary not only in their ability to supply resources, 
but in terms of the type and amount of resources available (Jansen et al. 2006). Also, under 
different environmental conditions, individuals will choose different strategies e.g., learning 
from others’ actions or their own past experience, to respond to environmental changes. In 
this study, we will explore the influence of environmental conditions on the relationship 
between vicarious and experiential learning and solvers’ crowdsourcing performance. 




In the context of our study, environmental dynamism refers to the rate of change and 
the degree of instability of the task requirements in crowdsourcing websites. It reflects not 
only the amount of change, but also the unpredictability of change (Dess and Beard 1984).  
 In dynamic environments, variations in customer preferences and fluctuations in task 
demands prevail (Jansen et al. 2006). Current knowledge about markets becomes outdated 
and new knowledge is required (Boone et al. 2008). Previous literature in management 
studies suggests that vicarious learning produces new knowledge which is likely to be 
relevant to the current environmental requirements (e.g., Bresman 2010). If individuals do not 
learn new information and skills from outside, their performance will immediately drop 
(Fang and Levinthal 2009). To mitigate the threat of out-datedness, individuals need to 
vicariously learn from peers’ successful strategies (Bresman 2010). A higher level of 
vicarious learning is more effective for individuals to obtain up-to-date information and skills 
and perform better. 
Conversely, in stable environments, existing knowledge will not become obsolete and 
can still contribute significant value to problem solving. Individuals will have less incentive 
to learn new knowledge from others for problem solving since their current knowledge can 
handle existing problems well (Levinthal and March 1993). In this case, vicarious learning 
will have a smaller effect on individuals’ performance. In the context of our study, 
vicariously learning new knowledge or skills will be more important for performance in a 
highly dynamic environment but less essential for performance in a low dynamism 
environment.  
Further, in dynamic environments, the unpredictable and rapid changes increase the 
uncertainty for individuals performing their tasks (Dess and Beard 1984). Previous literature 
has suggested that individuals will need multiple and diverse perspectives to make sense of 
dynamic environments and perform (e.g., Hambrick and Mason 1984; Ensley et al. 2006). 
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For example, Hambrick and Mason (1984) suggested that managers with heterogeneous 
backgrounds perform best in dynamic environments, whereas those with homogeneous 
backgrounds perform best in more stable environments. Similarly, Judge and Miller (1991) 
found that in dynamic environments, those CEOs who simultaneously consider more 
alternatives tend to outperform those who do not. In the context of our study, vicarious 
learning is likely to result in multiple and diverse perspectives to task solving and better 
perform in dynamic environments than in stable environments. Therefore, we hypothesize 
H3a: Environmental dynamism strengthens the relationship between vicarious learning and a 
solver’s crowdsourcing performance 
As discussed above, in a dynamic environment, significant changes in customer preferences 
and fluctuations in task demand prevail (Jansen et al. 2006). The knowledge derived from 
past experience depreciates (Boone et al. 2008) and alternative knowledge is required to 
address current problems. Learning from past experience will produce less diverse and useful 
knowledge in a dynamic environment (Dess and Beard 1984). Individual may not be able to 
tap on their experience for effective solutions. Conversely, in a stable environment, existing 
knowledge can solve problems adequately and no new knowledge is needed. Consequently, 
learning from past experience could be more effective in a stable environment. Therefore, we 
expect 
H3b: Environmental dynamism weakens the relationship between experiential learning and a 
solver’s crowdsourcing performance 
4.3.4 Competition Intensity 
Another important environmental condition is competition intensity which may affect the 
learning effects. In the context of our study, competition intensity is defined as the extent of 
competition among solvers. It is reflected in the number of peers and the number of areas in 
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which there is competition (Boudreau et al. 2011). In a competitive environment, best 
practices tend to be quickly imitated by peers (Jaworski and Kohli 1993; Levinthal and 
March 1993). Individuals may be disappointed by the fact that spending time and resources to 
learn from external knowledge sources or to experiment new ideas would not render much 
returns. In a competitive environment, individuals can obtain high performance by achieving 
economies of scale to maintain a low cost (Jaworski and Kohli 1993). However, people need 
time and effort to vicariously learn from others and assimilate and apply the learnt knowledge 
for production. In this way, vicarious learning may not result in economies of scale and low 
production cost, hence low competitive advantage in the market. Similar argument has been 
found in previous literature. For instance, Jansen et al. (2006) argued that searching for 
information from external sources and experimenting with new ideas can hurt performance 
when competitive conditions become more demanding. Similarly, in our study, in a 
competitive environment, limited resources are available for learning from others and 
borrowing new ideas, resulting in a reduced impact of vicarious learning on solvers’ 
crowdsourcing performance. Therefore, we expect 
H4a: Competition intensity weakens the relationship between vicarious learning and a 
solver’s crowdsourcing performance 
In a highly competitive environment, suppliers in the market can produce similar solutions 
for customers (Jaworski and Kohli 1993). In order to compete, suppliers will have intense 
pressures to produce the solution in a more efficient way and reduce costs (Matusik and Hill 
1998). Individuals can learn from their experiences to achieve scale of economies and 
efficiency. Hence, they can better cater to existing customers and cultivate customer loyalty. 
This may enhance their performance in competitive environments (Jansen et al. 2006).  
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Similarly, in the context of our study, individual solvers may benefit more from 
experiential learning to achieve efficiency and lower the cost of providing solutions in a 
competitive environment. Therefore, we expect 
H4b: Competition intensity strengthens the relationship between experiential learning and a 
solver’s crowdsourcing performance 
4.3.5 Prior Experience 
Prior experience includes previous knowledge and skills that can be applied to current task 
contexts (Dokko et al. 2009). With greater prior experience, individuals can identify more 
relevant information and will be more likely to extract knowledge and skills from previous 
actions (Cohen and Levinthal 1990). The knowledge and skills extracted from prior 
experience can improve the performance of solving similar tasks.  
Further, greater prior experience allows individuals to be aware of important 
information for solving particular tasks. With more information regarding the outcomes 
extracted from prior experience, individuals can learn from their own experience and extract 
knowledge and skills for better performance (Boh et al. 2007). In the context of 
crowdsourcing, greater prior experience will provide solvers a higher opportunity to learn 
from past outcomes and perform similar tasks better (Bayus 2010). Conversely, with less 
prior experience, solvers may have limited information about previous outcomes and cannot 
accurately extract the knowledge and skills required for successfully addressing similar tasks 
in future. Solvers will have to explore and acquire relevant knowledge before they can 
perform task solving. Therefore, we hypothesize 
H5a: Prior experience strengthens the relationship between experiential learning and a 
solver’s crowdsourcing performance 
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Previous literature also suggests that prior experience provides individuals with the 
background and schema necessary to sift through the large amounts of information and 
knowledge related to a task and increases their ability to store new knowledge into their 
memory for future recall and application (e.g., Cohen and Levinthal 1990). Relevant 
background information allows them to quickly search for learning objects and helps them 
decipher why the learning objects succeed and understand how to obtain similar outcomes.  
Further, prior experience serves as a knowledge base for individuals to learn new 
knowledge from external environments (Cohen and Levinthal 1990; Lichtenthaler 2009). It 
provides individuals with a schema to acquire new knowledge, helps them assimilate the 
newly learnt knowledge, and allows them to apply it in their performance (Lichtenthaler 
2009). Thus, prior experience provides a base for individuals to effectively learn from others. 
With greater prior experience, individuals are provided with sufficient information regarding 
others’ past outcomes and are more likely to effectively learn from them and apply newly 
learnt knowledge for better performance (Bresman 2010). Conversely, with less prior 
experience, individuals may lack necessary knowledge and skills to identify knowledge for 
others’ success, assimilate the knowledge, and apply it for performance. Limited prior 
experience may lead individuals to superstitiously learn from others, which will hurt 
performance (Denrell 2003; Levinthal and March 1993). Similarly, Shane (2000) argued that 
prior experience provides individuals the knowledge and schema to learn from others and 
identify opportunities for new businesses.  
In the context of crowdsourcing, greater prior experience should provide solvers with 
sufficient relevant information for learning from external sources and applying the newly 
learnt knowledge in performance. Conversely, limited prior experience may lead solvers to 
have limited knowledge to guide future behaviors and to myopically learn from others’ 
behaviors, resulting in a poor performance. Therefore, we expect 
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H5b: Prior experience strengthens the relationship between vicarious learning and a solver’s 
crowdsourcing performance 
4.4 Research Methodology 
Survey methodology was employed to test the research model. Survey methodology is 
chosen as a basis for establishing generalizability, allowing replicability, and having 
statistical power (Neuman 2005). To reduce the possibility of common method variance 
caused by a single data source (Podsakoff et al. 2003), the survey data was supplemented by 
collecting objective data for the dependent variable from the corresponding platform and 
using archival data for analysis. Additionally, to better assess the causality between surveyed 
constructs and the dependent variable, we collected the archival data for the dependent 
variable (the number of winning submissions) three months after the survey. 
4.4.1 Instrument Development and Conceptual Validation 
Since several constructs in the model were adapted to the study context and items for other 
constructs needed to be developed from scratch, we conducted a systematic procedure of 
instrument development (DeVellis 2003). There are three stages in instrument development, 
i.e., item creation and scale development, conceptual validation, and instrument testing. In the 
item creation and scale development stage, pools of items for each construct are created by 
first examining existing instruments or creating new items according to their definitions. In 
the conceptual validation stage, the unlabelled and labeled sorting exercises are conducted to 
assess the construct validity of the scales developed and to identify any potential ambiguity in 
items. According to the judges’ feedback in the sorting exercises, the items are refined. In the 
instrument testing stage, the instrument is further refined through a pilot test. A pilot test is 
useful to obtain an indication of the scales’ reliability and to identify any potential problems 
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in the instrument, as indicated by the respondents. In the pilot test, the various scales are put 
together into an overall instrument. 
In this study, items for some constructs were generated based on existing scales if 
available. New items were created through interviews with solvers, or according to its 
definition. The construct definitions are shown in Table 4.1. All items for each construct were 
validated through the unlabelled and labeled sorting exercises in which two sets of four 
judges were used. Inter-judge agreement (i.e., Cohen’s Kappa and agreement level) and item 
placement hit ratio were used to assess the level of conceptual reliability and validity.  
Table 4.1. Definitions of Constructs in the Proposed Model for Study 3 
Constructs  Definition  Source  
Experiential 
Learning 
The extent to which individuals learn  from real-time 




Vicarious Learning  The extent to which individuals indirectly learn by 





The extent to which competition among solvers is intense 
Adapted from 
Jaworski and 
Kohli (1993) Environmental 
Dynamism 
The rate of change and the degree of instability of the task 
requirements 
Prior Experience The extent of knowledge and skills that can be applied to 
the context of current tasks 









The results for unlabelled and labeled sorting are shown in Tables A.1, A.4, and A.7 
in Appendix A. We found that in both rounds of item sorting, the instrument has high Kappa 
score, agreement level, and hit ratio. Kappa score, agreement level, and hit ratio for all rounds 
are greater than 0.8. The results suggest sufficient item reliability and validity (Jarvenpaa 
1998). The validated items were then put together into an overall questionnaire and tested in 
the pilot study, which will be discussed next. 
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4.4.2 Pilot Study 
A pilot study was conducted to assess the reliability and validity of the items and to 
identify any potential problems in the instrument as indicated by the respondents. We pilot 
tested the instrument in zhubajie.com, a similar but smaller crowdsourcing website as our 
main study site TaskCN. For the pilot test, we surveyed 106 solvers in zhubajie.com. We 
edited item wording in the instrument according to the feedback from the pilot test and follow 
up interviews. The final instrument is shown in Table 4.2. The results for pilot study were 
shown in Tables B.2, B.5, and B.9 in Appendix B. The final instrument is shown in Table 4.2. 
Table 4.2. Items of Constructs in the Proposed Model for Study 3 
Constructs  Items  Source  
Experiential 
Learning 
EXP1: I usually summarize my prior experience for new knowledge 
EXP2: I often try to find new knowledge from my experience in solving 
previous tasks 
EXP3: I usually classify and sort out my previous experience to prepare 
for new tasks 






VIC1: I usually try to learn useful skills, knowledge, or creative design 
concepts from others 
VIC2: I usually try to learn useful knowledge from somewhere else 
VIC3: I will take others’ good work for reference in my own work 
VIC4: I usually try to learn new skills, knowledge, and creative design 
concepts from different channels 
Competition 
Intensity 
COM1: More and More professional peers come to the website 
COM2: I feel there are an increasing number of peers participating in 
task submission 
COM3: Each task has many competitors to solve it 
COM4: Competition in  the website is intense 
Adapted from 






ENV1: Task requirements change a lot across time 
ENV2: Task requirements change considerably over time 
ENV3: Changes in seeker’ requirements in  the website are high 
ENV4: Task requirement changes intensively across time 
Prior 
Experience 




The number of winning submissions in three months after the survey Jeppesen and 
Lakhani 
(2010) 
4.4.3 The Main Study 
We collected the survey data from solvers in TaskCN and archival data from this website to 
test our model. TaskCN is considered as one of the most popular and established 
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crowdsourcing websites in China. By the end of November 2012, TaskCN has over 3.3 
million registered solvers and over 52 thousand tasks
11
. This website has received media 
coverage in China as well as IS researchers’ attention (e.g., Yang et al. 2009; Sun et al. 2012). 
Around 1000 solvers are online per hour. The selection of this platform allows us a sufficient 
large pool of solvers to test our models. The existence of previous studies on this platform 
allows for comparisons and cumulation of research in this area.  
Following Sun et al. (2012)’s procedure, we invited solvers in TaskCN to participate 
in our survey by sending emails to them through the internal message tool. As a token of 
appreciation for their participation, a $10 voucher was given to respondents. A total of 165 
responses were received of which 159 valid responses remained after removing incomplete 
and duplicate data. For the dependent variable (solver’s performance in crowdsourcing), we 
measured it with the number of winning submissions in three months after the survey. 
4.4.4 Control variables 
We also include the demographic variables of solvers as controls in the model, which may 
affect solvers’ performance in crowdsourcing. These demographic variables include solvers’ 
age, gender, education, and tenure in the crowdsourcing website. Also, the type of tasks and 
status of solvers may affect their performance in crowdsourcing. The type of tasks was 
measured as dummy variables. Status of solvers refers to whether solvers are professionals or 
amateurs. Professional solvers who consider solving tasks in TaskCN as a career are more 
likely to actively participate in crowdsourcing and outperform the amateur solvers. We also 
include the increased number of submissions in the three months as control, i.e., increased 
submission. It is expected that the more they submit, the more likely they win. 





4.5 Data Analysis and Results 
For this study, structural equation modeling (SEM) analysis was chosen over linear 
regression, because SEM can simultaneously analyze all paths with latent variables in one 
analysis (Gefen et al. 2011). Within SEM, Partial Least Squares (PLS) was chosen over co-
variance based SEM for two reasons. First, the dependent variable (solvers’ performance in 
crowdsourcing) is measured with archival data, which may not conform to the proportionality 
constraints and uncorrelated measurement errors of co-variance based SEM (Gefen et al. 
2011). Thus, co-variance based SEM may not be an appropriate method to analyze secondary 
or archival data. Second, PLS is a suitable choice for the model with moderating effects (i.e., 
H3a, H3b, H4a, H4b, H5a, and H5b) as in our model (Gefen et al. 2011; Wetzels et al. 2009). 
Interaction terms were computed by cross-multiplying the standardized items of the relevant 
constructs (Wetzels et al. 2009). We used SmartPLS 2.0 to analyze the data. 
Table 4.3. Demographic Information for Study 3 
Demographic Variables Frequency (N=159) Percentage (%) 
Gender 
Male  108  67.92  
Female  51  32.08  
Age 
16-20  19  11.95 
21-25  89  55.97 
26-30  30  18.87 
31-35  12  7.55 
35-40  5  3.14 
> 40  4  2.52 
Education 
Level 
High school  19  11.95 
Bachelor  126  79.25 
Master  9  5.66 
Doctorate  5  3.14 
Tenure 
(Months) 
3-6 19 11.95 
6-9 34 21.38 
9-12 22 13.84 
>12 84 52.83 
Status  
 
Amateur  125  78.62  
Professional  34  21.38  
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Task Type Website design and programming 25  15.72  
Logo, benchmark, and product outlook 
design 44  27.67  
Writing and translation 48 30.19  
Laborious tasks  27 16.98 
Others 18 11.32 
Increased 
Submission 
0-2 84 52.83 
3-5 30 18.87 
6-8 15 9.43 
>8 30 18.87 
The demographic information about the respondents is listed in Table 4.3. Since a 
web-based survey design may suffer from non-response bias (Roztocki 2001), we tested for 
such bias by comparing the early and late respondents (Armstrong and Overton 1977). T-tests 
of the differences between the earliest 10% respondents and the last 10% respondents in 
terms of demographics revealed no systematic differences (see Table C.2 in Appendix C). 
Thus, non-response bias is not expected in this study. 
4.5.1 Instrument Validity 
To validate our instrument, convergent and discriminant validities were tested (Hair et al. 
2006). We assessed convergent validity by examining the Cronbach’s α (CA) (>0.7), 
composite reliability (>0.7), average variance extracted (AVE) (>0.5), and factor analysis 
results (Straub et al. 2004).  
As the results show in Table 4.4, the factor loading of each item was found to be 
larger than 0.7 on its own construct. In addition, Table 4.5 shows the CA, CR and AVE for 
each construct in the model. In Table 4.5, all the values for CA and CR are greater than 0.7 
and the values for AVE are greater than 0.5, satisfying the criteria suggested by Straub et al. 
(2004). These results demonstrated sufficient convergent validity for all constructs. 
Discriminant validity was assessed by examining the indicator-factor loadings and comparing 
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AVEs with inter-construct correlations (Gefen and Straub 2005). The results in Table 4.4 
show that all indicators load more strongly on their corresponding constructs than on other 
constructs in the model and loadings on unintended constructs are less than 0.4. Further, all 
constructs extracted have Eigen values greater than 1. Also, the square root of AVE is larger 
than the inter-construct correlations in Table 4.5. Overall, the results demonstrated sufficient 
discriminant validity of all constructs.  
Table 4.4. Exploratory Factor Analysis for Study 3 
 1 2 3 4 
EXP1 0.10 0.08 0.75 0.13 
EXP2 0.17 0.13 0.80 0.05 
EXP3 0.16 0.06 0.85 -0.02 
EXP4 0.09 0.06 0.93 0.06 
VIC1 0.87 0.05 0.09 -0.16 
VIC2 0.85 0.07 0.22 -0.07 
VIC3 0.82 0.03 0.12 -0.15 
VIC4 0.89 0.00 0.10 -0.06 
ENV1 -0.08 0.37 0.03 0.87 
ENV2 -0.11 0.38 0.00 0.91 
ENV3 -0.11 0.39 0.12 0.91 
ENV4 -0.14 0.38 0.06 0.91 
COM1 0.05 0.76 0.13 0.28 
COM2 -0.04 0.81 -0.07 0.37 
COM3 0.06 0.85 0.11 0.38 
COM4 0.07 0.83 0.16 0.34 
Eigenvalue 5.40 3.21 2.57 1.77 
% of variance 30.00 17.81 14.27 9.81 
Cumulative % 30.00 47.81 62.08 71.89 
 
Since we collected data for our independent variables and dependent variable from 
two independent sources, common method variance should not be an issue in our study 
(Podsakoff et al. 2003). Nevertheless, Harman’s single factor test was conducted by running 
an exploratory factor with all variables included (Podsakoff et al. 2003). The factor analyses 
produced neither a single factor nor one general factor that accounted for the majority of the 
variance (>50%), suggesting that common method bias is not a problem in this study.
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Table 4.5. Descriptive Statistics and Correlations for Study 3 
 
Mean STD Min Max CA CR AVE COM ENV EXP PERF VIC Age Edu Gender PEX Status Tenure SUB 
COM 5.40 0.74 3.5 7 0.87 0.90 0.71 0.84 
          
 
ENV 4.32 1.473 1 7 0.84 0.90 0.75 0.14 0.87 
         
 




        
 
PERF 2.56 5.59 0 32 - - - -0.10 0.09 0.32 - 
       
 
VIC 5.45 1.18 2.4 7 0.89 0.92 0.73 0.09 0.04 0.42 0.23 0.85 
      
 









     
 







    
 






0.09 0.04 - 
   
 
PEX 32.36 79.66 0 53 - - - -0.15 
-
0.04 
0.14 0.17 0.17 0.20 0.10 0.11 - 
  
 
Status 0.34 0.73 0 1 - - - -0.15 
-
0.07 
0.19 0.12 0.16 0.13 0.09 -0.12 0.09 - 
 
 






0.26 0.16 0.10 0.45 0.09 - 
 
SUB 7.25  13.32  0 64 - - - -0.05 0.07 0.35 0.41 0.23 0.23 0.06 0.09 0.41 0.23 0.22 - 
Notes 
ENV= Environmental dynamism, EXP= Experiential learning, PERF = the Increased number of winning tasks, PEX= Prior Experience, VIC=Vicarious learning, 
COM= Competition Intensity, AUT= Work Autonomy, Edu= Education level, SUB= Increased Submission, CA=Cronbach’s α, CR= Composite Reliability, 
AVE= Average Variance Extracted 
- Excluded in terms of FNP single measure 
+     Diagonal elements are the square root of AVE 
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4.5.2 Results of Hypotheses Testing 
Table 4.6 shows the results of hypotheses testing. The model explains 45% of the variance in 
solvers’ crowdsourcing performance. According to Ringle et al. (2012), a study that uses PLS to 
analyze the data should report the structural model evaluation criteria, i.e., Cohen’s effect size ƒ2 , 
which allows researchers to evaluate the independent variable’s incremental explanation of a 
dependent variable. Following Chin et al. (2003), we calculated the Cohen’s effect size of the 
model. The interaction model has a large effect size ƒ2 of 0.36 while the main model has a small 
to medium effect size ƒ2 of 0.13, according to Cohen (1988)12. This suggests that our model has a 
good predictive capability. We also conducted incremental F test of the R
2
 change. The results in 
Table 4.6 suggest that independent variables and interaction terms have unique contributions in 
explaining the variance in the dependent variable, i.e., solvers’ crowdsourcing performance 
(F1=9.49, p<0.001; F2=5.48, p<0.001). Table 4.6 also shows that only increased submission 
positively impacts solvers’ performance in crowdsourcing. This is reasonable since the more 
solvers participated in task solving, the more likely they will win. 
As hypothesized, vicarious learning and experiential learning positively affect solvers’ 
performance in crowdsourcing (H1 and H2 supported). As proposed, environmental dynamism 
positively moderates the relationship between vicarious learning and solvers’ crowdsourcing 
performance but negatively moderates the relationship between experiential learning and solvers’ 
crowdsourcing performance (H3a and H3b supported). Further, prior experience positively 
moderates the relationship between vicarious learning and solvers’ crowdsourcing performance 
and the relationship between experiential learning and solvers’ crowdsourcing performance, thus 
providing support for H5a, and H5b.  
                                                          




Table 4.6. Results of Hypotheses Testing for Study 3 









Age -0.07* -0.09* 0.03 N.S. 
Gender -0.09 -0.13 -0.04 N.S. 
Education 0.01 -0.01 -0.04 N.S. 
Tenure (Months) 0.03 0.01 0.03 N.S. 
Website Design and 
Programming  
0.01 0.02 0.01 N.S. 
Logo Design 0.04 0.05 0.03 N.S. 
Writing and Translation 0.03 0.01 0.02 N.S. 
Laborious Tasks  -0.10 -0.05 -0.04 N.S. 
Status  -0.11 0.01 0.05 N.S. 
Increased Submission 0.47*** 0.40*** 0.28* Significant 
Experiential Learning (EXP)  0.11*** 0.19** H1 Supported 
Vicarious Learning (VIC)  0.13*** 0.32*** H2 Supported 
Environmental Dynamism 
(ENV) 
  0.12 - 
ENV * VIC   0.10* H3a Supported 
ENV *  EXP   -0.11* H3b Supported 
Competition Intensity (COM)   -0.16 - 
COM * VIC   -0.10* H4a Supported 
COM * EXP   -0.08 H4b not 
Supported 
Prior Experience (PEX)   -0.27 - 
PEX * EXP   0.13* H5a Supported 
PEX * VIC   0.40** H5b Supported 
R
2
 0.15 0.25 0.45  
Effect Size ƒ2  0.13 0.36  
∆R2 (F –Value)  0.10 
(9.49)*** 
0.20(5.48)***  
Number of observations 159 
*p <0.05; **p <0.01; ***p <0.001  
In addition, competition intensity was found to negatively moderate the relationship 
between vicarious learning and solvers’ crowdsourcing performance (H4a supported). Contrary 
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to our prediction, competition intensity does not impact the relationship between experiential 
learning and solvers’ crowdsourcing performance (H4b not supported). Overall, 7 out of the 8 
model hypotheses were supported. 
4.6 Discussion and Implications 
With the emergence of new Internet based technologies, individuals are increasingly empowered 
to participate in organizational task solving through crowdsourcing platforms. Solvers’ 
performance is key to the value that seeker firms obtain from these platforms while their learning 
can impact their performance in crowdsourcing. Previous literature suggests that solvers can 
potentially learn to improve their quality of solutions and their performance in crowdsourcing 
(e.g., Archak and Ghose 2010). However, few studies have investigated how solvers learn in 
crowdsourcing platforms and how this impacts their performance. Further, considerable 
ambiguity remains in the contingencies under which a favorable outcome is obtained through 
learning. Therefore, researchers and practitioners are interested to understand how solvers learn 
and perform (Howe 2008).  
Based on performance outcome learning theory and relevant previous literature, this 
study developed a model to explain solvers’ performance in crowdsourcing, i.e., the influences 
of vicarious and experiential learning on performance. Also, we examined the moderating effects 
of external environmental conditions (i.e., environmental dynamism and competition intensity) 
and prior experience on the effectiveness of vicarious and experiential learning. We found that 
vicarious learning and experiential learning are significantly related to solvers’ performance in 
crowdsourcing. Also, we found that prior experience positively moderates the influences of 
experiential learning and vicarious learning on solvers’ performance in crowdsourcing. 
Environmental dynamism negatively moderates the influence of experiential learning on solvers’ 
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performance but positively moderates the influence of vicarious learning on solvers’ 
performance. In addition, competition intensity was found to negatively moderate the influence 
of vicarious learning on solvers’ performance.  
Contrary to our prediction, competition intensity was found to have no impact on the 
influence of experiential learning on solvers’ performance in crowdsourcing. This could be 
because although learning from experience can increase the efficiency and reduce costs of task 
performance, other peers in the competitive platform could also learn the necessary skills and 
produce solutions with similar costs. Another possible explanation for the deviant finding could 
result from the duration of competitive intensity. If there is long-term intense competition, 
solvers may find that they are trapped in an endless improvement of skills for a particular type of 
task without any improvement in performance. Therefore, the variation in competition intensity 
may not affect the influence of experiential learning on solvers’ crowdsourcing performance.  
4.6.1 Limitations and Future Research 
The findings of this study should be interpreted in light of its limitations. First, our study is 
restricted in its ability to make broad generalizations by studying one crowdsourcing platform 
i.e., TaskCN, in which users participate in tasks like logo design or software design. Future 
research could focus on other crowdsourcing platforms such as Innocentive (e.g., Jeppesen and 
Lakhani 2010) to test if similar results hold. For example, in Innocentive, more creativity and 
expertise may be needed to solve tasks. This will require solvers to have very specialized skills 
that need much formal education or training. Learning may be arduous for solving such highly 
complex and specialized problems. Future study will explore the influences of task 
characteristics on the learning effectiveness. 
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Second, while this paper examined the influences of vicarious learning and experiential 
learning on solvers’ performance in crowdsourcing, future work can explore the process of 
solvers’ task solving and performance in crowdsourcing. For instance, researchers can 
investigate the factors that influence the process of task solving and cause different levels of 
performance in crowdsourcing. Another avenue is to apply a different perspective to explore the 
influence of various antecedents on solvers’ performance. Researchers may explore the 
influences of relational networks among solvers on their performance. Specifically, researchers 
could draw on network theory (e.g., Burt 1992; Granovetter 1973) to examine the effects of 
network structures such as centrality, structural holes, and tie strengths on solvers’ performance. 
Third, this study explored the moderating effects of environmental dynamism, 
competition intensity, and prior experience on solvers’ performance based on performance 
outcome learning theory. Future research can examine other moderators of solvers’ performance 
in crowdsourcing, e.g., awareness of past experience, experience relevance, and visibility of 
external events. These factors may influence how well individuals can extract knowledge from 
past experience or their observations of others. Also, future research can explore how solvers can 
learn to choose different tasks to earn more money. For example, researchers can study whether 
solvers that stick to one type of task can outperform those who solve various types of tasks in 
crowdsourcing platforms. This could be useful since it can provide insights to solvers on their 
strategies in choosing task types. 
4.6.2 Theoretical Contributions 
In general, this study contributes to previous crowdsourcing literature by modeling and testing 
the influences of vicarious learning and experiential learning as well as the moderating effects of 
various contingencies on solvers’ performance in crowdsourcing. Specifically, this study 
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contributes to prior literature in several ways. First, based on performance outcome learning 
theory, this paper modeled and investigated the impacts of vicarious learning and experiential 
learning on solvers’ crowdsourcing performance. This study adds to previous literature that only 
investigated whether solvers learn in crowdsourcing (e.g., Archak and Ghose 2008; Yang et al. 
2008) by modeling and empirically validating the influences of vicarious and experiential 
learning on their performance. In addition, previous learning literature used proxy measures to 
operationalize vicarious learning and experiential learning based on secondary data such as the 
number of modification requests completed (e.g., Boh et al. 2007). This study contributes to 
previous learning literature (e.g., Kim and Miner 2007; Schwab and Miner 2008; Srinivasan et al. 
2007) by directly operationalizing and empirically measuring individual solvers’ vicarious 
learning and experiential learning with self developed and validated instruments. The instrument 
can be reused by researchers for future study. 
Second, previous crowdsourcing literature has not examined the contingencies of solvers’ 
learning in crowdsourcing. Based on previous learning literature (i.e., the symbolic cognition 
view and situated cognition view), this paper examined the moderating effects of environmental 
conditions on solvers’ performance. It found that environmental dynamism positively moderates 
the influence of vicarious learning on solvers’ performance in crowdsourcing but negatively 
moderates the influence of experiential learning on their performance. In addition, competition 
intensity was found to negatively moderate the influence of vicarious learning on solvers’ 
performance in crowdsourcing. Findings from this paper contribute to previous crowdsourcing 
literature (e.g., Howe 2008) and learning literature (e.g., Schwab and Miner 2008) by 
hypothesizing and empirically testing the moderating roles of environmental conditions on 
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solvers’ performance in crowdsourcing. The findings enrich our understanding of the conditions 
under which learning during crowdsourcing results in a better performance. 
Third, although previous literature found that prior experience is important to the learning 
effectiveness (e.g., Bayus 2010; Boh et al. 2007; Schwab and Miner 2008), the moderating effect 
of prior experience on learning has not been investigated before. This study examined the 
moderating effect of prior experience on solvers’ crowdsourcing performance. It found that prior 
experience positively moderates the influences of vicarious learning and experiential learning on 
solvers’ crowdsourcing performance. The findings contribute to previous learning literature and 
enrich our understanding of the importance of prior experience on the learning effectiveness in 
crowdsourcing. 
Fourth, this study contributes to the literature on performance outcome learning theory. 
Performance outcome learning theory has been applied to study organizational learning in 
different contexts (e.g., Schwab and Miner 2008). This study explored and extended the 
applicability of the theory in a context that is not examined by previous literature, i.e., individual 
solvers’ learning in crowdsourcing. The explanatory power and support for the model indicate 
that performance outcome learning theory is an appropriate lens to explain solvers’ performance 
in crowdsourcing. In addition, performance outcome learning theory has been examined at the 
organizational level (e.g., Minor et al. 2001), team level (e.g., Bresman 2010), project level (e.g., 
Schwab and Miner 2008), and multilevel (Boh et al. 2007). This study contributes to previous 
literature by exploring performance outcome learning mainly at the individual level.  
4.6.3 Practical Implications 
From a pragmatic perspective, this study offers insights to crowdsourcing platform 
administrators on how to cultivate a pool of skilled solvers for crowdsourcing. In contrast to 
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prior work that focused on solvers’ participation in crowdsourcing (e.g., Kaufman et al. 2011; 
Zheng et al .2011), this study modeled and empirically tested the antecedents of solvers’ 
performance in crowdsourcing. It examined the influences of vicarious and experiential learning 
on solvers’ performance in crowdsourcing as well as the contingencies of the learning 
effectiveness. Specifically, this study contributes to practice by suggesting ways to enhance 
performance through learning in crowdsourcing.  
Even though environmental dynamism and competition intensity are found to be 
important to learning, the extent to which external environmental conditions can be altered for 
the purpose of enhancing learning outcomes could be limited. It may not be a viable option for 
crowdsourcing platforms to change dynamism (which depends on firms’ requirements) and 
competition (which depends on solvers’ participation). This is also highlighted by previous 
literature which suggests that although external environment conditions may have statistically 
significant effects on behavior, their effects may not be controllable as compared to other 
variables (Jansen et al. 2006).  
A more viable approach to enhance solvers’ performance as suggested by our study is by 
improving experiential learning and vicarious learning. To enhance experiential learning, in the 
study of crowdsourcing in InnoCentive, Jeppesen and Lakhani (2010) suggested that solvers 
should undertake technically familiar tasks to solve so that they can learn from their past 
experience. Boh et al. (2007) suggested that individual developers can learn from their work 
experience in the same system and related systems to improve their productivity in software 
development. In the context of crowdsourcing, solvers can learn from their previous experience 
of solving the same type of tasks or related ones. Similarly, in the study of movie production, 
Schwab and Miner (2008) suggested that recent experience should be applied rather than the 
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experience gained from a long time ago. Also, they suggested that highly visible past success 
should be learnt rather than forgettable experiences, so that individuals can derive more useful 
information from the visible experience. In the context of crowdsourcing, solvers should tap on 
their recent experience for reference. 
For enhancing vicarious learning, Bresman (2010) suggested that inviting people from 
outside one’s work context to discuss how to avoid repeating past mistakes, talking to people 
from outside, going outside to gather information about task solving could help improve 
performance. In the context of crowdsourcing, soliciting feedback from firms and external 
people could help solvers vicariously learn to perform. Chua and Pan (2008), in their case study 
of knowledge transfer in an outsourcing project, suggested that on-the-job training, prototyping 
previous knowledge, and simulating past problems help employees to learn from experienced 
employees. In the context of crowdsourcing, solvers can learn from those solutions which have 
won rewards from firms. Further, previous studies suggest that besides the factors considered in 
experiential learning, vicarious learning can be enhanced by minimizing the knowledge distance 
between knowledge adopters and knowledge sources (e.g., Kim and Miner 2007). Information 
accessibility about learning objects should be improved to enhance individuals’ vicarious 
learning if they can obtain sufficient information to identify the cause of others’ success. In the 
context of crowdsourcing, solvers should learn from those solutions that they are familiar with 
and that are able to access and comprehend. 
To promote prior experience (the moderator that may be controllable), crowdsourcing 
platforms can encourage solvers to practice their skills by participating in solving relevant tasks. 
They could provide incentives to attract solvers to participate and reduce the costs for solvers to 
participate in crowdsourcing as suggested in Study 2. As incentives, crowdsourcing platforms 
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could provide what solvers want such as monetary rewards or enjoyment. In terms of costs, they 
could reduce cognitive effort of solvers through clearly defining problems. They could also 
protect solvers from a fair treatment by seeker firms to prevent solvers’ knowledge loss. To do so, 
they can design regulations by punishing plagiarism in crowdsourcing by peer solvers or by 
firms. Correspondingly, they can invite solvers to report any plagiarism cases encountered in 
crowdsourcing. Also, they could design policies to protect solvers’ intellectual property from 









Solvers and seekers are key stakeholders in the crowdsourcing strategy. Their participation 
determines the success of crowdsourcing platforms. Considering the importance of seeker firms’ 
participation in crowdsourcing to the survival of crowdsourcing platforms, the importance of 
solvers’ participation to its and seekers’ profitability, and the importance of solvers’ performance 
in attracting seeker firms to crowdsource their tasks to crowdsourcing platforms, practitioners 
have expressed substantial concerns about attracting firms to crowdsource (e.g., Doan et al. 
2011), encouraging solvers’ participation in crowdsourcing (e.g., Kaufman et al. 2011), and 
promoting solvers’ performance in crowdsourcing through learning (e.g., Yang et al. 2008). 
However, research and understanding has been lacking on what motivates firms to crowdsource, 
how firms can promote solvers’ actual participation, and how effectively solvers learn to perform 
in crowdsourcing and the contingencies of the learning effects on performance. 
To this end, this thesis developed three models to address the research gaps discussed 
above. Study 1 developed a model based on transaction cost theory, the resource based view, and 
the knowledge based view to examine drivers and inhibitors of firms’ intention to crowdsource. 
The findings indicate that cost reduction, access to specialized skills, and brand visibility 
positively affect firms’ intention to crowdsource, while proposal evaluation cost and codification 
cost reduce firms’ intention to crowdsource.  
Study 2 developed the research model based on prospect theory and previous related 
literatures to examine the influence of expected benefits and costs as well as the moderating 
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effects of trust on solvers’ participation in crowdsourcing. The findings indicate that monetary 
reward, skill enhancement, work autonomy, and enjoyment positively affect solvers’ actual 
participation in crowdsourcing, while cognitive effort deters solvers from participating in 
crowdsourcing. Further, it found that trust negatively moderates the relationships between 
cognitive effort and solvers’ participation as well as between loss of knowledge power and 
solvers’ participation in crowdsourcing.  
Study 3 developed a research model based on performance outcome learning theory and 
previous literature to examine the influences of both vicarious and experiential learning on 
solvers’ performance in crowdsourcing as well as the moderating effects of environmental 
dynamisms, competition intensity, and prior experience. The findings indicate that both vicarious 
learning and experiential learning positively affect solvers’ performance in crowdsourcing. 
Further, it found that prior experience positively moderate the influences of vicarious learning 
and experiential learning on solvers’ performance in crowdsourcing. Environmental dynamism 
positively moderates the influences of vicarious learning on solvers’ performance in 
crowdsourcing but negatively moderates the influences of experiential learning on their 
performance. In addition, competition intensity was found to negatively moderate the 
relationship between vicarious learning and solvers’ performance in crowdsourcing.  
These three studies contribute to both IS research and practice. Particularly, Study 1 
identified the antecedents of firms’ intention to crowdsource and revealed the unique antecedents 
in the context of crowdsourcing, such as brand visibility, codification cost, and proposal 
evaluation cost. This contributes to previous outsourcing literature by providing alternative 
important factors that could affect IT outsourcing decisions. Also, it contributes to the literature 
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on transaction cost theory, the resource based view, and the knowledge based view by extending 
their application to the context of crowdsourcing and refining them.  
Study 2 identified the antecedents of solvers’ actual participation in crowdsourcing 
measured by the number of tasks that solvers have participated in three months.  It contributes to 
previous literature, which has mainly studied the antecedents of solvers’ intention to participate 
in crowdsourcing. It also contributes to prior literature by exploring the influences of cost 
concerns together with benefits on solvers’ participation in crowdsourcing as well as the 
moderating effects of trust. Further, it contributes to prospect theory by extending its application 
to study the short term transactions between solvers and seekers in the context of crowdsourcing. 
Study 3 identified the influences of learning activities on solvers’ performance and the 
contingencies of the relationship. It contributes to previous literature by finding that solvers can 
experientially and vicariously learn to improve their performance in crowdsourcing while the 
learning effects depend on environmental dynamism, competition intensity, and prior experience. 
It also contributes to prior literature by modeling and empirically testing the contingencies of the 
effects of vicarious and experiential learning based on the symbolic and situated cognition view. 
Overall, the three studies in this thesis contribute by enhancing the understanding of 
crowdsourcing from both seekers and solvers perspectives. They also suggest ways in which 
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APPENDIX A. CONSTRUCT OPERATIONALIZATION 
Table A.1. Construct Labels by Judges in Unlabeled Sorting 
Constructs Judges 
1 2 3 4 



























Access to expert 
knowledge (1-4) 
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availability  (1-3) 
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knowledge (1-4) 
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Cognitive Effort 
(1-4) 





task requirement  
(1-4) 



































Trust in the 
website  
(1-4) 
Trust in the 
website 
(1-4) 
Trust in the 
website 
(1-4) Loss of 
Knowledge 
power (4) 







Learn from own 
experience (1-4) 





















































Table A.2. Inter-Judge Agreement & Cohen's Kappa for Seeker Model (Study 1) 
 Round 1 Raw 
Agreement 
Round 1 Cohen’s 
Kappa 
Round 2 Raw 
Agreement 
Round 2 Cohen’s 
Kappa 
Judges 1 and 2 0.988 0.986 1 1 
Judges 1 and 3 0.951 0.944 1 1 
Judges 1 and 4 0.951 0.944 1 1 
Judges 2 and 3 0.963 0.958 1 1 
Judges 2 and 4 0.963 0.958 1 1 
Judges 3 and 4 0.963 0.958 1 1 
Average 0.963 0.958 1 1 
 
Table A.3. Inter-Judge Agreement & Cohen's Kappa for Solvers’ Participation Model 
(Study 2) 
 Round 1 Raw 
Agreement 
Round 1 Cohen’s 
Kappa 
Round 2 Raw 
Agreement 
Round 2 Cohen’s 
Kappa 
Judges 1 and 2 0.973 0.971 0.991 0.990 
Judges 1 and 3 0.973 0.971 0.991 0.990 
Judges 1 and 4 0.973 0.971 0.991 0.990 
Judges 2 and 3 0.964 0.962 1 1 
Judges 2 and 4 0.982 0.981 1 1 
Judges 3 and 4 0.972 0.972 1 1 
Average 0.973 0.971 0.996 0.995 
 
Table A.4. Inter-Judge Agreement & Cohen's Kappa for Solvers’ Learning Model (Study 
3) 
 Round 1 Raw 
Agreement 
Round 1 Cohen’s 
Kappa 
Round 2 Raw 
Agreement 
Round 2 Cohen’s 
Kappa 
Judges 1 and 2 1 1 1 1 
Judges 1 and 3 0.872 0.811 1 1 
Judges 1 and 4 1 1 1 1 
Judges 2 and 3 0.964 0.962 1 1 
Judges 2 and 4 1 1 1 1 
Judges 3 and 4 0.882 0.815 1 1 




Table A.5. Hit Rate for Seeker Model (Study 1) 
Target 
Category 





















A   
COS 16                 16 100.00 
BRD   16 
      
  16 100.00 
ACC   
 
16 
     
  16 100.00 
DIV   
  
16 
    
  16 100.00 
INT 
    
12 
    
12 100.00 
SPE  
    
16 
  
 16 100.00 
COD   
     
16 
 
  16 100.00 
EVA   
      




Total Items: 124 
  
Table A.6. Hit Rate for Solvers’ Participation Model (Study 2) 
Target 
Category 
Actual Category Total 
Quantity 
Hit Rate (%) 
MON SKL REP REC AUT ENJ COG LOS TRU N/A   
MON 16          16 100.00 
SKL  16         16 100.00 
REP   16        16 100.00 
REC    16       16 100.00 
AUT     16      16 100.00 
ENJ      16     16 100.00 
COG       16    16 100.00 
LOS        16   16 100.00 
TRU         16  16 100.00 
Average  100.00% 










Hit Rate (%) 
EXP VIC COM ENV N/A   
EXP 16     16 100.00 
VIC  16    16 100.00 
COM   16   16 100.00 
ENV    16  16 100.00 
Average  100.00% 





APPENDIX B. PILOT STUDY RESULTS 
Table B.1. Pilot Demographic Information for Seeker Firms (Study 1) 
Demographic Variables  Frequency (N=102)  Percentage  
Firm Age (Years) 
<1 1 0.98 
1-5 47 46.08 
6-10 40 39.21 
>10 14 13.73 
Firm Size (Number of 
employees) 
<10 27 26.47 
10-50 33 32.33 
51-100 23 22.55 
>100 19 18.65 
Industry  
Advertising and Public Relationship 9 8.82 
Education 2 1.96 
Financial Service and Insurance 5 4.90 
IT service 26 25.49 
Manufacturing 17 16.67 
Retailing 12 11.76 
Traditional Service 31 30.39 
 
Table B.2. Pilot Demographic Information for Solvers (Study 2 & 3) 
Demographic variables Frequency (N=106) Percentage 
Gender 
Male 74 69.81% 
Female 32 30.19% 
Age 
16-20 8 7.55% 
21-25 60 56.60% 
26-30 24 22.64% 
31-35 12 11.32% 
36-40 0 0% 
> 40 2 1.89% 
Education Level 
Others 2 1.89% 
High school 16 15.09% 
Bachelor 86 81.13% 
Master 1 0.94% 
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Doctorate 1 0.94% 
Tenure (Months) <1 19 17.92% 
1-3 34 32.07% 
4-6 17 16.64% 
7-9 6 5.66% 
>9 30 28.30% 
 
Table B.3. Pilot Descriptive Statistics and Correlations for Seeker Model (Study 1) 
 
Mean STD Min Max CA CR COS BRD ACC DIV SPE COD EVA INT Age Size 
COS 5.97 1.08 1 7.00 0.85 0.90 0.69                   
BRD 5.65 1.15 1 7.00 0.83 0.89 0.50 0.67                 
ACC 5.99 0.99 3 7.00 0.77 0.89 0.37 0.43 0.71               
DIV 5.20 1.43 1.00 7.00 0.84 0.90 0.31 0.39 0.45 0.74             
SPE 5.22 1.69 1.00 7.00 0.90 0.86 0.32 0.37 0.32 0.24 0.67           
COD 5.36 1.51 1.00 7.00 0.94 0.96 0.28 0.22 0.50 0.41 0.41 0.89         
EVA 4.86 1.49 1.00 7.00 0.86 0.89 0.02 0.18 0.00 0.04 0.28 0.09 0.77       
INT 4.71 0.72 2 5.25 0.93 0.95 0.16 0.22 0.46 0.19 0.09 0.17 0.09 0.89     
Age 6.88 9.14 1 50 - - 0.02 0.08 0.03 0.13 0.08 0.03 0.15 0.07 -   
Size 231.31 882.40 5 8000 - - 0.02 0.13 0.02 -0.02 -0.14 -0.13 0.06 0.02 0.28 - 
Notes 
COS=Cost Reduction, BRD= Brand Visibility, ACC= Access to Specialized Skills, DIV= 
Solution Diversity, SPE= Specification Cost, COD=Codification Cost, EVA= Proposal 
Evaluation Cost, INT= Intention, Age= Firm Age, Size= Firm Size 
- CA=Cronbach’s α, CR= Composite Reliability 
- Excluded in terms of  a single measure and formative construct 
- Diagonal elements are the average variance extracted (AVE) 
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Table B.4. Pilot Descriptive Statistics and Correlations for Solvers’ Participation Model (Study 2) 
 Mean STD Min Max CA CR MON SKL REP REC ENJ AUT COG LOS TRU Participation 
MON 6.53 0.89 1 7 0.88 0.91 0.84          
SKL 5.70 1.29 1 7 0.95 0.96 0.49 0.89         
REP 5.00 1.39 1 7 0.86 0.90 0.29 0.43 0.75        
REC 5.97 1.16 1 7 0.87 0.90 0.58 0.44 0.31 0.81       
ENJ 5.25 1.20 1 7 0.80 0.87 0.33 0.27 0.34 0.40 0.63      
AUT 5.66 1.28 1 7 0.76 0.83 0.53 0.29 0.13 0.45 0.33 0.79     
COG 5.21 1.28 1 7 0.86 0.89 0.31 0.09 0.28 0.30 0.40 0.22 0.78    
LOS 3.36 1.61 1 7 0.89 0.92 -0.07 -0.04 0.05 0.10 -0.22 -0.14 0.06 0.76   
TRU 4.99 1.47 1 7 0.91 0.94 0.14 0.15 0.17 0.19 0.32 0.17 0.17 -0.25 0.79  
Participation 268.40 388.98 2 1884 - - 0.08 0.29 0.05 0.11 -0.07 0.05 -0.01 0.20 -0.24 - 
Notes 
MON= Monetary Reward, SKL= Skill Enhancement, REP= Peer Reputation, REC= Firm Recognition, ENJ= Enjoyment of Solving, AUT= Work Autonomy, 
COG= Cognitive Effort, LOS= Loss of Knowledge Power, TRU= Trust 
- CA=Cronbach’s α, CR= Composite Reliability 
- Excluded because of  a single measure of NOS 
- Diagonal elements are the square root of average variance extracted (AVE) 
 
Table B.5. Pilot Descriptive Statistics and Correlations for Solvers’ Learning Model (Study 3) 
 Mean STD Min Max CA CR EXP VIC PERF COM ENV PEX 
EXP 5.36 1.25 1 7 0.88 0.92 0.86          
VIC 5.45 1.17 2 7 0.87 0.89 -0.11 0.79       
PERF 2954.48 9467.01 0.8 67600 - - -0.16  0.06 -      
COM 5.39 0.74 3 7 0.85 0.89 0.12 0.05 0.18 0.82    
ENV 4.32 1.47 1 7 0.90 0.93 0.11 0.16 0.14 -0.10 0.85  
PEX 57.39 126.07 1 1050 - - -0.22 0.15 0.90 0.11 0.22 - 
Notes 
ENV= Environmental dynamism, EXP= Experiential learning, PERF= Solvers’ Performance in Crowdsourcing, PEX= Prior Experience, VIC=Vicarious 
learning, COM= Competition Intensity, 
- CA=Cronbach’s α, CR= Composite Reliability 
- Excluded because of single measure of PERF and PEX 
- Diagonal elements are the square root of average variance extracted (AVE) 
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Table B.6. Pilot Preliminary Exploratory Factor Analysis Results for Seeker Model (Study 1) 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
BRD1 0.13 -0.04 0.19 0.11 0.10 0.74 0.03 0.19 
BRD2 0.07 0.08 0.05 0.17 0.08 0.67 0.16 0.38 
BRD3 -0.06 0.09 0.27 0.24 0.12 0.72 0.23 0.07 
BRD4 0.15 0.05 0.26 0.03 0.12 0.79 0.05 -0.09 
COS1 0.02 0.02 0.79 0.23 0.02 0.09 -0.02 0.08 
COS2 -0.02 0.27 0.73 0.17 0.01 0.25 0.17 -0.02 
COS3 -0.08 0.15 0.71 -0.04 0.06 0.42 0.17 -0.05 
COS4 -0.03 -0.02 0.82 0.04 0.11 0.13 0.09 0.28 
ACC1 -0.13 0.10 0.19 0.22 0.07 0.13 0.24 0.72 
ACC2 -0.01 0.38 0.18 0.42 0.10 -0.08 0.03 0.74 
ACC3 -0.08 0.08 0.25 0.01 0.09 0.22 0.18 0.75 
ACC4 0.11 0.54 0.16 -0.01 0.05 0.22 0.09 0.50 
DIV1 0.10 0.35 0.23 0.06 0.10 0.13 0.74 0.04 
DIV2 -0.07 0.18 0.12 0.04 0.09 0.16 0.75 0.13 
DIV3 -0.01 0.06 0.02 0.00 0.07 0.22 0.84 0.05 
DIV4 0.12 0.22 0.16 0.16 0.03 -0.02 0.78 0.24 
SPE1 0.14 0.04 0.08 0.84 -0.02 0.06 0.05 -0.11 
SPE2 0.14 0.28 0.26 0.70 0.10 0.10 0.06 0.09 
SPE3 0.15 0.25 0.24 0.72 0.07 0.10 0.16 0.15 
SPE4 0.03 0.11 -0.05 0.79 0.01 0.19 -0.04 0.15 
COD1 0.05 0.85 0.10 0.21 0.10 0.06 0.12 0.20 
COD2 0.04 0.88 0.09 0.14 0.08 -0.02 0.16 0.10 
COD3 -0.07 0.86 0.17 0.15 0.07 0.10 0.15 0.15 
COD4 0.16 0.72 -0.15 0.33 -0.20 0.05 0.15 0.04 
EVA1 0.81 0.07 0.00 -0.02 0.08 0.20 0.06 0.03 
EVA 2 0.80 0.00 0.12 0.02 0.09 0.08 0.12 0.05 
EVA 3 0.83 0.05 -0.06 0.14 0.13 0.05 -0.04 -0.15 
EVA 4 0.76 -0.01 0.04 0.29 -0.02 0.01 -0.06 -0.20 
INT1 0.07 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.91 0.09 0.10 0.18 
INT2 0.06 0.04 0.07 -0.05 0.89 0.14 0.10 0.12 





Table B.7. Pilot Revised Exploratory Factor Analysis Results for Seeker Model (Study 1) 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 8 9 
BRD1 0.14 0.17 0.13 -0.09 0.06 0.73 0.21 0.02 
BRD2 0.08 0.02 0.17 0.04 0.02 0.66 0.43 0.16 
BRD3 -0.05 0.26 0.25 0.11 0.09 0.72 0.01 0.24 
BRD4 0.17 0.24 0.02 0.06 0.10 0.81 -0.03 0.05 
COS1 0.03 0.82 0.23 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.06 -0.03 
COS2 0.00 0.71 0.18 0.28 0.03 0.28 -0.05 0.18 
COS3 -0.06 0.68 -0.04 0.15 0.08 0.46 -0.04 0.17 
COS4 -0.02 0.84 0.04 -0.02 0.07 0.11 0.26 0.08 
ACC1 -0.10 0.24 0.08 0.18 0.17 0.12 0.73 0.27 
ACC2 0.01 0.42 0.10 0.21 0.20 -0.09 0.63 0.05 
ACC3 -0.11 0.01 0.09 0.28 0.30 0.19 0.74 0.18 
DIV1 0.10 0.35 0.23 0.06 0.10 0.13 0.04 0.76 
DIV2 -0.05 0.12 0.03 0.17 0.10 0.16 0.12 0.76 
DIV3 -0.01 0.01 0.00 0.06 0.07 0.25 0.09 0.81 
DIV4 0.11 0.14 0.17 0.24 0.00 -0.03 0.21 0.80 
SPE1 0.15 0.09 0.84 0.03 -0.03 0.05 -0.07 0.05 
SPE2 0.18 0.22 0.72 0.29 0.04 0.10 0.11 0.03 
SPE3 0.18 0.21 0.74 0.26 0.05 0.10 0.10 0.19 
SPE4 0.02 -0.06 0.81 0.07 0.02 0.18 0.17 -0.04 
COD1 0.09 0.07 0.22 0.86 0.07 0.05 0.20 0.13 
COD2 0.07 0.06 0.13 0.88 0.04 -0.02 0.12 0.14 
COD3 -0.05 0.12 0.15 0.87 0.04 0.08 0.17 0.16 
COD4 -0.03 0.10 0.09 0.87 0.03 0.03 0.13 0.15 
EVA1 0.79 0.02 0.00 0.09 0.09 0.25 0.06 0.00 
EVA 2 0.79 0.14 0.04 0.05 0.09 0.09 0.03 0.13 
EVA 3 0.81 -0.06 0.16 0.07 0.16 0.08 -0.14 -0.07 
EVA 4 0.76 0.03 0.29 0.00 0.01 0.01 -0.21 -0.03 
INT1 0.06 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.91 0.05 0.22 0.09 
INT2 0.06 0.07 -0.08 0.03 0.90 0.11 0.15 0.07 
INT3 0.02 0.05 0.08 0.07 0.93 0.05 0.07 -0.01 
Eigenvalue 9.28 4.18 2.78 2.61 1.94 1.81 1.29 1.19 
% of variance 27.28 12.28 8.17 7.66 5.70 5.33 3.78 3.51 





Table B.8. Pilot Exploratory Factor Analysis Results for Solvers’ Participation Model (Study 2) 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
MON1 0.16 -0.03 0.03 0.78 -0.05 0.13 0.16 0.17 0.28 
MON2 0.28 0.13 0.12 0.83 -0.02 0.05 0.14 0.16 0.12 
MON3 0.31 0.14 0.28 0.72 0.01 0.00 0.10 0.21 0.07 
SKL1 0.88 0.00 0.10 0.27 -0.01 0.01 0.00 0.15 0.03 
SKL2 0.88 0.07 0.13 0.11 0.02 0.00 0.24 0.10 0.07 
SKL3 0.90 0.04 0.13 0.21 0.00 -0.02 0.08 0.12 0.10 
REP1 0.09 0.02 0.77 -0.01 0.04 0.12 0.27 0.09 0.09 
REP2 0.10 0.04 0.83 0.16 -0.02 0.12 0.01 0.18 0.08 
REP3 0.10 0.13 0.79 0.17 -0.02 0.20 0.00 0.10 -0.12 
REP4 0.19 0.13 0.80 -0.02 0.16 -0.02 0.21 0.03 0.02 
REC1 0.23 0.17 0.05 0.28 0.10 0.08 0.17 0.74 0.17 
REC2 0.16 -0.09 0.40 0.17 0.10 0.12 0.17 0.70 0.03 
REC3 0.13 -0.07 0.35 0.08 0.11 0.02 0.04 0.74 0.07 
REC4 0.23 0.20 0.09 0.35 0.07 0.10 0.07 0.74 0.21 
ENJ1 0.26 -0.05 0.18 0.20 -0.11 0.13 0.72 0.16 0.24 
ENJ2 0.09 0.10 0.13 0.01 -0.13 0.19 0.78 0.15 0.15 
ENJ3 0.04 0.23 0.12 0.18 -0.14 0.15 0.72 0.29 -0.13 
ENJ4 0.11 0.11 0.13 0.10 -0.03 0.09 0.82 -0.11 0.03 
AUT1 0.07 0.01 -0.05 0.21 -0.09 0.14 0.27 0.22 0.70 
AUT2 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.15 -0.03 -0.02 0.01 0.01 0.85 
AUT3 0.08 0.06 0.13 0.18 -0.02 0.09 -0.02 0.09 0.83 
AUT4 0.10 0.20 -0.11 0.31 -0.05 -0.03 0.27 0.32 0.70 
COG1 -0.01 0.06 0.14 -0.02 0.10 0.86 0.09 0.05 0.01 
COG2 -0.03 0.14 0.12 -0.03 0.07 0.85 0.13 0.13 0.14 
COG3 0.03 0.02 0.12 0.43 0.02 0.70 0.18 0.10 -0.01 
COG4 -0.02 0.07 0.05 0.07 -0.01 0.84 0.10 -0.04 0.04 
LOS1 -0.01 -0.13 0.09 -0.04 0.90 0.06 0.03 0.07 -0.03 
LOS2 -0.03 -0.20 0.04 0.09 0.84 0.06 -0.18 0.12 -0.16 
LOS3 -0.07 -0.15 0.01 0.04 0.84 -0.05 -0.15 0.08 -0.08 
LOS4 0.06 0.00 0.04 -0.17 0.85 0.11 -0.04 -0.06 0.09 
TRU1 0.02 0.90 0.10 0.04 -0.16 0.07 0.04 0.05 0.00 
TRU2 0.12 0.82 0.09 -0.11 -0.06 0.09 0.22 -0.01 0.15 
TRU3 0.10 0.85 0.03 0.20 -0.08 0.01 0.03 0.07 -0.06 
TRU4 -0.03 0.90 0.04 -0.03 -0.18 0.14 0.07 0.05 0.03 
Eigenvalue 9.32 4.15 3.42 2.70 2.16 1.81 1.56 1.44 1.09 
% of variance 25.88 11.54 9.49 7.50 5.99 5.01 4.33 4.00 3.03 




Table B.9. Pilot Exploratory Factor Analysis Results for Solvers’ Learning Model 
(Study 3) 
 1 2 3 4 
EXP1 0.01 0.21 0.86 0.01 
EXP2 0.11 0.22 0.83 0.07 
EXP3 0.02 0.15 0.85 0.08 
EXP4 0.10 0.33 0.76 0.01 
VIC1 0.14 0.84 0.10 0.10 
VIC2 -0.02 0.70 0.33 0.03 
VIC3 0.16 0.76 0.11 0.15 
VIC4 0.17 0.82 0.23 0.00 
ENV1 0.81 0.06 0.06 -0.09 
ENV2 0.88 0.12 0.00 -0.09 
ENV3 0.86 0.16 0.12 -0.03 
ENV4 0.90 0.09 0.05 0.00 
COM1 0.12 0.01 -0.01 0.82 
COM2 -0.06 0.13 -0.03 0.88 
COM3 -0.10 -0.14 0.18 0.80 
COM4 -0.19 0.23 0.03 0.80 
Eigenvalue 5.43 3.56 2.61 2.31 
% of variance 24.67 16.17 11.85 10.50 
Cumulative % 24.67 40.84 52.69 63.19 
 
 
Table B.10. Item Revision for Main Studies 
Original Items Edited Items 
DIV1: Solutions obtained through 
crowdsourcing are diverse 
DIV1: Different solutions can be obtained 
through crowdsourcing  
COD4: It is difficult to describe our tasks to 
solvers 
COD4: It is difficult to write down what we 
need into task requirements 
MON2: Seekers will pay me for the 
submission 
MON2: I will receive monetary rewards for 
my submission 
SKL3: I can understand the problems from 
seekers’ feedback on my solution 
SKL3: Solving problems in the platform 






APPENDIX C. NON-RESPONSE BIAS TEST IN MAIN 
STUDIES 
Table C.1. Non-response Bias Test for Seekers (Study 1) 
Demographic variables (Seeker Firm)  T-value  P-value  
Firm Age (Years) 0.97 
0.34 
Firm Size (Number of employees) 1.50 0.15 
Industry  
Advertising and public relationship 1.00 0.33 
Education 1.37 0.21 
Financial Service and Insurance 0.83 0.40 
IT service 0.75 0.44 
Manufacturing -1.37 0.18 
Retailing -0.95 0.35 
Traditional Service 1.00 0.33 
 
 
Table C.2. Non-response Bias Test for Solvers (Study 2 & 3) 
Demographic variables T-value P-value 
Gender 0.10 0.99 
Age 0.92 0.37 
Education Level 0.36 0.72 
Tenure (Months) 1.50 0.15 
Status 0.91 0.38 
Task Type Web Design & Programming 1.00 0.33 
Logo, Benchmark, and 
Product Outlook 
1.27 0.26 
Writing and Translation 0.83 0.40 








APPENDIX D. COMMON METHOD BIAS ANALYSIS 
FOR STUDY 1 
 
Following Liang et al. (2007) and Wells et al. (2011)’s PLS approach, an unmeasured latent 
method construct (ULMC) was included in the structural regression model to assess common 
method bias (CMB). The analysis results are shown in Table A1. The results suggest that all 
original factor loadings (from the measurement items to the related latent construct) remained 
significant as did the hypothesized paths in the structural regression model. Only 5 of the 30 
paths from the ULMC to the measurement items were significant. The loading magnitude of 
5 significant paths was substantially smaller than the corresponding loading to the related 
latent construct. This provides further evidence that the study results were not due to CMB. 
 





























BRD1 0.84 0.71 20.13 0.03 0.00 0.52 
BRD2 0.94 0.88 18.39 -0.08 0.01 1.63 
BRD3 0.98 0.96 32.33 -0.12 0.01 2.94 
BRD4 0.64 0.41 10.37 0.21 0.04 3.01 
Cost 
Reduction 
COS1 0.84 0.71 18.13 0.00 0.00 0.06 
COS2 0.86 0.74 19.55 0.01 0.00 0.17 
COS3 0.92 0.85 31.82 -0.01 0.00 1.65 




ACC1 0.54 0.29 4.13 0.14 0.02 1.16 
ACC2 0.97 0.94 17.91 -0.16 0.03 2.61 
ACC3 0.91 0.83 21.82 -0.04 0.00 0.64 
Solution 
Diversity 
DIV1 0.81 0.66 13.58 0.02 0.00 0.36 
DIV2 0.79 0.62 13.51 0.06 0.00 0.92 
DIV3 0.92 0.85 18.29 -0.05 0.00 0.79 
DIV4 0.81 0.66 13.61 -0.03 0.00 0.48 
Specification 
Cost 
SPE1 0.91 0.83 25.82 -0.13 0.02 2.73 
SPE2 0.78 0.61 14.52 0.08 0.01 1.53 
SPE3 0.79 0.62 15.18 0.12 0.01 2.30 






EVA1 0.80 0.64 21.25 -0.05 0.00 0.99 
EVA2 0.86 0.74 32.81 0.03 0.00 0.71 
EVA3 0.84 0.71 27.39 0.01 0.00 0.06 
EVA4 0.82 0.67 25.52 0.01 0.00 0.26 
Codification 
Cost 
COD1 0.91 0.83 47.48 -0.07 0.00 0.45 
COD2 0.92 0.85 41.06 0.06 0.00 0.53 
COD3 0.88 0.77 31.79 -0.02 0.00 1.54 
COD4 0.76 0.58 14.17 0.01 0.00 1.25 
Intention to 
Crowdsource 
INT1 0.93 0.86 28.02 -0.03 0.00 0.88 
INT2 0.91 0.83 39.31 0.05 0.00 1.66 
INT3 0.94 0.88 31.41 -0.02 0.00 0.51 
 
 
